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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis presents a study of innovation that focuses on the promotion of art as a 
force of genuine invention and the unfolding of a much-desired ability to profit from 
this development.  
 
Innovation lies at the heart of contested and divergent views on the role of artistic 
critique and the creation of value so pervasive in recent economic development, not 
least in the light of the financial crisis that erupted in 2007. This research connects to 
and builds upon an increasing engagement within economic sociology and social theory 
with the intermingling between art and business, or how art has come into view as a 
source of change. It takes experimental filmmaking and design methods associated with 
the European artistic avant-garde and anti-capitalistic critique as empirical examples. In 
doing so, this thesis explores an inclusive logic of differentiation centring on how ‘anti-
capitalist’ critique feeds into processes of valuation, and explores how innovation 
practice benefits from the realities that it also excludes.  
 
The thesis draws together insights from two ethnographic studies of innovation in 
which artistic critique is translated into tools of innovation. In doing so, it explores the 
way in which artistic critique suspends, provokes and tests ‘realities’ that might stand as 
sources of knowledge for the purpose of business innovation. It makes the key 
argument that art and business exist in differential relations in which the principles and 
values associated with art and business coexist in multiple combinations, which are 
intimately bound up with new sites of action, such as the formation of camps, labs and 
studio workshops. Drawing attention to how such differential relations between art and 
business are becoming central to the construction of contemporary economies, this 
thesis makes a critical contribution to innovation studies expanding its vocabulary and, 
at the same time, its empirical field.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Last autumn Elizabeth Price’s video installation called Choir was running at the New 
Museum in New York. The 15-minute video brings together a range of visual and 
disparate material to reflect on spaces of assembly and performance. The photographs 
and film footage capture visuals that together sketch out the space of an ecclesiastical 
auditorium. A flow of images of black and white reproductions of leaf-shaped trefoils, 
flame-shaped ogees and profane wooden carvings direct our attention to church motifs. 
Images from the destruction of Manchester’s Woolworths store by fire in 1979 are 
included in the montage, which runs alongside scrolling captions which say: ‘This is the 
choir/also known as the quire.’ Then the flow is interrupted by pop-music and an 
explosive montage starts rolling in red colour: from recordings of dance floors, female 
limbs, marble foliage and miniskirts to a shouting activist who chants ‘We know’ into a 
microphone around eighty times. The sound-track includes tambourines and ecstatic 
handclaps and evokes associations with the 1960’s wall-of-sound Girl Groups. This 
performance is again interrupted, this time by visuals of defunct and broken objects, 
including utensils, gothic stalls, ornaments and empty coffins before coming to rest on 
the animated twisted wrist of a figurative sarcophagus. 
 
       
Figure 1: Stills from Elizabeth Price, Choir, 2011, HD Video, courtesy the artist and MOT International. 
 
Despite the fragmented nature of the installation and its seeming attempt to escape any 
predefined interpretation or to impose upon the viewer a functional meaning, it seems 
to express a certain kind of artistic critique. Combining institutional and bureaucratic 
features with the complex relationships between commodity, culture and history, Price’s 
works create what Giulia Smith (2011) has called ‘a pornography of the inert’. In this 
installation the darkness from the archival images overshadows those of colourful pop-
culture. The chant ‘We Know’ is interrupted by fragments of old BBC footage of the 
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Woolworths fire, with the interviewed witnesses again acting as a kind of chorus, 
describing and interpreting the events. At this stage, it becomes apparent that the joyful 
coloured dance composes a surface that covers a deeper or darker historical 
heritage. The slick surfaces immortalized in the black and white close-ups draw an 
analogy with advertisement and commodity fetishism. The first montage of the 
installation ends in anticipation of the second: tomb effigies of petrified cavaliers 
holding their swords half out of the scabbards are displayed. In the portrait of the choir 
this relation is made explicit, embodying a kind of spatial performance. 
 
Moving from the artistic installation staged inside the museum to the streets of New 
York, just a few blocks away, I encountered yet another collective assembly. In Zuccotti 
Park close to the New York Stock Exchange occupants had settled to demonstrate 
against the neoliberal economic system. Hundreds of people were gathered with signs 
saying, ‘Healthcare not Wealthfare’, ‘People before Profit’, and singing statistical 
numbers showing the increasing unemployment rate in the U.S. Some demonstrators 
had painted their faces like zombies and were eating false dollar bills.  
 
            
Figure 2: Photographic documentation from Occupy Wall Street, Oct 2011, New York 
 
 
The event set out to provoke in an attempt to portray the bankers as criminals. One 
sign read: ‘If corporations are people, why can’t we put them in jail?’ ‘Bankers’ were held 
responsible for the financial crisis, which erupted in the summer of 2007, and its 
consequences, such as cuts in public welfare and increased social inequality. 
Furthermore, bankers were accused of doing business that was abstracted from society 
only for the sake of profit-making – a division in which traders come to be considered 
gamblers. The distinction between capital and the social world was suddenly turned 
upside-down.   
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The Occupy Wall Street movement occupied a large territory in the heart of 
Manhattan’s financial district, but it also did something else – it constructed a space for 
itself. The encampment of the protesters by reporters, photographers, tourists and most 
of all police constituted an assembly in a style similar to the way in which Price wants us 
to perceive of the choir, the auditorium and its construction of space. 
 
Walking through the crowd gathered in Zuccotti Park, it seemed as if artistic practice 
had moved from inside the walls of the museum to outside the walls of the NY stock 
exchange. The writings of Paolo Virno – a figurehead for the Italian neo-Marxist 
movement – were in the back of my mind as I viewed the occupation, showing how 
everything tends to become performative. The protestors needed an audience to show 
their action, just as dancers, play-actors or musicians ‘need the presence of others before 
whom they can appear’ (Virno, 2004, p. 53).  
 
To date the figure of the artist is one of the most prominent in representations of social 
critique – not least against a capitalistic or neoliberal world. Seeing Price’s installation in 
connection with the event of Occupy Wall Street, the performance of space is brought 
into concert with labour, value and production. Price’s installation stages an imaginary 
scenario, a sardonic or provocative performance, which turns a dark post-human space 
into a critique of pop-culture and consumerism. This critique already presumes a range 
of conclusions framed by the incompatible nature of artistic critique and a capitalist 
world-order that alienates, calculates, rationalises, limits and orders the untamed, 
imaginary and intuitive forces of art. 
 
As part of an economic sociology course at Columbia University, I was reading Luc 
Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s book The New Spirit of Capitalism (1999) just at the same 
time as the Occupy Wall Street movement had settled into Zuccotti Park. Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s book is a highly influential account which proposes that ‘artistic critique’ has 
entered into a dynamic relation with capitalism. Their thesis departs from the mass 
revolt against the Gaullist regime in France in May 1968 that targeted the 
dehumanization of the capitalist sphere based on the demands of freedom, autonomy 
and authenticity, widely thought to be typical of artistic practice. In their account, artistic 
critique is separated from the issues addressed by social critique such as solidarity, 
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security and equality associated with the history of the working class movement.  
 
However, in an article called The Misfortunes of the “Artistic Critique” and of Cultural 
Employment (2011), the political-cultural thinker Maurizio Lazzarato has reacted strongly 
against the claim by Boltanski and Chiapello that artistic critique is separated from social 
critique and should come from intellectual and artistic circles (especially that of 
nineteenth-century Parisian Bohemia). Lazzarato (2011) points out that Boltanski and 
Chiapello revive the oppositional divides established between freedom and equality, and 
between sovereignty and economic integration. In their argument, the values of 
expressive creativity, fluid identity, autonomy and self-development are displayed against 
the constraints of bureaucratic discipline, bourgeois hypocrisy and consumer 
conformity. In contrast, Lazzarato suggests that it is not among the artists that the 
critique of contemporary economic activity can be found. Rather, he points to an 
‘aestheticization’ of the economy itself (Lazzarato, 2008 p. 174), saying that art and 
business are not discrete or separate spheres that stand in an oppositional relation to 
one another but instead are being brought together.  
 
In the three examples presented above, the distinction – or lack of it – between art and 
business is a contested issue, albeit that the terms are used in multiple and seemingly 
contradictory ways. By comparison, this thesis connects to and builds upon an increased 
engagement within sociology and social theory with the boundaries performed or denied 
between art and business. This includes how the relation between art and business has 
been defined or redefined in the debate on ‘the new economy’, which is also to say how 
art came into view as a source for innovation. By opening this thesis with the experience 
of Price’s art installation, the simultaneous performance outside the New York stock 
exchange, and the notion of artistic critique as it has been portrayed from within the 
academy, I present a story that focuses on the capitalization of art’s ability to construct 
new sensations and affects (Raffnsøe, 2009). In doing so, I look into the promotion of 
art as a force of genuine invention and the unfolding of a – by now – much desired 
ability to profit from this development. This is a tendency that has been explained as a 
defining feature of contemporary capitalism and its intermingling with creativity 
(Clough, 2007; Thrift, 2005). At the same time, art is also associated with sentiment, 
non-rational forces and imaginary constellations, which are sometimes held to be 
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protected from economic calculation. This dichotomy is a concern that lies at the heart 
of contested and divergent views on the role of artistic critique and the creation of value 
so pervasive in recent economic development, not least in the light of the financial 
crisis. However, in this thesis I do not attempt to fill this ‘gap’, to neglect its divide, or 
to argue that artistic critique should again be included in economic debates. Rather, I 
analyse the differential logic that underpins these wedded practices when analysed as an 
outcome of innovation processes. Three elements are drawn together in these examples 
of the relations between Price’s installation, the happening of Occupy Wall Street and 
social science: artistic techniques, performance and social change, and these three 
elements frame the aim of this thesis, which is to understand innovation as an inclusive 
logic of differentiation, centring on how the critique that art promotes feeds into and also 
define new forms of capitalist production.  
 
This study thus intervenes in the debates on the nature of contemporary capitalism and 
its relation to artistic critique. It takes innovation as its analytical object and explores 
two kinds of artistic critique within the field of design and experimental filmmaking as 
they are translated into tools of business innovation. It thus includes a range of 
ethnographic studies within innovation practice in order to reflect upon the enactment 
and experience of artistic-performative interventions. The enactment of the relation 
between art and business or the incorporation of artistic critique into the operation of 
capitalism poses some interesting questions when analysed in practice. What does an 
innovation strategy between art and business look like? What is its mode of operation? 
Is there indeed something new and disorienting about the forms of knowledge that are 
practiced? How are capacities for creativity being legitimized, how are they being 
mobilized, and with what effects? 
 
The divisions pointed out in the art installation by Price, in the political event of 
Occupy Wall Street and in economic sociology indicate a change in the way in which 
artistic practice is seen as permeating economic debates. In what follows, I present an 
overview of the academic literature on this topic, its sociological relevance and the 
questions and associated arguments that I develop throughout this thesis. I draw this 
chapter to a close by providing an overview of the thesis.  
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Differential Distinctions 
A report published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) from 2000 emphasises the capacity to innovate and alternative economic 
models as fundamental keys to global recovery from the financial crisis. Labs, camps 
and studio workshops are now organised to facilitate spaces in which such models or 
alternative solutions are invented whether in relation to public service provision, 
democratic processes, policy futures or consumer markets (cf. Mulgan and Albury, 
2003). In the UK, the Performance and Innovation Unit was established in 2002 as part 
of the British Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in an attempt to create an environment that 
would enable the invention of ‘untraditional’ economic solutions. Geoff Mulgan (2007), 
the former head of this unit, describes art as being fundamental to economic solutions. 
Such policy claims are repeated in many recent intellectual debates which share a 
commitment to change. Furthermore, in some areas of these debates artistic liberation, 
or even rebellion, is seen to offer the basis of individual authenticity, contributing to the 
ideal of self-management and the anti-hierarchical social form of the network (cf. 
Boltanski, 2002, p 6). These examples – and there are many others – serve to illustrate 
the way in which art-business relations have been opposed, denied, preserved, defended 
and reinforced, which in itself contributes to yet further dichotomies.   
 
A facilitator of one of the labs I studied commented on the prospect of a change in 
government due to the then imminent election that took place in the UK in May 2010, 
stating that: ‘If the government changes everyone will be affected… my view would be if the 
Conservatives come into power all the creative-cultural things are going to suffer badly… because it is 
just a different philosophy when it comes to culture, it’s extremely market-led’. Here, as elsewhere, a 
binary opposition is set up, one in which art is associated with liberal, intuitive and 
radical values opposed to the rational-instrumental values representative of a neo-liberal 
market system. In the western world social analysts, business executives and politicians 
have repeatedly assumed that the social world is organised around contrasting and 
incompatible categorical principles that are conventionally linked to either art or 
business: individual vs. collective, intuition vs. rationality and liberation vs. domination.  
 
The belief that these values are antagonistic continues to generate heated political 
debate. It motivates the widespread fear that the industrial logic of the market will 
contaminate the intuitive, imaginary and rebellious forces of art. In the chapter named 
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‘The Culture Industry’ in Dialectics of Enlightenment (1947), Theodor W. Adorno and Max 
Horkheimer famously argued that the commercialization of art compromises its 
autonomy. In other words, marketability dispenses the ‘purposelessness’ central to what 
they define as high-art (1947). The evaluation of pop-culture as a second rate art has 
also given rise to the parallel fear posed by Marxist critiques that art serves to enforce 
and justify prevailing political ideology and power structures (cf. Swingewood, 1986). 
The contrasts drawn between the principles associated with art and business coexist in 
multiple combinations and are used to actualise, organise and compare different 
realities. 
 
Moreover, the art-business relation is organised around a range of dichotomies evident 
in both neo-liberal paradigms and the politics of what has been associated with leftist 
thought. These traditions differ in the values they assign to the artistic critique as 
opposed to economic interests. Yet they agree on the assertion that art’s integration into 
business is based on a disjuncture marked by a radically different relationship between 
the economic and the artistic world that followed from the transition to a ‘networked’ 
society or ‘knowledge’ economy in the 1970s. This transformation has been highlighted 
by Scott Lash and John Urry (1994), among others, from a social science perspective 
and this is an aspect of the treatment of capitalism that I investigate in further detail in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. For now, suffice to note that the relation between art and 
business is by no means a simple connection. Far from being incompatible, the 
principles associated with art and business coexist in various combinations. Price’s 
installation, Occupy Wall Street and the various voices in social science are good 
indicators, but also the differentiation of art and business in innovation practices 
provides important evidence of the multiplication and diversity of the art-business 
relation. As we shall see later these divisions are also intimately bound up with new sites 
of action (such as the formation of camps, labs and workshops) in which there is no 
simple contrast or continuum of art to business.1  
 
Furthermore, as organised innovation spaces proliferate and art becomes more and 
more ingrained in business practices, critical attention has begun to be channelled into 
engagements with specific innovation practices. Here, social studies of science and 
                                                
1 A case in point is the public services labs organised by the The National Endowment for Science, 
Technology and the Arts (NESTA) that promotes art as a political undertaking, as what gives form to and 
materializes needs, the imaginary, futures, consumer tastes. 
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technology have contributed to empirical and situated accounts of innovation and 
creativity (cf. Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009). At the same time, practitioners have started 
critically assessing their innovation capacities in order to grasp and make profit from 
this call for change. Concurrently, there is growing interest in the organisation of 
innovation not as the end-product of research, but as a processual development. It is in 
this context that the notion of differentiation plays a crucial role in this thesis. The 
multiple enactments of the boundaries between art and business requires a careful 
analysis, so that the configurations which emerge from its intertwining can be 
understood. More generally, this engagement with the divisions and connections 
between art and business acknowledges the growing relevance that borders, limits, 
conflict and critique have acquired in social science, political ideas and artistic practices 
in recent years.  
 
However, while the present research is very much indebted to social science and, more 
precisely, to its emphasis on the inseparability of artistic and economic categories, it also 
engages with critical debates on economic relations and artistic practice connecting to a 
body of work across a number of interconnected sub-disciplines, including the 
philosophy of science, social studies of science and technology and critical management 
studies. The aim is to give a sense of the multiple layers, differential relations and folds 
that operationalise the relation between art and business. In doing so, I trace where and 
how different modalities of innovation are performed in and through the way in which 
particular differentiations are made to connect, blur and separate the field of art from 
that of business. Let me explain in further detail how this relation can be studied in 
practice.  
 
Firstly, I connect this investigation to the debates in economic sociology where critique 
is seen as a pre-requisite of innovation and the unfolding of new forms of capitalism. As 
Nigel Thrift (2005) notes that ‘capitalists and anti-capitalists alike often share many of 
the same tropes, of speed, flow, network, and so on…. [C]apitalist firms have taken on 
some of the language and practices of the opposition…’ (p. 4). Here, as with the earlier 
examples of assembled spaces within Price’s installation, Occupy Wall Street and in 
social science, the task is not to render the boundaries between art and business 
unstable or to prove them obsolete. Following Barry, Born and Weszkalnys (2008, p. 
26) who define innovation as introducing novelty into a particular domain and 
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transforming the being of this domain, I investigate the ways in which already acclaimed 
artistic innovations associated with the European radical avant-garde are translated into 
business strategies. Accordingly, I take as empirical examples experimental filmmaking 
and design methods, which pose a specific kind of artistic or anti-capitalistic critique 
that differentiates them from other kinds of filmmaking practices and design methods. I 
propose that they are practical examples of how artistic critique is opposed to, but also 
internal to, the field in which it operates. Handling the notion of artistic critique implies 
a two-folded research strategy. Let me define this strategy in further detail in order to 
more precisely define the notion of artistic critique and its importance for a sociological 
study of innovation practice. 
 
First of all the innovation practices observed draws upon an inherited legacy of artistic 
critique — one which is rooted in the criticism of Fordist industrialism and capitalism. 
This has been defined as a passage from avant-garde to capitalist critique through 
postmodernism into post-critique — and characterized by the emergence of two major 
registers. Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) define a ‘reformist’ imperative to reflect on and 
change the organizations that compose the ‘art world’, i.e., the marketplace for the 
exchange of cultural objects, services and knowledge, museums and galleries where 
these goods circulate, and a second more radical imperative to directly address larger 
social calls for resistance and revolt to regimes, authority, ideologies, etc. From these 
two registers the critical values that are considered somehow to infuse and validate 
critical art practice emanate. 
 
The study is based on the assertion that the somewhat normative material presented by 
writers like Boltanski and Chiapello is being absorbed and repeated by art practices as an 
attempt to situate artistic production in a larger context of capitalist production and 
market constructions, or further, to justify the values produced in artistic practices. I 
propose that the investigation of this repetition or doubling of the rhetoric of critique 
poses an interesting paradox, which challenges traditional sociological methods. It 
requires a move from critical sociology focusing on the rationalising and reductionist 
processes of capitalisation of art to a sociology of critique. As such, critique is not a 
peripheral activity imposed upon the study as an explanatory frame of reference but 
immanent to the practices of this study. Revisiting the problem of innovation within 
practices making use of artistic critique has several implications for how we are to 
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understand the empirical, ethnographic techniques, its relation to the field-site itself – to 
theory and academic writing. In the thesis, I start from the premise that I as the 
researcher constantly found myself as being both ‘opposed’ and ‘within’ the practices 
that I study. I attempt to develop an ethnographic method for turning the practices 
‘inside-out’, which includes the researcher as producer and consumer, and not simply 
observer, of innovation practice. 
 
However, the duality of critique implies more than my relation to the field – it also 
addresses the twisting and bending of relations within the field itself, such as the 
funding context, which is generated by the practice itself, and the clients, who also acts 
as tutors etc. What is othered or excluded is also within. It is the multiple layers of 
differentiation – being both within and outside, both included and excluded – that 
makes my study a matter of operating at the border. What I aim to show in the thesis is 
not a study where theory and the empirical are to be considered context and content for 
one another. Rather, this kind of practice involves a folding or doubling of the object of 
study and its analysis. Said differently, I do not have a hypothesis to prove, a specific set 
of concepts I plan to apply or a normative frame of critique. Rather, these are immanent 
to the practices I study. I find that there is a lot to explore here – a lot to ask about 
these knowledge practices. Especially I am interested in the justification of research 
methods and the ways to model the participants’ self-representation in the complex 
context of artistic creativity. The practices differentiate themselves from business in 
order to experimentally test it. My study includes the practical implications of the 
appropriation of artistic critique. I therefore include the destructive and dogmatic forces 
it entails and draw on a range of inspirations – from affect theory to literary accounts of 
Kafka (critical theory) and ethnomethodology to reach the ‘creative’ breakdowns.  
 
The attempt is to develop a framework that makes it possible to reconcile these 
seemingly antagonistic approaches – the one normative and assigning the critical task to 
the sociologist, the other concerned with sticking as closely as possible to the actions 
within the field-site itself. In order to do so I develop a topological approach to critical 
theory in order to render visible the functioning of such assemblages rather than posing 
a straightforward deterministic critique (as if I am placed outside the field-site). First of 
all, this is not a story about domination or power struggles in a Bourdieuian sense or 
about exploitation or alienation in a Marxist sense. Rather, what seems to be at stake 
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here is something much closer to an endless entanglement based upon the enactment 
and re-enactment of critique.  
 
I do not engage directly with critical sociology and its description in terms of power 
relations, which underscores the potency of mechanisms of oppression, alienation and 
domination and reduces the act of the sociologist to one of reactive critique. In all of 
this, also the role of art is under transformation and must be considered by its 
functional application more than by the Adorno and Horkheimer notion of ‘high art’, 
where art is considered independent from its application in practice and irreducible to 
processes of commodification. To sum up, artistic critique is performed simultaneously 
at a conceptual level and at the level of the empirical case. According to Boltanski and 
Chiapello (1999) the struggle for autonomy and authenticity has been neutralized by the 
pseudo-fulfilment by capitalism in the form of self-management and the capitalization 
of art and its critical potential. Considering this as too simple a divide, I draw a map of 
innovation enacted by a differential relation between art and business where the 
reformist might also be radical.  
 
That is, a critique which includes both the divides and connections produced by the 
knowledge systems and values that actors claim to adhere to without itself opposing 
such divides (Boltanski and Chiapello, 1999, p. xi). A sociology of critique emphasises 
the importance of paying attention to the justificatory operations performed by the 
people involved in order to treat the concepts associated with the art-business divide as 
lived realities rather than formal categories (Slater, 2002). Said differently, the innovation 
practices mapped out in this thesis do not prove a setting in which the distinction 
between reformist or radical critique is at stake but rather a doubling of the critique 
performed by the actors themselves – that is a doubling or folding of radical critique 
into reformist critique.   
 
This is a sociological endeavour that looks at how oppositional binaries are not only 
intertwined but also contribute to the boundary-making practice constitutive of 
capitalism and are instrumental to the making of contemporary politics. This is seen in 
the light of a move in which organisations are viewed to operate via affective 
interventions rather than totalising strategies. The aim is thus to develop an account of 
non-representational innovation (Thrift, 2008), which does not ground creation in the 
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authenticity of the individual case. In doing so, I evaluate the performative capacities of 
innovation taking the production of diverse realities as sources of innovation. In doing 
so, I compare different instances or techniques of boundary-making as performative 
highlighting their mutual implications and the differentiations they effect.  
 
Furthermore, I argue that it is crucial that the recursivity – or doubling – of the rhetoric 
of critique is not considered as a property attributed to persons, objects or the spaces 
concerned. Rather, a differential art-business relation can be seen to operate, first of all, 
as an generative strategy that can be used to characterise, categorise, organise and 
contrast various spaces, institutions, bodies, groups, activities, interactions and relations. 
Secondly, differentiation is also understood as a tool which ties the participants to 
specific political ideas, social worlds and economic relations. In this way, art-business 
relations are shown to feed back to, and contribute to, those distributed governmental 
processes and procedures out of which emerge a new set of differentiations. This 
includes considerations on the way in which academic writing plays into and intervenes 
in these practices. To put this differently, a study of the art-business relation is as much 
about acting on the boundary as it is about describing it. This thesis thus explores 
innovation as a differentially articulated innovation assemblage.  
 
Price’s installation captures a very important aspect of this thesis, namely that spatial 
technologies shape human life. This includes some consideration of the social effect of 
artistic devices applied to the study of management processes. Put differently, 
innovation techniques are not only accounted for in terms of the objects or products 
invented but also how devices shape and re-shape spaces of interaction. In recent 
science and technology studies (STS) scholarship (Callon, 2007; Muniesa and Callon, 
2007; MacKenzie, Muniesa and Sui, 2007), the market is being thought anew in light of 
the recognition that technical devices (non-humans) also operate in processes of 
innovation. However, my struggle is not to prove that technology is also social, but how 
artistic tools in themselves might be considered as techniques, which also include the 
corporeal bodies, devices and instruments that co-constitute spatial arrangements. This 
includes a reflexive ethnographic account which treats innovation not as a unitary thing, 
but as a means of developing a set of sensibilities towards physical encounters. 
Therefore, much of this thesis focuses on the subtle, less visible interactions and 
differentiations provoked by artistic performative interventions.  
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This approach allows me to explore the tools and methods that contribute to the 
making of alternative orderings and forms of valuing produced in and through the 
utilization of art as a means of innovation. As such, this thesis is not concerned with 
innovation practices in and of themselves, but rather with the significance and character 
of the values, norms and meanings which justify such practices. It serves to show, in 
other words, the ways in which the ‘making up’ or ‘construction’ of economic realities is 
achieved and how those activities, objects and relations that are categorized as 
‘innovative’ are built up or assembled from various enactments of the relation between 
art and business. The operationalization of boundaries is to be understood as a flipside 
to or fold of the processes of flexibilization, networked society and deterritorialized 
capital flows (also named post-Fordism, cf. Chapter 2).  
 
Drawing attention to artistic devices as powerful tools that work according to a logic of 
differentiation, this thesis makes a critical contribution to innovation studies, expanding 
its vocabulary and, at the same time, its empirical field. Building this study upon a 
sociology of critique, I work from the assertion that the dynamic relation between 
capitalism and critique can be observed in practice. I address the workings of late 
capitalism without compromising attention to ethnographic detail. This thesis is an 
attempt to combine those two. In doing so, it presents a collection of ethnographic 
accounts and aims at narrating a coherent story about innovation through the 
entanglements of the economic and artistic practices that materialise in and through the 
enactment and experience of artistic-performative interventions.  
 
The ethnographic accounts I present here inform the treatment of innovation as a 
hybrid or complex phenomenon drawing together different fields of research practice, 
rather than as comprised by a domain-specific set of methods and techniques. This also 
highlights the fact that ethnographic methods cannot be considered external to the 
practices they seek to trace, the field it aims to map and issues that they address (Lury 
and Wakeford, 2012). I do not attempt to pose a critique of the inevitable occurrence of 
the new and its differentiation of art from that of business from a privileged position 
outside of the field of study. Rather, I investigate the way in which affective events and 
moments of critique make visible the boundaries that perform the empirical sites as 
insides and outsides to each other. This movement, the production and folding (in) of 
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the outside, is an ongoing concern throughout this study, and one I explicitly return to 
at the end of the thesis in the hope of rendering innovation as inclusive differentiation or 
how innovation practices in effect benefit from what they exclude. 
 
Thesis Outline 
Investigating the differential enactment of innovation as a practice between art and 
business has several implications that I deal with in the following chapter. Chapter 2 
introduces the literature that informs the study of innovation as a practice between art 
and business. This review connects the issues addressed in this chapter to the broader 
field of capital and creativity. Firstly, it provides an historical overview of the way in 
which creativity has entered the economic sphere. This includes some reflections on 
how the production of the new has been characterised as an aesthetic and material 
process. Secondly, I draw attention to the different ways in which art has been applied 
as a strategy of innovation categorized as artistic production, art as leadership, or art in 
business. I illustrate these categories with a few empirical examples in order to 
demonstrate the way in which such practices reproduce the binary distinction between 
the two separate fields of art and business. Drawing on the literature of artistic critique 
and the modern avant-garde as it relates to post-Fordist production, I argue that 
innovation practice can be considered as an emergent assemblage rather than a stable form 
of organisation, institution or specific art practice.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the way these themes are turned into research practice. The case 
studies were conducted as ethnographic studies of two specific innovation processes, 
including participant observation and ethnographic interviews. In order to account for 
this study of innovation as an ethnography and, thereby, to address my research 
question, I employ theory of the assemblage as put forward by Manuel DeLanda (2006), 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1980) and Bruno Latour (2005), and this provides a 
framework in which to situate my use of various methods. Firstly, I discuss the cases as 
connecting the fields of politics, art, research and business. In doing so, I explain how 
each study comprises an assemblage of temporary associations between a set of 
institutions, knowledge practices and devices that constitute the innovation process. In 
this way, the artistic ideas that I follow do not pre-exist or have any pre-determined 
identity or functional definition apart from their actualisation in practice. In pursuing 
this claim, I follow recent discussions of ethnographic research, which argue that the 
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field site consists of temporal events and relations, which cannot be accounted for in 
terms of pre-existing physical sites to which the ethnographer travels (Atkinson et al., 
2001, p. 9; Hess, 2001, p. 238). Secondly, I explain how this ethnography constitutes a 
‘method assemblage’ (cf. Law, 2004, p. 144) conducted by the use of multiple methods, 
that allows me to consider the ethnographic studies not as representational givens, but 
as emerging empirical entities, emphasising different aspects of the complex nature of 
these processes of innovation. 
 
Having set out the conceptual and methodological framework for my research on 
innovation, Chapter 4 moves on to the analysis of the creative practices introduced as 
examples of the entanglement between capitalism and creativity. I investigate the ways 
in which such creative spaces are enacted by analysing how they justify and evaluate the 
selection of the artistic elements for the organisation of spaces of innovation. While 
mapping such relations, it is to the performativity of the field that I would like to draw 
attention. In the course of this chapter, I look into the performances that both delimit 
and, thus, stabilise a particular field and, at the same time, open up the possibility of 
investigating its mode of operation. The notion of performance structures this chapter 
in a twofold way. It introduces the key argument of sociological accounts of innovation 
which claims that experimental activities are instruments that contribute to the 
construction of contemporary economies (Muniesa and Callon, 2007). Yet, these 
activities emerge in and through the settings which they also perform (such as the 
market, governmental institutions and artistic practices). To show this, I identify and 
map out the terms and statements presented by these practices, providing concrete 
examples of how an artistic vocabulary is introduced into the economic sphere. I argue 
that this vocabulary operates according to a strategy of differentiation, by negating any 
association, similarity or identification with the techniques and methods employed 
within industrial or corporate forms of production. This chapter provides a kind of 
survey of different approaches to creativity, while contextualizing the two ethnographic 
studies to which I draw attention in the next two chapters. In these chapters I turn my 
attention to cases of the artistic techniques and devices used in order to generate change 
and creativity. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the way in which sociological accounts of the camp might bring us 
closer to an understanding of the spatio-temporal structures enacted within the 
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innovation process and the way in which the spatial configuration of the camp enables 
this practice to theorise rules, constraints and conflict as a creative strategy. I present a 
case study of an innovation process in which rules and constraints were externally 
imposed in order to foster creativity inspired by experimental filmmaking. More 
specifically, I present an ethnographic account of my participation in a 5-week work-
camp. I argue that the camp cannot solely be understood as establishing an external 
order or straightforward exclusion – such as the camp distinguishing itself from its 
corporate context (promoting a divide between art and business). In the course of the 
chapter, I examine the way in which the camp-space came to subvert the nature of the 
relations of representation by the application and appropriation of rules inspired by 
experimental filmmaking. This investigation emphasises the paradoxical relationship 
between inclusion and exclusion as it unfolded in the work-camp, which accounts for 
what Bülent Diken and Carsten Bagge Laustsen (2005) define as its extra-territoriality. In 
order to understand the way in which filmmaking was both applied as an innovation in 
its own right and as a means of innovation, the structure of this chapter is separated into 
two parallel narratives. The ‘subtext’, normally occupied by footnotes, explains the way 
in which this particular filmmaking movement has changed the ‘essence’, the effects and 
the art of filmmaking itself against Hollywood filmmaking. As such, this text aims to 
explain the artistic ideal in order to understand its application within the camp itself. 
 
Chapter 6 investigates another innovation process in which norms and rules were 
internally generated from the experimental setting itself. I present a case study of a 4-
week design brief in which ‘poetic investigations’ were applied in order to invent what 
the designers called ‘alternative futures’. Moreover, in conducting the design project, 
fine-art means were applied to provoke debate in order to question a given reality. Such 
means included the use of artistic interventions, crits and tutorials characterised as 
confrontational techniques, that is, encounters and situations the designer sets in motion that 
challenge social behaviour and render the practices of everyday life visible. The chapter 
sets out to discover how tutors, organizers, partners, clients, funders and students 
perceived and reacted to the devices and what actually happened in the conduct of those 
devices. This includes some reflection on ethnomethodology, especially Harold 
Garfinkel’s (1967) breaching experiments, in order to address how those devices came 
to breakdown a common-sense perception of reality. I investigate the devices as affective 
means of innovation, which provoke the performances that enable the students, clients 
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and tutors to theorise pain as a strategy of innovation. In a similar style to Chapter 5, the 
artistic idea of this design practice is presented as both an innovation in its own right 
and as a means of enabling the process of innovation. Again, I separate the text of the 
chapter into two parallel narratives explaining how this idea of design is based upon a 
use of artistic performances and interventionist techniques framed as a critique against 
industrial design.   
 
In Chapter 7 I bring together the analysis from the work-camp and the design brief to 
explore and question the linkages between innovation, technologies and the self. The 
artistic devices in question are considered ‘the specifically modern techniques of 
bureaucratic organization’ (Kwinter, 2001, p. 105) where the performative criteria by 
which one is judged is never revealed. I draw a parallel here to a selection of Franz 
Kafka’s writings. His stories are preoccupied with the relations of social organisation 
presented in a fictional universe whose objects, spaces and relations are apprehended 
and manipulated in the same distorting way as in the organisation of innovation. The 
second aspect of this, which revisits some of the issues addressed in Chapter 4, is how 
the relation between the individual and their environment feeds into processes of 
valuation. I demonstrate the way in which the devices came to act as a public 
demonstration, test or proof that exhibits ‘the necessary work of ourselves on ourselves’ 
(Davidson, 2001, p. xxiv; cf. Foucault, 2001) in order to be creative – that is, a 
performance that gives validity to the processes carrying certain aesthetic values. This 
chapter argues that this is an exemplary case of the strategic, generative unmaking of the 
self, constituted in and through a space that allows for a certain kind of exemption from 
a ‘common sense perception of the world’.  
 
In conclusion, I pay attention to the way in which these innovation processes came to 
be considered distinctively artistic and also commercially valuable. Furthermore, I 
examine how the artistic devices applied to innovation have material consequences 
measured in terms of its affective enactment crucial for a cultural-artistic reconfiguration 
of the economic world. To draw to a close, I return to the examples with which I began: 
Price’s installation and the Occupy Wall Street. The ‘We Know’ chanted throughout the 
performance is important since it gives a hint of the collective processes of creation and 
their repetitive nature. Price exhibits a visual imaginary montage that repeats itself over 
and over again – a structure that is born out of the call for the new. It is this repetitive 
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structure or territorial occupation that I return to at the end of the thesis, where I 
portray how local affective interventions bring about a differentially enacted strategy of 
innovation, or put differently, how an industry is performed in and through local 
interventionist forms of interaction.   
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2. Creative Assemblages and the Production of the New 
 
Introduction  
Having presented this thesis as a study of the art-business divide in relation to a call for 
change, in this chapter I consider the ways in which innovation emerges from the 
intermingling of creativity and capitalism. The notion of creativity has accompanied the 
history of capitalism from the start, along a spectrum from intertwinement to 
antagonism. The notion of capitalism originates from Late Latin capitalis, meaning head, 
as in leadership – or ownership of capital. This definition of capitalism also refers to 
produce or ‘bringing into being of economic value’ (OED, 2007), which in the 
sociological tradition refers to a wider economic system based on the notion of the 
market in relation to consumption and production (BD, 1993). Creativity, on the other 
hand, originates from Medieval Latin creativus, which means to create and stems from 
creare, ‘to bring forth, produce, bring into being or form out of nothing’ (OED, 2007). 
 
Both concepts – capitalism and creativity – stem, in part, from the notion of production 
or, more precisely, from the concept of produce, which refers to ‘production of 
something, by either natural growth or as result of some action’ (OED, 2007). However, 
these two concepts are also radically different in the way in which they refer to the 
emergence of the new. The one has roots in the meaning of capit, that is, to capture the 
new by transforming it into capital investments in terms of financial assets, and the 
other means to open up the notion of production as the emergence of the new, as 
something that is brought into being out of nothing. This etymological difference 
between capitalis and creativus reflects the dominant tendency in the economic literature 
on innovation, but it also relates to more sociological accounts of creativity and 
capitalism, which have considered the one as a prerequisite for the other; that is, 
creativity must exist as a process of production of something new before it is captured 
in capitalistic ideas of the market. This chapter documents various ways in which 
newness has been presented in relation to production. I thereby focus on innovation as 
a dual construction, i.e., as consisting both of new forms of production and the production of 
the new, which refers to the sociological literature on new forms of capitalism and its 
intermingling with creativity.  
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At the beginning of this chapter, I provide an historical overview of the way in which 
creativity has entered the economic sphere and thereby the discourse around 
innovation. As such, creativity is considered to be a crucial strategic resource for 
survival and growth in contemporary capitalism (Thrift, 2008). More specifically, I argue 
that the increased focus on creativity and the power of the market show that new ways 
of structuring the future have entered the scene and introduce artistic creation as an 
integral part of the processes of production within contemporary capitalism. I do so in 
order to explain my empirical cases as instantiations of such a broader historical shift, 
which is addressed in the work of social theorists such as Thrift (2005), Boltanski and 
Chiapello (1999), Lazzarato (2011), Negri and Hardt (1999) and Virno (2004) as they 
focus on new forms of production in contemporary capitalism. In brief, this shift relates 
to new ways in which economic and cultural processes are being understood in the light 
of post-structural theory. Before I address the question of how to analyse this theme in 
relation to my research object, I draw attention to the way in which art is understood as 
a strategy for innovation.   
 
The various ways in which the art-business dichotomy outlined in the previous chapter 
has defined what is considered internal or external to new forms of capitalism can be 
addressed in relation to three major categories: (1) artistic production, referring to the 
production and circulation of art objects; (2) art and leadership, referring to artwork 
introduced into business practices; (3) art-in-business, referring to artistic processes where 
business executives are introduced to the production of artworks. These are the three 
major directions within the current debate on innovation; however, they cannot be 
considered as mutually exclusive. Rather, these are three categorizations that constitute 
the research field on innovation studies within the social sciences. For each category, I 
provide illustrative examples of different creative practices. In doing so, I account for 
the ways in which these different forms of innovation strategies have been contested as 
ways of instrumentalizing art and thereby reducing its creative potential. The recent 
intermingling between creativity and capitalism invites a critique of Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s (1999) thesis on a new spirit of capitalism. The notion of creativity is 
introduced into commercial organisations with the assumption that creativity and 
capitalism are two separate paradigms in relation to strategies of innovation. In 
continuation, I argue that the creative practices described reproduce such binary 
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categorical distinctions and thereby produce a certain idea of innovation within 
contemporary capitalism.  
 
Having described recent work on the intermingling of capitalism and creativity, in the 
next section I explain the analytical framework which I apply to study such 
entanglement in practice. The spheres of capitalism and creativity are not considered as 
two separate fields but as constructs from a plane stretched out between the interrelated 
concepts of deterritorialization and reterritorialization proposed by Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980). These concepts allow me to explore processes of production before they 
become categorized as strategies generating either capital or creativity. It is on the basis 
of these themes that I develop my analytical perspective and the theoretical grounding 
of this study of innovation.  
 
To bring the chapter to a close, I briefly discuss the methodological implications, which 
I develop further in the following chapter. As such, I use this conceptual plane not only 
to situate the issues of my research object, but also to define the analytical tools by 
which to conduct such a study and thereby ground the analysis of the empirical material 
throughout the following chapters. With this theoretical positioning, I aim to follow and 
to demonstrate empirically the argument that creativity and capitalism cannot be 
distinguished and that they are enacted in practice in multiple and heterogeneous ways. 
This argument resonates well with the idea that capitalism invokes its own special 
metaphysics, where the economic field is seen as a processual ordering rather than as an 
objectively given fact.  
 
The Rise of Creative Capitalism  
There has by now been a significant amount of research on creativity within the 
academic literature, describing how innovation has come to be considered as a social 
phenomenon within contemporary capitalism (cf. Thrift, 2006; Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009; 
Raunig, Ray and Wuggenig, 2011). However, the notions of innovation and creativity 
have only recently been introduced directly into the social science literature. A variety of 
theories within social science claim that an economic transformation has taken place 
within the last 40 years, where the notion of innovation has come to play an ever-
increasing role in economic development.  
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These theories emerged as a consequence of historical developments that have caused a 
repositioning in writings on contemporary capitalism. This has been framed as a shift 
from mass production to flexible specialization and post-Fordism (Lash and Urry, 1987; 
Harvey, 1989; Amin, 1994). This rather recent development taking place in the 1970’s is 
explained not only in terms of ways of producing but also in terms of new ensembles or 
arrangements in the corporate world, such as: design, marketing, branding, research and 
development (R&D), communication strategies, as well as human resource 
management, and other activities regarded as ‘immaterial’. A range of political thinkers, 
such as Negri, Virno and Lazzarato have framed this as a shift from ‘manual activities to 
the ability to put together creativity and imagination’ (Lazzarato, 2004b). Instead of 
defining innovation purely in terms of techno-scientific developments, these thinkers 
connect innovation to the fundamental notions of production, consumerism and value 
creation. These are areas of production that are directed towards consumer 
differentiation, focusing on the symbolic value of commodities and relating to individual 
identity construction (Appadurai, 1986). In this field there is a growing appeal to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1972; 1980) work on affect in their two-volume work on 
‘Capitalism and Schizophrenia’ as a means of capitalistic production, which I return to 
later in this chapter. In what follows, I introduce the broader historical shifts preceding 
this understanding of immateriality.  
 
Innovation From an Historical Perspective 
Within economic sociology, the significance of innovation is said to emerge with the 
economic transformations that followed the second industrial revolution corresponding 
to the latter half of the 19th century until World War I (1870-1914). This includes the 
invention of advanced technologies for transport and communications, together with 
the rise of information technology, especially the proliferation of software, global actors 
and transnational corporations, and the globalization of international trade. A common 
way of accounting for these transformations, which have taken place since the latter part 
of the eighteenth century, is the rise of a knowledge economy (Amin and Thrift, 2004). 
This shift also entails the transformation in commodification (from physical products to 
knowledge), which again gave rise to terms such as immaterial production which have 
often been used to designate the operation of these new technologies. Bhidé explains 
this shift by referring to issues such as off-shoring, outsourcing, entrepreneurship and 
venture capitalism as new forms of international trade where flows of capital are related 
 30 
to cross-border activities and transactions (Bhidé, 2008 p. xii). Increased use of 
networks, the circulation of capital and the globalization of production create a spatially 
dispersed field of production, which is neither physically located in the factory nor 
spatially bound to a geographical territory. These transformations are said to invoke a 
new historical phase of capitalism and a process of accumulation and production where 
capital is said to circulate at a global scale (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980; Lazzarato, 
2004a).  
 
This shift also entails the decline of regulation and production by the nation-state and 
gives rise to global markets and corporations. Capitalism then becomes associated with 
a market-driven economy, where innovation is said to be of importance as a means by 
which to differentiate (Porter, 1990). This means that being first to the market and 
thereby distinguishing the company from its competitors is considered crucial for 
survival and growth with the rise of a new economy. This differs from the classical 
focus on demand and supply, which implies a change from producing for pre-existing 
needs identified within the market to companies inventing the needs and desires of its 
consumers (Thrift, 2008; Lury, 2004; Arvidson, 2006). This shift emphasises a change in 
production where it becomes diversified and differentiated. Economies of scale (mass 
production) are said to be replaced by economies of scope, whereby a specialization of 
production takes place (Chandler, Jr., 1990). Furthermore, a move occurs from 
hierarchical and bureaucratic organisations to network-based organisations, which are 
able to provide such flexible specialisation. Prahalad and Krishnan (2008, p. 42) suggest 
that this era can be described as a ‘new age of innovation’. More specifically, innovation 
is said to occur with the increased focus on knowledge production, where invention and 
new ideas are claimed to be the crucial capital asset, driven by business strategies and 
technological transformations. In this case, innovation occurs as a process by which an 
organization generates creative new ideas and converts these into valuable commercial 
products, services and business practices (Kuhn and Marsick, 2005). The notion of 
creativity specifically designates the process of generating novel ideas, considered as a 
necessary step preceding the innovation process.  
 
This fundamental split between capitalism and creativity has been presented in terms of 
the neoclassical distinction between invention and innovation as proposed by Porter, 
who has defined innovation as ‘invention brought to market’ (cf. 1990, p. 119-126), a 
 31 
distinction widely recognised and still prevailing within economic theories of 
innovation.2 Invention and thus the process of creativity are therefore conceived as 
being external to the economy and as a resource that a corporate firm might transform 
or turn into economic value as it becomes realized in the market (Pratt and Jeffcutt, 
2009, p. 4). Studies of invention have until recently been conducted from outside the 
economic field. A number of critiques have been directed towards this neoclassical 
economic perspective, claiming that this is a rather reductive approach to innovation.3 
Such a critique has been posed by Virno (1996; 2004) and Lazzarato (1996; 2004a; 
2004b), among others, who depart from the notions of immaterialization, a perspective 
to which I now turn.  
 
An important aspect of this historical shift is the transformation of the relationship 
between production and consumption. The specificity of the commodity produced 
within this era of immaterial production is characterised by its informational and cultural 
value. These values consist in the fact that they cannot be destroyed in the act of 
consumption, but they enlarge, transform and create the ideological and cultural 
environment of the consumer (Lazzarato, 2004a).  
 
Writing from within a post-structuralist tradition, this perspective originates from a neo-
Marxist critique of the liberal economy. Such a critique is based on a re-reading of 
Marx’s ‘Fragment on Machines’, a section in Grundrisse (1939) focusing on economic 
development incorporating ‘scientific labour, technological application of the natural 
sciences, social structuring of global production’ to the work of capital (Virno, 2004). 
Virno refers to Marx in this respect saying that ‘the development of fixed capital 
indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of 
production’ (Virno, 2001, p. 1). In continuation Lazzarato writes that ‘within 
contemporary capitalism the company does not exist outside the producers or 
                                                
2 See, for instance, the works of Afuah (1998), Afuah and Bahram (1995), Helström et al (2003), Kuhn 
and Marsick (2005), Kline and Rosenberg (1986), Henderson and Clark (1990), which are currently being 
taught at business schools worldwide. 
3 One of the critiques raised against neoclassical economic theory is the assumption of an atomized and 
anonymous market brought about by fully competitive conditions, as this is a conception that neglects the 
role of social relations among individuals in bringing order to economic life (Granovetter 1985). Other 
theorists have challenged what they call ‘neo-liberal orthodoxies’ (Harvey 2010) arguing that it creates an 
idealistic abstract model of the individual firm separated from its structural relations within the rest of the 
economy (the critique is raised against the conceptualization of the firm as a black-box where the 
formatting of a specific income will create a predefined outcome). Furthermore, the emphasis in neo-
classical economic theory has been on the spatial patterns produced by large industrial enterprises rather 
than the processes internal to those enterprises (cf. Watts, 1980, p. 29-30).   
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consumers who express it. Its world, its objectivity, its reality merges with the 
relationships enterprises, workers and consumers have with each other.’ (Lazzarato, 
2004a, p. 188) Furthermore, Lazzarato claims that the sensible defined as desire and 
beliefs are integrated into the circulation of capital. From this perspective, immaterial 
labour is said to produce first of all a social relationship. This activity shows that labour 
produces not only commodities but first and foremost the relationship of capital with 
creativity (see for instance Deleuze and Guattari, 1980). 
 
Such a re-reading of Marx points towards an understanding of capitalism characterized 
by affective labour as proposed by Hardt (1999) and implies – when joined with 
Foucault’s (1976) notion of biopower – that ‘life itself’ becomes internal to economic 
production and the circulation of capital. This view contributes to discussions of new 
forms of production in terms of sensation and affects and represents a neo-Marxist 
intellectual route that has problematized, or at least articulated, a change in the way of 
thinking about capitalistic production, value creation and aesthetic transformation.4 As 
was indicated in Chapter 1, this perspective sets the background from where to 
understand industries as constructed by affective spaces rather than by territorial 
occupation (Thrift, 2008, p. 21). Let me unravel this point in relation to the claims made 
about new forms of production in contemporary capitalism.  
 
The increased focus on the creation of value in relation to the production of knowledge 
means that capitalism is not an external force, an economic system that occupies a 
certain geographical or physically constrained territory, rather it occupies ‘territories of 
‘thought’’, as Thrift (2008, p. 17) argues, which refers to the notion of ‘cognitive 
capitalism’ (Boutang, 2008). This notion has constituted the ground for critiques 
claiming that human capacities, and thereby thought, become a means of innovation, 
which composes new forms of value creation. Lazzarato claims that immaterial labour 
constitutes itself in forms that are immediately collective, and exists, so to speak, only in 
the form of ‘network and flow’ claiming that the organisation of production is not 
                                                
4 The concept of affect stems from the Latin afficere, (influence) and affectus (disposition), which refer to 
the idea of making ‘a difference to’ (OED, 2007). In this aspect, O’Sullivan and Zepke (2008, p. 3) write 
on affect in relation to artistic creation that: ‘…the affect becomes a trajectory of transformation, 
inasmuch as the artist constructs from the continuous variation of matter as expression (affect) capable of 
embodying its continuous development, capable that is, of producing a difference’. This has also been 
understood in relation to Deleuze’s (1986, p. 60) description of power as the ability ‘to affect and be 
affected’. The definition of this concept is based on the analysis of new forms of power that transform 
our understanding of production and consumerism.  
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immediately visible as it is not confined by ‘the walls of a factory’ (Lazzarato, 1996). 
Furthermore, the organisation of immaterial labour tends to happen within new forms 
of organisational construction such as small ‘productive units’, which are organised for 
temporary, or ad hoc, projects and thereby constituted only for a given time, which 
often institutes a temporary spatial order of production.5 It is further argued that such 
new forms of organization coincide with artistic forms of organisation, as they are often 
said to be organised on the edge of established structures and make use of freelance 
work, creative self-employment and temporary projects based on materialization of new 
or creative ideas (Lazzarato, 2011, p. 43; McRobbie, 2011, p. 122; Thrift, 2005, p. 34).6 
It is through this inversion of the relation of capitalism from being constituted by 
external territorial occupation to being constituted by internal processes of 
territorialization that the new economy is said to be constructed.  
 
Value Creation 
It is not only at the organisational level that the economy and creativity are taken into 
account in terms of artistic creation. Moreover, writings on capitalistic production 
emphasise the need for imagination and invention of the new as means of 
differentiation (Porter, 1990). Thrift (2008) writes that ‘…value increasingly arises not 
from what is but what is not yet but can potentially become, that is from the pull of the 
future, and from the new distributions of the sensible that can arise from that change’ (p. 
31, italics in original). This is an economic development that he defines as the ‘cultural 
circuit of capitalism’ (Thrift, 2005, pp. 20-50). This aspect belongs to the range of 
theories which emphasise the way that artistic creation enters the economic sphere, 
which are then related to what Lazzarato has claimed to be an ‘aestheticization’ of the 
economy (Lazzarato, 2008). Sociological scholars have argued that the market is 
constructed, since the objects that are invented or produced do not satisfy pre-existing 
needs in a market but invent new forms of being. Innovation means to produce objects 
                                                
5 Instead of being a mechanic production function as proposed in neo-classical theory or an abstract 
capitalist imperative, the enterprise here emerges as a contested site of new forms of production at 
different organisational and spatial scales. At the same time, the boundary of the firm is increasingly 
difficult to define, and this is why the identification of its boundary-making practices become even more 
important – that is, to identify its wider relations with other actors and institutions composing its 
territorial organisation (cf. Chapter 4).     
6 Tiziana Terranova has also introduced a similarity between artistic production and new labour in the 
post-Fordist era. She claims that the interpretation of Marxist value (from Grundrisse) is not only generated 
from ‘alienated surplus labour of the individual worker but also a more indeterminate activity which 
captures and re-combines features of aesthetic experience and artistic experimentation – an engagement 
with the world which produces new ways of seeing and feeling’ (Terranova, 2006, p. 30-31).    
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that invoke the sensible, which means that value is produced by creating a world in 
which the object exists rather than the functional qualities attached to a consumer 
product (Lazzarato, 2004a, p. 188).  
 
These themes have been represented in the literature of economic sociology from the 
perspective of constructivism. Relatedly, Mitchell argues that the economy cannot be 
considered as a pre-existing sphere, into which creative processes of innovation 
introduce changes. He claims that ‘[t]he economy is a twentieth-century invention that 
was built out of such projects’, saying: There is no simple divide between an 
experimental or simulated world of the industrial workshop or business planning and a 
real world outside it’ (Mitchell, 2008, pp. 1118-1119).7 It might be said that a particular 
metaphysics underlines this economic perspective from which it becomes possible to 
argue that creativity is an integral part of contemporary capitalism. The analytical point 
is that the economy is taken as processually constituted and not as an objectively given 
reality. This metaphysics implies a shift from looking at the economy in terms of 
industrial production, considered a limited physical space, to the internal construction of 
a space as it relates to the production of affect and sensation. Space, then, is not conceived 
of as an empty volume in which events, entities or relations are contained, but as a 
temporally contingent category constructed in order to foster innovation and creativity. 
These aspects propose that the historical shift to a post-industrial society has been a 
turn towards creativity, not, however, as a prerequisite of innovation, but as the very 
functioning of capitalism itself (Thrift, 2008; McRobbie, 2011; Boutang, 2008).  
 
Thinking about the economy in relation to a particular form of metaphysics, apart from 
the focus on space and on the market, also implies a change in the relation to objects. 
Alfred Gell (1998) has argued that a redefinition of the aesthetic takes place, since 
artistic work does not only relate to the representation of an aesthetic object (that is, its 
visual imaginary in packaging, the design of products or the construction of a logo for a 
company). Rather, the aesthetic refers to the production of the sensations and affects 
that are afforded by the objects invented (Verbeek, 2000). The notion of aesthetic 
objects refers to a dimension other than the extension of commodification into the 
                                                
7 Lash and Urry argue that the transition in the relations between production and consumption are 
symptoms of the postmodern condition. However, they also argue that postmodernity constructs a 
specific idea of what new forms of capitalism might be and its future implications (Lash and Urry, 1987, 
p. 286). 
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world of art products. Objects produced within the new fields of consumption such as 
design, fashion, video or film can be thought of as aesthetic objects, that is, objects that 
are affectively loaded and which transform a way of being or a way of perceiving the 
world (Verbeek, 2000).  
 
In this way, the artwork is not only the outcome of an innovation process which is 
introduced into a market, but one that constitutes that market as well as the space in 
which it is produced. This changes the way we can perceive the market from being a 
recipient of innovation to ‘constituting the utility of innovations’ (Pratt and Jeffcutt, 
2009, p. 12). It is from such a perspective that the market has been seen as being 
performed, a notion which was suggested by Callon (1998; 2007) from the field of STS. 
Such a vision transcends the idea that R&D, academic institutions or the laboratory 
constitute enclosed experimental sites, which create new knowledge. Rather, the process 
of creation is itself considered as a performance (Pratt and Jeffcutt, 2009, p. 13).8 This 
type of argumentation goes against a neoclassical assumption in which creativity is seen 
as being external to or outside the market. Theories of the market in the economic 
sociology literature disregard the chain of causation implicit in Porter’s economic 
analysis (1990). This notion of performance transcends the dichotomy that was 
previously held within economic sociology, considering the economy as an independent 
system where the distinction between the economic system and the broader social field 
was preserved.9  
 
In summary, I have suggested that there has been an historical shift in which creativity is 
said to enter the field of capitalistic production. The construction of objects as 
commodities has now become aestheticized and the market is said to be performed.  
These tendencies are seen as implications of this historical shift within theories 
originating from a post-structuralist tradition. These are all developments that have been 
                                                
8 This is where the STS literature and economic sociology intersect, starting with the work of Michel 
Callon (2007), who emphasised the notion of the ‘performativity of the market’. From this perspective, 
STS will prove relevant for a study on innovation and I develop this perspective further in the following 
chapter.  
9 This distinction was upheld by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958) and Polanyi 
in The Great Transformation (2001) where he presented a critique of the disembedding of the market from 
the wider social field. Mitchell (2008) takes this point further by arguing that the economy is not to be 
understood as one separate field into which the social can be translated, or in Polanyi’s terms embedded, 
rather the economy must be seen as an invention in itself, as a processual construction. It is from this 
perspective that the economy does not represent an objectively given reality but is processually 
constituted and performed. As a result, the economy cannot be considered to be a pre-existing sphere 
into which creativity introduces change.   
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argued to constitute the backdrop to the current operation of contemporary capitalism. 
This literature provides a view of innovation and production that moves beyond an 
understanding of industrial production as existing in relation to external spatial 
formations into the realms of the aesthetic and the potential as constituting crucial 
dimensions of the economic sphere. A central point is that affect and sensation are seen 
as constituting new means of production and the creation of value, producing social 
networks or new forms of connectivity. Based on such perspectives, a notion of 
production emerges, relating to the production of the social, which is captured in critical 
theories of value (Arvidsson, Bauwens and Peitersen, 2008). Moreover, creativity was 
previously considered to be an activity outside the economic system and, according to 
this approach, it has moved inside the very mode of capitalistic production. From the 
perspective of economic sociology, the economy is theorized as a construction, which 
enacts a metaphysics of processes, rather than of essences, and of performance, rather 
than normative certainties.10 
 
It is in relation to this historical shift that I want to situate my research project. 
However, before I demonstrate the analytical tools needed to frame my empirical 
research, I outline the way in which art has been introduced as a strategy for innovation. 
In doing so, I attempt to render visible the dichotomies between creativity and 
capitalism constructed within recent studies of art and business within the field of social 
science.  
 
Art as a Strategy for Innovation 
Following the above account of the connection between creativity and new forms of 
capitalism, some intersections between artistic sensibilities and mainstream 
socioeconomic structures can be mapped out, which resonate with critical contributions 
to theories of contemporary capitalism within economic sociology. This section 
                                                
10 However, critiques of constructivism have suggested that such a perspective reduces the economic 
market to relativism. More importantly, the British author and academic Gavin Kitching (2008) has 
argued that constructivist accounts implicitly presuppose a deterministic view as, in this case, the 
economy is not just constructed by language, object and processes, but also determined by it. I include 
this critique in order to study innovation by drawing on contributions from the field of STS. John Law, 
commenting on the notion of Actor Network Theory, notes that ANT is not to be understood as a purely 
semiotic endeavour, but that it also needs to include materiality and sociality into the study of economic 
constructions. This definition he further argues is what distinguishes ANT from other post-structuralist 
accounts and also from the work of Foucault (Law, 1999, p 3-4)   
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identifies the perspectives from which the notions of capitalism and creativity have been 
discussed and will point out a few examples of the fields that have been objects of such 
debates. I highlight three predominant fields to explore the intermingling of creativity 
and capitalism: artistic production, art and leadership, and art-in-business. These categorizations 
have been identified and specified within the literature on economic sociology, which 
takes art as an object of study as it has been translated into a strategy for business. In 
this way, the categorizations represent different ways in which the aestheticization of the 
economy might take form. They illustrate how artistic performances and methods have 
been used as tools to intervene in the system of production, e.g., product-development, 
strategic thinking about the firm and processes of invention (Boland Jr. and Collopy, 
2004).  
 
The first category that I want to draw attention to is that of artistic production. Within this 
field, art has been investigated in relation to economics in terms of cultural production, 
that is, through the creation of artworks such as artistic objects, performances or 
methods. This type of production has been discussed on a broader scale in relation to 
the emergence of the creative industries, especially within the UK. In this field, artistic 
value is articulated as a value of the creative industries, where art is seen to make an 
economic contribution to an emerging industry in terms of value added, employment 
and enterprise. This is seen in recent studies by, for instance, Howkins (2007), Florida 
(2002) and Cunningham (2002). The assumption here is that the production of the new 
is related to the emergence of a new industry, which means that new kinds and forms of 
objects are exchanged as commodities in the market, generating economic profits for 
new kinds of businesses and contributing to the Gross National Product (GNP).  
 
The second category relates to how innovation has been understood as the management 
of artistic organisations. This field can be categorized under the name of art and leadership. 
An example is organisations such as ‘Arts&Business’, situated in London, facilitating 
partnership opportunities between the art world and business. The organisation is 
established to maximise financial investment in the arts sector. This approach focuses 
on the application of business models to artistic practice (cf. Martorella, 1996). The 
assumption here is that the rational logic of the business world captures and structures 
the more irrational and messy world of artistic creation.  
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The third and last category is the category of art-in-business. In this field, art is taken as a 
tool for transformations within business practices. Such transformations are related to 
processes where artistic methods of creation are applied to business, changing the 
character of the organisational structure of the firm, or inventing a new structure or new 
products. Thrift (2005), for example, writes about forms of practice where artists make 
employees perform a play or paint a picture. Such techniques are used to make 
employees more creative and inventive. A number of studies have been conducted 
exploring the logic of artistic creation in various different disciplines. The theatre has 
been used especially as a metaphor for new or inventive forms of leadership (cf. for 
example Austin and Devin, 2003; Eikhof and Haunschild, 2006; Monthoux, 2004).  
 
This categorization represents three predominant ways in which the notions of creativity 
and cultural production come into the picture and guide the discussion on innovation, 
where art is taken as a strategy for business. The artist and the studio are taken as 
material sites of creative action, which are translated into corporate strategies 
materialized as different forms of in-house innovation, or research centres within 
private companies, public organisation or governmental institutions. 
 
Within the historical shift to post-Fordism, the interrelation of art with the field of 
business entails such kinds of organisational practices as mentioned above. Lazzarato 
describes the rise of workshop-based processes as constituting new forms of spatial 
organisation (Lazzarato, 2004b). Others have argued that small-scale network-based 
organisations employing less than ten highly specialised skilled workers are symptomatic 
of a new way of organising processes of innovation (Bhidé, 2008; Prahalad and 
Krishnan, 2008). These are said to be design-oriented and multidisciplinary, involving 
collaboration between entrepreneurs, designers, and engineers (Kumar, 1995). Andrea 
Branzi has defined this development as the end of the historical avant-garde and the rise 
of a permanent-avant-garde, ‘where corporations work with small experimental design 
centres to develop new scenarios within which the corporations develop new products’ 
(quoted in Dunne, 2005, p. 91-92). Besides, an increase in art practices that rely on both 
subsidies from state funding and/or commission from corporate companies has 
emerged. 
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Common to these practices are that they emerge as small-scale organisations co-
ordinating ‘inter-disciplinary’ innovation processes involving business, art, design, 
research institutions and policy-makers. The practices are typically short-term projects 
that take place in a remote site outside the realm of the company. Such configurations 
arise as a result of connections between various different actors, engaging in forms of 
production which cannot be reduced to a single discipline or occupation, either that of 
business or that of art. It is in this way, a new hybrid model of economic growth has 
been said to emerge including freelance work, and self-employment (McRobbie, 2011, p. 
122; Thrift, 2005, p. 32) – a model that tends to look more like artistic and creative 
practices than businesses (Lazzarato, 2011). I argue that it is possible to detect a range 
of practices emerging within this shift to ‘creativity’. The important point to keep in 
mind is that these practices are both dependent on state funding from research councils 
and private subsidies – and the notion of creativity is produced in and through these 
funding contexts. In order to explicate this argument, I provide a few examples of 
artistic spaces that have been taken as attempts to create a ‘realistic economic model’ 
based on a particular anti-capitalist orientation (cf. Gielen and Bruyone, 2009).  
 
The first example is the Italian art practice Cittadelarte’. This is an interdisciplinary art 
organisation that organises creative processes in a discarded textile factory near Bienna, 
Italy. This practice facilitates innovation processes based on the principles of the Italian 
artist Michelangelo Pistoletto. The art city was instituted as a concrete action of the 
‘Progetto Arte’ Manifesto, where Pistoletto proposed a new role for the artist: that of 
placing art in direct interaction with all the areas of human activity, which constitute a 
society. Pistoletto invests his earnings from the international art market in Cittadellarte.  
 
Another example is the Watermill Foundation, which organises creative processes in the 
forest of Southampton, Long Island based on the artistic practice of Robert Wilson. 
The Watermill Foundation enables research into the arts of the stage. Watermill 
supports projects that mix and integrate different genres and art forms, which break 
with traditional forms of representation and which aim at developing democratic 
approaches. The primary activity of the Watermill Centre is a Summer Program led by 
Robert Wilson, focusing on new projects developed in all areas of the arts. Other 
activities include workshops, artist residencies, conferences and lectures, and a variety of 
local and international educational partnership programs.  
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These practices have been characterised as ‘revolutionary art strategies that would like to 
undermine neoliberalism’ (Gielen and Bruyne, 2009, p. 11). Their artistic objects such as 
Pistoletto’s mirror-paintings have been seen to have revolutionary pretensions 
outdistancing modernity since the 1960s. Such projects oppose art or design that 
identifies with the consumer society, and which is absorbed with the attention of mass 
media. However, in recent years, Pistoletto has attracted attention with the founding of 
Cittadellarte and Rob Wilson by establishing the Watermill foundation. These artistic 
enterprises, such as the Watermill Foundation and Cittadellarte, have been written about 
as spaces that fuel an artistic but also ethical, political and economic sense of possibility. 
Virno argues that Cittadellarte introduces a ‘dismeasure’ inside the more general 
measure or common sense of culture (interview in Lavaert and Gielen, 2009). This 
dismeasure, he suggests, is aesthetic and formal. These practices invite scientists and 
businesses to develop and implement practical new economic methods of production 
and to redefine their activities to be in themselves works of art (Lavaert and Gielen, 
2009). In doing so, Pisteletto is said to install a different measure of art and to operate 
within a post-Fordist model of value creation. 
 
This artistic orientation serves to distance any mainstream arena (including the media). 
Instead, process of transition and experimentation defined in solely artistic terms are 
valued, having an artistic practice (e.g. film production, interactive design or performing 
art) as their overall frame for innovation. Furthermore, they use the name of 
contemporary artistic celebrities, such as the British sculptor Anthony Gormley, the 
Danish filmmaker Lars von Trier or the video-artist Bill Viola to express the specific 
artistic practice they adhere to and to frame a methodology for innovation.  
 
However, these practices are characterized as creative inventions that facilitate the 
process of innovation. They incorporate aspects of artistic production to produce art 
objects, contributing to the creation of value within the creative industries, as well as 
organising the processes of creation in which business clients take part in both 
observing and being taught the artistic method. In this way, the practices in question 
implicitly propose an innovation strategy where business itself is taken as the 
experimental object. The creative practices I have paid attention to organise innovation 
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processes that include various aspects of the above-mentioned categories: artistic 
production, art and leadership, and art-in-business. 
 
Within the innovation practices just mentioned, art is taken as a sort of creative template 
for business to follow. Art practices are seen as paradigmatic sites of observation for 
new business strategies, models of invention or market promotion within the new 
economy. This aspect of the art world was previously associated with critical activities in 
a search for alternative values and was therefore seen as being not only outside the 
prevailing economic system but also as being against capitalistic values. The examples 
given above all proclaim a strong political or cultural programme as an indication of 
their artistic approach and as forces against capitalism or consumerism. However, the 
three approaches outlined above are exactly enacted in terms of practices of 
collaboration with the corporate world, that is, they are enacted in processes of 
economic innovation facilitated on the basis of specific artistic principles.  
 
The claim that creativity might drive economic growth has framed a lot of debates on 
how artistic creation enters the economic sphere. In the three categories, such 
intersections are represented in a story about how capitalism has come to occupy a non-
capitalistic territory. In all of these categories, art is taken as a metaphor for business or 
as a model to which the business world has to adapt. These examples demonstrate the 
way in which a binary logic is constructed, as they translate the logic of one (art) into 
that of the other (business). These research approaches therefore seem to be caught in a 
rather reductive dichotomy where the values of the art-world enlighten business and 
where business rationalises art.  
 
Art as Resistance 
The creative practices described above associate their artistic principles with those of 
the modern avant-garde. An internal contradiction in relation to theories of capitalistic 
value-production and innovation as a matter of differentiation would seem inevitable. 
Avant-garde art is often defined by its ability to provoke or shock the public or an 
audience in order to critique contemporary capitalistic society (Debord, 1967; Jameson, 
1991). A case in point is the by now well-known activist group called The Yes Men. They 
produce false websites, blogs and films in which they promote the belief that corporate 
organizations and governmental organizations act in dehumanizing and exploitative 
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ways toward the public. Their activities have been considered to advocate art as a type 
of creative revenge on capitalism (i.e., Hynes, Sharpe and Fagan, 2007). In this context, 
Lazzarato redefines the avant-garde not as a matter of institutional art practice, but 
rather as a technique or practice in terms of ‘processes of creation’ encountered as an 
aesthetic orientation towards the world (Lazzarato, 2008, p. 174). This orientation 
embeds an anti-capitalistic approach to the field of innovation and constitutes an almost 
revolutionary contextualization of the field of art and innovation. Following Lazzarato, 
we see a new kind of ‘functional avant-garde’ – artists that presents themselves as 
employees of imaginary organisations or companies in order to carry out subversive 
work that fuses fictional and real legal, economic and cultural systems.  
 
What is interesting about this kind of innovation practice is that it engages with the 
notion of innovation and at the same time relies on an artistic mode of critique or 
resistance against the logic of capitalism. A distinction between art and business is 
thereby maintained as these practices critique the reality in which they also engage. 
Thus, these examples enact the aestheticization of the economy by constructing a 
differential relation between art and capitalism as two separate fields of research. Such a 
perspective entails a specific critical approach, which coincides with the logic of 
neoliberalism as suggested by Foucault (1994), and later addressed by Boltanski and 
Chiapello (1999). Budgen comments on Boltanski and Chiapello that:  
 
Capitalism, however, has always relied on critiques of the status quo to alert it to 
dangers in any untrammelled development of its current forms, and to discover 
the antidotes required to neutralize opposition to the system and increase the 
level of profitability within it. (Budgen, 2000, p. 151)  
 
Boltanski and Chiapello define innovation as a mode driving the operation of capitalism. 
They argue that the ‘new spirit of capitalism’ integrates a new regime of justification and 
critique based on network-mobility and new forms of connectivity. In continuation, 
Albertsen and Diken (2006, p. 245) ask ‘[w]hat if contemporary power thrives well in 
forms of justification and critique based on the notion of creativity?’. This means that 
the critical approach afforded by such creative practices directed towards new forms of 
capitalism works to reinforce the very logic which they oppose.    
 
To sum up, the borrowing from an artistic vocabulary, which is now entering the 
economic field, can be traced back to historical transformations within the operation of 
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capitalism. Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) argue that creativity might be integrated into 
the logic of control and subjugation in contemporary capitalism. However, there is a 
danger of engaging too easily in a critical analysis of art and business in relation to the 
analysis of a neo-liberal economy. The key point is that it might be too easy to just write 
off this historical turn to creativity as the full accomplishment of neoliberalism in the 
area of the arts, as has been done in some academic corners of cultural studies and 
sociology. I address this aspect in the next section, presenting my analytical approach. 
However, what I want to ask is: how does the intermingling of creativity and new forms 
of capitalism work out in practice? 
 
In demonstrating the links between creativity and theories of the new economy, I have 
been concerned with showing the heterogeneous nature of the art-business relation and 
the variety of their links and how they might be explained. However, the overall 
perspective in the theories and directions I have presented in this chapter illustrate the 
idea that creativity is vital to the operation of contemporary capitalism. However, I wish 
to focus my attention on other kinds of dynamics rather than the ones Boltanski and 
Chiapello have proposed. The practices that are my focus in the rest of the thesis (cf. 
Chapter 3) cut across the three categorizations, enacting multiple differentiations which 
reproduce the intermingling of art and business. The operation of these organisational 
forms can be understood as processes in transformation rather than as stable entities of 
organisation, that is, as emergent assemblages, which might be defined as a specific 
heterogeneous arrangement bringing together different aesthetic perspectives, economic 
realities and technological futures.11   
 
Assembling the New 
In researching innovation, I wish to demonstrate that the intermingling of art and 
capital is complex and comprises heterogeneous processes that do not conform to the 
current criticism of either new forms of capitalism, as outlined in the previous section, 
                                                
11 On the basis of this the notion of immateriality might be contested and redeployed to include 
phenomena that are considered to be at once material, discursive, human, corporeal, and technological in 
studies of innovation (i.e., Latour, 2005). Rather than apply the idea of immaterial production, as it seems 
to imply a separation of a non-material world from that of a physical world of objects, places, and 
materials. Furthermore, the notion of immaterial production is not only to be understood as the ‘less than 
material’ but refers to what Deleuze and Guattari (1980) have called the ‘incorporeal’. In order to explain 
this in further detail, I draw on the notion of the assemblage, as I explain in the next section of this 
chapter.  
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or to the instrumentalism of art, as mentioned above. New relations and connections 
are being created that expand our current understanding of both art and capital and also 
have the potential to change the way in which we think about creative practices, 
economic circulation and artistic production. It is to capture and conceptualize the 
complex interweaving of the different rationalities associated with the field of capitalism 
and creativity that I apply the notion of the assemblage. As the vocabulary for this study 
is still to be defined, in what follows I explore a few key concepts as a way of defining 
the analytical perspective of this thesis.  
 
In investigating innovation practices, I do not want to judge with a binary categorization 
whether the result is innovative or not, whether the solutions or the artworks produced 
are new, or whether they actually create future growth; rather, I aim to investigate how 
the mobilization of forces takes place, by which the innovative process is assembled and 
executed. The purpose is to construct a plane from where it becomes possible to 
investigate the way in which the differentiations between art and business, capitalism 
and creativity are produced, reproduced, and circulated within and between creative 
practices. This implies putting innovation at the forefront as an object of investigation 
and not as an outcome of the innovation process.  
 
I outline ‘the more abstract plane of relations that underlie’ (Kwinter, 2001, p. 34) such 
considerations of innovation and which form what Kwinter (2001, p. 34) calls the 
‘conditions of possibility’.12 This means considering the use of artistic techniques and 
tools as conditions for the notion of innovation and the idea of the new and, at the 
same time, constructing a vocabulary for the study of innovation. It is in relation to such 
a charting that the complexity of the field may be apprehended, as the artistic ideas, each 
in their own way, add to a perspective implying that innovation might be understood as 
more than just a symptom of the ‘new’.  
 
On Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization  
The historical transformation to post-Fordism has been argued to constitute a 
movement of destabilization in terms of displacement of the workforce, 
dematerialization of labour and decentralization of capital flow. Furthermore, the 
                                                
12 This analysis depends on a series of assumptions in which the world is taken as consisting of temporary 
and only relatively stable forms, not unities or totalities, following a Deleuzian-Latourian route which 
views capitalism as composed of diverse and changing networks.  
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aestheticization of the economy proposed by Lazzarato (2008) seems to indicate a 
displacement of capital across territorial occupations as a consequence of the second 
industrial revolution (Thrift, 2005), which made the borders of territories look like 
imaginary constructs. However, according to Barry (2001, p. 38) what is considered 
technological, cultural, political or economic is in itself related to the concept of the 
territory. In general, the practices that are thought of as innovative are exactly those 
which are seen as capable of escaping territorial constraints (as such, practices are seen 
to respond to new trends and, thereby, to turn the value of globalization into a 
resource). From this point of view, the structural formation of boundaries or territorial 
occupation should not be erased from the debate of innovation and creativity (cf. Barry, 
2001, p. 59; Cocco, 2007, p. 307).  
 
The demarcation of territorial borders is materially established through the binary 
differences of art and business. From this territorial perspective we end up with a 
definition of business where capital is socialized and a definition of art where creativity 
is economized. In this way, the economy is seen as internally differentiated where value 
creation happens beyond the financially regulated market. Territorial boundaries are re-
enacted most visibly through novel forms of capitalism in the context of innovation 
strategies. 
 
From this perspective, I draw out the assertion that innovation strategies can best be 
ascertained by examining the way in which the notion of innovation itself is brought 
into being by way of differentiation, that is, to articulate its relations to other creative 
practices, governmental institutions and the creative industries. I argue that the use of 
artistic ideas as a strategy for innovation entails a process of social ordering, which is 
described by Deleuze and Guattari as being constituted through the dynamics of 
‘deterritorialization’ and ‘reterritorialization’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 25).13 In 
doing so, I trace different organisational formations constituted by the spatial dynamics 
                                                
13 In this chapter I address the notion of the assemblage with a specific focus on the definition suggested 
by Deleuze and Guattari (1972). However, the notion of the assemblage has been taken up in the 
sociology of science and technology by Irwin and Michael (2003) in the book Science, Social Theory and 
Public Knowledge. They refer to the assemblage as ‘the collection of heterogeneous fragments that can entail 
‘territorialization’’ (Irwin and Michael, 2003, p. 78). The term has also found resonance in anthropological 
studies, especially with the publication by Ong and Collier (2005) entitled Global Assemblages: Technology, 
Politics, and Ethics as Anthropological Problems. I will return to these references in the next chapter, while 
addressing the methodological implications of assemblage for the empirical investigations in this thesis.  
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of the assemblage as they unfold in particular events or social experiments where art is 
taken as a principle of innovation.14  
 
To explain this research strategy, I return to the case of Pistoletto’s artistic project. The 
mirror-paintings have been acclaimed as a work of art that attempts to break down the 
traditional notions of figurative art. The ‘mirror-effect’ produced through the experience 
of the paintings provokes the viewer to reflect on their surroundings and they are 
themselves included as a part of the painting. The attempt is to exhibit an ever-changing 
spectacle and portray some reflections on contemporary consumer society. The artistic 
idea of Pistoletto is recognised as a well-known principle that has challenged and 
reconstructed the essence of art by transforming its methods of production. It is these 
kinds of artistic transformations that are translated into principles of innovation applied 
to business processes. The artistic transformation in the example of Pistoletto’s art 
practice provides a sense of direction and orientation producing a specific idea of what 
it means to be creative. According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991) such transformations 
happen ‘within’ and ‘in spite’ of a given territory – a territory, which in this case refers to 
the current economic environment enacted by the ‘major’ institutions within the field of 
innovation.15 These institutions include other creative practices, governmental 
institutions and the creative industries. Let me briefly elaborate on this theme in further 
detail.    
 
Considering the examples of innovation practices given in this chapter, a proliferation 
of terms from the arts used to organise innovation processes occur. Concepts such as 
script, scenario, staging, casting, interdisciplinarity, creation and collaboration are key elements that 
contribute to the enactment of the specific innovation programmes – that is, a 
vocabulary, which promotes flexible organisational forms and performative character 
                                                
14 The processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization are defined as the processual movement of 
the assemblage. John Phillips (2006, p. 108) defines, with reference to Deleuze, the notion of assemblage 
from the French ‘agencement’, as a form of connectivity (cf. Chapter 3). The process of 
deterritorialization is defined as ‘the ‘transformative vector of a territory’ (Parr, 2005, p. 67), that is, as a 
process of ‘coming undone’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, p. 322) 
15 According to Deleuze and Guattari (1991, p. 67) the concept of the territory not only refers to a 
geographical demarcation of land, but also to a domain of action or thought, as I have already introduced 
in relation to Thrift’s (2005) idea of new forms of capitalism. Deterritorialization has been suggested as 
the implication of the historical shift to post-Fordism. In this aspect, some writers see the new economy 
as a decrease of territories, as suggested by Deleuze (1986) in his writings on Foucault. However, Deleuze 
also emphasizes the important point that deterritorialization cannot be understood without its counter-
movement of reterritorialization. That is, a process of reterritorialization always takes place simultaneous 
with the act of deterritotrialization (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 326). In this way, the new economy 
cannot solely be understood as the erasure of territories, but as a transformation in processes of control, 
which Deleuze has suggested to be a hybridization of discipline into a society of control (Deleuze, 1986). 
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that can adapt to any changing circumstance in the financial market. As such, the artistic 
ideas, which are applied as principles of innovation, become a creative condition for 
inventing the new. Albertsen and Diken (2006, p. 247) write that ‘[t]he artistic critique of 
the 60s and 70s today supply business with a rhetoric of creative productivity, making 
aesthetics an element of social cohesion’. In this view, the aesthetic critique has entered 
into a post-Fordist regime of justification where the notion of creativity is re-coded in 
terms of flexibility, interdisciplinarity, provocation and experimentation (cf. Chapter 
4).16  
 
The idea of the new is closely tied to deterritorialization and reterritorialization as two 
types of mobility organising innovation processes. On the one hand, creativity is staged 
as a deterritorializing force ‘undoing’ rigid channels of power in producing the new. On 
the other, reterritorialization is seen as the processes by which the creative condition of 
inventing the new ‘antagonizes the determinants of its production’ (cf. Read, 2003, p. 
91). As I show later, this implies that such an approach to creativity, enacted by 
differentiating itself from the current discourse on innovation, also means that this 
differentiation is in itself a reterritorialization of the capitalistic creation of value.  
 
Instantiation of Capitalism 
From the historical perspective outlined in this chapter, creativity comes into view as an 
economic reality emerging from the historical transformations of post-Fordism. In 
continuation, I argue that the rise of certain kinds of creative practices can be traced as 
symptomatic of this development or tendency within contemporary capitalism and its 
engagement with creativity. At the same time, these practices have the effect of 
contributing to such transformations through their use of the tools and methods of 
artistic creation. They appear as an enactment of new forms of production, while 
fostering the production of the new by reproducing artistic ideas within practices of 
innovation. In this way, the practices in question are not exemplary cases of such a 
                                                
16 This development confirms Albertsen and Diken’s (2006, p. 247) argument that critique is not a 
peripheral activity; rather, it contributes to capitalist innovations. The association to the artistic avant-
garde in the ‘60s and ‘70s indicates an aesthetic critique of capitalism applied as a strategy for innovation. 
This might be seen as an indication of Boltanski and Chiapello’s (1999, p. 169) argument that capitalism 
has found new forms of legitimation in the latter form of critique, which resulted in a transfer of 
competencies from leftist radicalism towards management. The movement towards flexibility, 
experimentation and provocation as means of innovation are then reconfigured into a capitalist logic 
rather than escaping its mode of production. Albertsen and Diken (2006, p. 247) quote Virilio and 
Lotringer saying that ‘we are today ‘condemned to nomadism, at the very moment that we think we can 
make displacement the most effective means of subversion’’.  
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development; rather, the temporary relation to business in terms of collaboration with 
clients, funders and research institutions makes them look like interstitial spaces.  
 
In this way, the historical development of new forms of capitalism becomes a creative 
condition of the future and not a description of closely integrated practices of 
innovation.17 That is, the practices are not taken as empirical evidence for an historical 
tendency or to prove that creativity is intertwined with capitalism. Rather, the study aims 
to investigate how the differential relations between creativity and capitalism are 
constructed and deconstructed within and through these creative practices. 
 
This perspective, which proposes  a particular form of metaphysics, implies that the idea 
of innovation might be considered as a process that renders visible the existence of the 
new economy as a particular configuration. Nevertheless, it follows that I do not 
consider capitalism as a metaphysical entity (i.e., Lash, 2007), one which transcends the 
physical exchange of commodities.18 Rather, I view capitalism as enacted within socio-
material practices and their interconnections, which determine the way in which we 
think about innovation. The practices observed entail a processual configuration which 
renders  the ‘objective’ existence of the economy as a particular configuration produced 
in and through the circulating patterns of de- and re-territorialization.  
 
On the basis of these considerations, I develop the idea that capitalism is ‘instantiated’ 
(Thrift, 2005) in particular innovation practices. The cases in question are ‘in 
themselves’ capitalist practices that embody a certain socio-economic rationality. This 
suggests a perspective on innovation that is not caught in prescriptive models or 
objectively given realities (De Laat, 2000; Godin, 2006); rather, it emphasises the reality 
that is constituted in and through these innovation practices. These are arrangements 
                                                
17 It is in this way that I view the innovation practices as ‘creative assemblages’. This notion has been 
addressed by Wilkie et al. (2010) in ‘Creative Assemblages: Organization and Outputs of Practice-led 
Research’. They suggest that the notion of creative assemblages should be seen as a methodological 
device to investigate the organization of creative practice-led projects. That is, as a means of 
understanding how pratice-led research is heterogeneously composed as an ‘interweaving of practices, 
technologies, institutions, authors, knowledge and issues constituting the case studies in question’ (Wilkie 
et al., 2010).  The term is also mentioned by Mar and Anderson (2010) in order to address the complexity 
of the collaborative contexts in which art production is entangled.  
18 Lash argues that within post-Fordist transformations capitalism itself has become metaphysical as 
cultural values represent an abstraction of the physical exchange of material commodities (Lash, 2007).   
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that make up what we tend to think of as economics, arts, creation, capital, state, 
institutions, organisations, and markets.19  
 
Compared to the literature on the intermingling of art and business, the dual 
construction of new forms of production and production of the new raises a set of 
interrelated problems or issues as to how to account for the ‘new’. On the basis of this, 
I aim to explore the way in which strategies of innovation entail a process of social 
ordering mediated through the invention of aesthetic objects within various creative 
practices taking art as a principle of innovation. I follow the critical potential of the 
artistic ideas enacted within processes of innovation and the relations between capital 
and creativity that are at stake in them.  
 
Conclusion 
The focus on the creative industries and the attempt to merge the cultural world with 
that of business, or rather, to turn art into a profitable global industry, as well as the 
increased use of artistic tools to engage employees highlight different ways in which the 
notions of creativity and capitalism are seen as intertwined. In this view, innovation is in 
itself a multiplicity of different realms, which are enacted in different sorts of ways, 
constituting an assemblage of relations, attitudes and beliefs in relation to the 
production of the new. In drawing attention to writings on new forms of capitalism, 
innovation comes into view, not as a matter of the dissemination of new ideas or 
products to a predetermined market, but rather as affecting ontological change (Barry, 
Born and Weszkalnys, 2008). 
 
In this chapter, I have paid specific attention to the entanglement of creativity and 
contemporary capitalism. In conclusion, this chapter can be considered as a two-fold 
contribution to the field of innovation studies. Firstly, I traced the intermingling of 
creativity and capitalism and, secondly, I mapped out the analytical perspective that 
                                                
19 Heelas captures the dynamics of deterritorialization and reterritorialization saying that modernity was 
characterized by ‘a number of differentiations’ such as private/public, micro/macro, and postmodern 
dedifferentiation (Heelas 1998, p. 2). He claims that both differentiation and dedifferentiation processes 
are taking place within both modernity and postmodernity. Central to the transformation under 
consideration is the claim that postmodern differentiation and dedifferentiation operate in a new way. 
They are not regulated by grand narratives, whether these are narratives of religion, science, growth, 
human self-realization, Marxism, liberal economic theory or high art (cf. Chapter 1). The processes of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization are then bound up with one another in that each can generate 
the other. 
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renders visible the role of the production of the new in the historical transformation 
towards post-Fordism. In this way, I have demonstrated that the increased focus on the 
creativity and the power of the market show that new ways of structuring the future 
have entered the economic sphere, and I have described how artistic creation has been 
considered as an integral part of the processes of production within contemporary 
capitalism. 
 
The identified intersections between art and business, characterized as an assemblage of 
heterogeneous relations, explains a configuration of the social world and the forms of 
strategies that shape how cultural artefacts, new technologies and management 
processes come into being. By combining detailed attention to innovation practices with 
an equally developed sense of space, and by visiting a few of these practices, it might be 
possible to get a sense of how they operate in and through the dynamics of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. At the same time, I hope to contribute to 
critical studies of innovation by investigating the complex and differential articulation of 
the field of innovation. It is the methodology of such a study that I turn to in the 
following chapter.  
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3. Methodology: An Ethnography of Innovation 
 
Introduction 
Having outlined the conceptual landscape of my investigation of innovation, in this 
chapter I present the methodological framework for this research, an ethnography of 
innovation. In doing so, I explain how this thesis practically engages with the 
exploration of innovation. The methodological rationale was guided by the belief that 
art-led innovation can be better understood by participating in and observing how 
designers, filmmakers, and performing artists deploy the notion of innovation within a 
business setting. The object of this thesis is therefore interactive research-based 
practices utilizing art as a strategy of innovation. I present the artistic vision as it was 
enacted in practice by following, in a Latourian (2005) sense, the tools and devices 
utilised within innovation processes and the transformation of bodies and subjects.  
 
This research has drawn on a range of methodological approaches including periods of 
observation of different innovation processes, participation in camps, labs and studio-
workshops, as well as conducting interviews with a range of parties (such as partners, 
organisers, tutors, students, funders and clients). In addition, I draw on document 
analysis and literary accounts including the sources used by the practices to frame the 
artistic ideas upon which their innovation strategies are based. I have sought to find 
ways in which to explore the articulation of the various ways in which art and business 
were enacted within the practice of innovation. In doing so, I employ a theory of the 
assemblage as put forward by DeLanda (2006), Deleuze and Guattari (1980) and Latour 
(2005), providing a framework in which to situate the use of various methods and, at a 
descriptive level, to present the cases.  
 
Firstly, I discuss the cases as connecting the fields of politics, art, research and business. 
I explain how these cases came into view as assemblages, comprising a set of temporary 
associations between institutions, knowledge practices and artefacts that constitute the 
innovation process. In this way, the artistic ideas that I follow do not pre-exist or have 
any pre-determined identity or functional definition apart from their actualisation in 
practice. In pursuing this claim, I follow recent discussions of ethnographic research, 
which argue that the field site consists of temporal events and relations, which cannot 
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be accounted for in terms of pre-existing physical sites to which the ethnographer 
travels (Atkinson et al., 2001, p. 9; Hess, 2001, p. 238). I draw out an anthropological 
account of the relational connectivity of the assemblage (Riles, 2001; Phillips, 2006; 
Strathern, 2004).  
 
Secondly, I explain how this ethnography constitutes a ‘method assemblage’ (Law, 2004) 
conducted by the use of multiple methods in collecting and analysing the empirical 
material. I explain how this application of multiple methods allows me to consider the 
ethnographic studies presented in this thesis, not as representational givens, but as 
emerging empirical entities, emphasising different aspects of the complex nature of 
these processes of innovation. I present the methods which are used to facilitate 
innovation and, simultaneously, which enact the artistic ideas, in order to demonstrate 
the way in which the notion of the assemblage can be thought of as a heuristic tool 
within social science (Irwin and Michael, 2003, p. 113).  
 
The duality between, firstly, the characterisation of the empirical cases as assemblages 
(‘method assemblage’) and, secondly the description of the ethnographic approach as 
‘assembling methods’ constructs a critical analytical perspective from where I reflect on 
innovation as a practice that cannot be apprehended as an empirical object outside of 
the methodological frame which brings it into view as inventive (cf. Clough, 2009). To 
draw the chapter to a close, I discuss the sociological implications of this dual 
construction, as the analytical frame cannot be separated from its object of research. 
 
Method Assemblages 
My first encounter within the field of innovation was when I participated in a work-
camp inspired by experimental filmmaking. The camp took place in the summer of 2007 
in an urban film city over the course of 5 weeks. I participated in this camp as part of a 
summer programme related to my postgraduate studies within business administration. 
The team in which I participated was supposed to propose a business strategy for 
promoting the invention of an aesthetic object, which could be used to digitally transmit 
emotions across spatial and temporal distances. The camp itself was organised by a 
small-scale innovation company – a spin-off from a Danish film company. The 
filmmaking practice they took its inspiration from is associated with the emergence of a 
‘new’ artistic avant-garde by stipulating a set of rules to be obeyed as creative constraints 
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in order to rethink the current state of filmmaking. The innovation practice facilitates 
creative processes using rules and constraints as methods of invention.  
  
At a later point in time I re-encountered the artistic principle of filmmaking within the 
field of design where I participated in a 4-week design brief. The brief was set by an 
international telecommunications company and aimed at a group of Masters students 
being taught to practice a kind of artistic critique. The brief investigated the future of 
digital manners, which addresses the emergence of etiquettes modelled around the 
invention of new digital technologies. The project was organised as a research 
experiment taking place at an academic institution in London. My first encounter with 
the design practice was an informal interview with the professor organising the design 
brief. He discussed the release of Anti-Christ (2009) by Lars von Trier in order to explain 
the shared artistic vision between this practice of design and the filmmaking movement. 
Anti-Christ was taken as an illustration of a film produced to deconstruct any 
predetermined story that might be represented in the mind of the audience. In this 
practice of design, the invention of objects is meant to provoke and, thereby, foster 
critical awareness of social and ethical implications of new and emerging technologies. 
This is similar to the filmmaking movement that illustrates a vision meant to shock and, 
thereby, provoke a debate around the use of technological manipulation (i.e. the use of 
special effects and artificial props). In a similar way to Anti-Christ, the design object is 
not produced to fulfil a specific function, but to leave only cues for the audience to 
interpret. It is this shared artistic vision that was translated into guiding principles of 
innovation in both of the practices in which I participated. 
 
The case of filmmaking illuminates how innovation practice uses cinema as a kind of 
experimental laboratory for producing ideas rather than objects for the screen. Film is 
not in this case merely ‘an object for perception and expression; it is the subject of 
perception and expression’ (Sobchack, 1992, p. 167), constituting a strategy for 
innovation. The idea of design, which aims to promote a specific kind of artistic 
critique, functions in a similar way by operationalising the principles of design, not to 
produce functional objects, but to test the social utility of design. These are both 
interventionist practices that construct social experiments in order to develop their 
artistic idea. In this way, the artistic techniques applied to foster transformational change 
within these practices become experimental data processing tools for the study of 
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innovation. Behind this approach to innovation lies the assumption that innovation 
studies have moved from a focus on the invention of functional or technological objects 
to the social itself becoming a resource of innovation (see Chapter 2).  
 
Latour (2005) argues that in technological societies social change takes the form of an 
ongoing production of new distributions – marked by the proliferation of new 
connections such as the one between art and business. The organisation of innovation 
as a spin-off from a film company and as a design brief, as well as the examples 
mentioned in Chapter 2, exemplify how innovation emerges from diverse settings and is 
not restricted to institutional research environments. In particular, the work-camp and 
the design brief were constituted as an interim network of relations across different 
creative disciplines, political fields and businesses. 
 
The innovation processes engaged a great number of people from a vast variety of fields 
as diverse as venture capital, academia, cultural institutions, governmental agencies, 
private corporations, design bureaus, self-employed practitioners, freelance artists, 
journalists and entrepreneurs. The design brief, for instance, involved a design studio, 
which consisted of two partners, also situated within the academic department in which 
the process took place. Furthermore, the brief engaged nineteen students, two external 
and two internal tutors, a range of specialized designers and artists and programmers for 
the brief, as well as academic staff and representatives from the client. Similarly, the film 
company employed six full-time positions and more than sixty people participated in the 
work-camp, which consisted of thirty nine students, administrative staff, artists, 
businesses, engineering and marketing professionals as well as script-writers, actors and 
filmmakers (producers and instructors). For the work-camp the different projects served 
clients as diverse as unions, political parties, large-scale medical companies, consul-
tancies, insurance companies and publishing houses.  
 
Both the work-camp and the design brief present a form of organisation with no stable 
relations, no stable amount of staff or employees and no fixed buildings to represent 
them. The company only exists through momentarily assembled relations that gather for 
the duration of the innovation process and do not have the spatial coordinates of 
governmental institutions, artistic practices or corporate businesses. However, this does 
not mean that these practices are not defined by stable boundaries but that they were 
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enacted in and through the innovation process. It is these processual constructions or 
boundary-making practices that define the innovation processes that I investigate 
(camps, labs and studio-workshops), rather than the practices per se. It is in these spaces 
that artistic creation comes to be associated with the displacement of innovation away 
from the centralised institutions of research, such as R&D departments or academia, as 
well as independent from national politics or macro-economic structures (Marres, 2007, 
p. 176). Following the cases, innovation came into view as distributed, happening in and 
through relations and not limited to the traditionally well-defined spaces of innovation 
(where the market has been seen to be what structures the invention of new 
technology).  
 
The question is under what conditions can assemblages be recognized as sites in which 
artistic ideas are enacted, deployed or just played out. Within this construction the idea 
taken from filmmaking and design came into view as two artistic enactments of the 
notion of innovation. I investigate the way in which these practices form part of a 
network distributed by the nature of their temporary organisational structure.20 The 
artistic vision also relies on assumptions and presuppositions determined by the way in 
which these practices deploy the notion of innovation. This observation provides a view 
from which to consider innovation as assemblage. The innovation processes are taken 
as locally situated practices, in which (global) capitalism is seen as an emergent 
dimension defining the connection among sites (Marcus, 1995, p.99) or, put another 
way, how sites are variously constructed in and through the connections in which they 
participate.  
 
This ethnographic assumption is what Marcus (1995) refers to as the essence of ‘multi-
sited ethnography’, which he emphasises is a consequence of the partial or fragmented 
form of organisation considered to be local and decentralised. This perspective is also 
captured in the concept of post-Fordism implying ‘the end of organised capitalism’ 
                                                
20 The case studies are considered as ‘strategic fixations’ of a more relational and ever-changing dynamic 
field. The small-scale innovation practice, which at the time of my research was a spin-off from a film 
company, has now merged with other companies and forms an independent consultancy specialised in 
change management and game design. In this way, the cases conducted serve as partial fixations, which 
are observable manifestations of the operation of the assemblage (Strathern, 2004). In addition, I have to 
add that the comparison between the events and practices are mine. I emphasise a few examples where 
the cases speak to or about one another. Following Strathern, this is not to be understood as a traditional 
comparative study in which separate fields are presumed to exist independently from one another and to 
inform one another drawing out their similarities and differences. Rather, I draw out the way in which 
their relational construction in itself performs an industry assemblage (see Chapter 4). 
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(Lash and Urry, 1987) and replacing the macro-models of the capitalist world system. In 
light of the flexible specialization obtained through this mode of organising innovation 
(dispersed across time and space) calls for ethnographic research to be defined as an 
exercise in ‘mapping terrain’ (Marcus, 1995, p. 99) However, that is not to be 
understood in a representational manner, but in the Deleuzian sense of exploring the 
construction of its territoriality (see Chapter 2). I argue that the field is a dynamic one, 
which emerges in and through the different spatio-temporal configurations (such as 
camps, labs, workshops). These cannot be accounted for as long-lasting events to be 
observed (Atkinson et al., 2001, p. 9; Hess, 2001, p. 238), but might better be 
apprehended as a field site constructed by ephemeral connectivity or associations 
(Latour, 2005).21  
 
In focusing on innovation processes as assemblages I outline an ethnographic study 
defined as ‘multi-sited’ (Marcus, 1995, p. 97; Hess, 2001, p. 236; Holmes and Marcus, 
2005). The challenge for a study of innovation as assemblage is not to translate the field 
site into that of an isolated space taking the actors as members of a strange tribe, but for 
the study to form part of the research setting – enacted in and through a number of 
practices in which they are also situated (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). Such a 
perspective addresses the shaping of a research object without reference to an overall 
frame (such as the state, national politics or macroeconomic models) used as 
‘contextualizing referents of research’ (Marcus, 1995, p. 103). In this matter, STS has 
manifested its importance in presenting the lab as a complex cultural and social time-
space (Franklin, 1995). In continuation, Hess (2001) explains the transformation from 
the laboratory to cultural and interventionist approaches as a second generation of 
ethnographic studies. Defining a multi-sited field whilst rethinking time-space relations 
in ethnographic research means tracing a territory.  
 
In what follows, I argue that the organisation of innovation operates as an assemblage; 
however, I do not, in a linear fashion, attempt to identify the existence of a specific 
                                                
21 The object of study cannot thus be seen as the type of representational field site traditionally regarded 
as an object of ethnographic research. The definition of ethnography has conventionally been understood 
as ‘detailed, first-hand, long-term, participant observation fieldwork written up as a monograph’ 
(Macdonald, 2001, p. 60). Since the early twentieth century, ethnographic field work has been central to 
anthropology. Such work was usually carried out in a society different from the west and viewed as ‘a rite 
of passage required for entry to the ‘tribe’ of anthropologists’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 1). 
Traditionally fieldwork required living within the field for an extended period of time (over the course of 
a year or more), in order to document, interpret and report the beliefs and values integral to their way of 
living (Skeggs, 2001, p. 428). 
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assemblage taking it as a representational ‘model’. Rather, I operationalise this term in 
order to investigate the dynamic of the field and the relations which separate, connect 
and blur the artistic critique from the field of business. It is in this way that my approach 
to innovation is different from the more network-oriented methodologies which trace 
the existence of objectively given relations between stable entities. I outline a research 
design that is based on this methodological principle, as well as paying attention to its 
challenges and assumptions. In doing so, I consider the problem of representation 
within ethnographic research.  
 
Techniques, Devices and Tools  
Following an STS/anthropology informed ethnography, with Latour (1987, 1991) and 
Callon (1993, 1999) setting the scene, the focus is on the relationship between the 
paradigmatic experimental site, the laboratory, and what is outside of it – in this case the 
‘real’ economy. This formulation relates to the innovation processes being organised as 
isolated from ‘real-scale’ markets (Mackenzie, Muniesa and Siu, 2007, p. 11). The 
construction of camps, labs, workshops, are all temporary constructions located in 
physical settings detached from the outside market. Latour and Woolgar’s (1979) study of 
Roger Guillemin’s laboratory at the Salk Institute showed how the existence of scientific 
facts depends on their staging in experiments. In this view, the laboratory turns into a 
creative-performative condition from where to stage ‘reality’ and presents the spatial 
facilities of the scientific lab as a facilitator of inventing the new (Latour, 1987; Latour 
and Woolgar, 1979). This comparison is supported by the fact that the creative practices 
that I encountered, borrow scientific terms, such as the laboratory, experimentation and 
investigation. These are then applied to artistic activities in the process of innovation, 
presenting the innovation processes as set within sequestrated places of invention. 
 
Similarly, Rheinberger (1997, p. 37) claims that it is the experimental systems that give 
laboratories their special character as particular cultural settings ‘where strategies of 
material signification are generated’. He argues that it is not the scientific or broader 
cultural terms that determine from the outside what a laboratory is. Consequently, it is 
inside the laboratory that ‘things’ (Rheinberger, 1997) are generated, which in the end 
gain the power of determining what it means to be scientific. It is also such ‘things’ 
occurring inside the lab that Mol and Law (2004) pay attention to, such as the X-ray, CT 
scanning and laboratory chemistry. It is such tools or techniques that Rheinberger 
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(1997, p. 8) defines as ‘epistemic objects’, considered to be constitutive of the material 
culture of the laboratory.  
 
I adopt this vision of the object by viewing the tools for innovation as acted out by 
corporealities (physical presence of bodies) and materials, as well as the tools and 
techniques used within the innovation processes. The experimental setting of 
innovation includes techniques taken from the art world, such as crits, brainstorms, 
tutorials, and interventions (Greenberg, 1992; Simons and McCormack, 2007). These 
are techniques through which the experimental setting is both generated and also 
sustains its ‘inventiveness’ and, thereby, its ability to be considered as a site of 
innovation. More specifically, I pay attention to two such interventions that emerged 
within the work-camp and the design brief.  
 
In the first case, I draw on my participation and experience in Rumspringa (cf. Chapter 5) 
that took place in the second week of the five-week work-camp. This is an intensive 
initiation ritual that lasted forty two hours, where the innovation teams were locked in a 
room without any information about the events to come. Furthermore, any kind of 
technological or digital devices, such as mobile phones, watches and laptops were 
confiscated. The teams entered an empty hall with blocked windows and a timer on the 
wall. Throughout the forty two hours the teams were led through a rigorous sequence 
of tasks accompanied by strict deadlines of only a couple of minutes. This event served 
to embody the artistic idea of filmmaking by imposing constraints on the participants in 
order to generate a process of ideation, that is, as a way in which to construct an 
imaginary space for invention where the participants supposedly would suspend outside 
reality.  
 
Secondly, I pay attention to the Berlin Street Experiment that happened in the second week 
of the design brief (cf. Chapter 6). It was organised as a three-day workshop, which took 
place at the client’s headquarter. In this experiment the students were expected to set up 
spaces for artistic intervention investigating etiquettes around digital technologies. The 
approach for this intervention was characterised as ‘confrontational techniques’, that is, 
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encounters and situations the designer sets in motion that challenge social behaviour 
and render visible the practices of everyday life.22  
 
Both of these interventions were meant to violate unspoken social rules, to test the 
limits of a given social situation in order to question the taken-for-granted everyday 
reality. To understand the operation of these tools as devices of innovation I first 
introduce the structure of making and unmaking captured in the concepts of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization (cf. Chapter 2). Again I turn to Rheinberger’s 
(1997) investigation of ‘experimental systems’. He posits that experimental settings must 
be capable of ‘differential reproduction’ in order to act as devices or provocative tools - 
tools that, according to Rheinberger (1997, p. 3), act as ‘generator[s] of surprises’ 
producing scientific novelties that are beyond our present knowledge (brackets in 
original).  
 
An important task is to look into the processes that construct this experimental system 
as the driving force of production of the new. Both of these experiments (Rumspringa 
and the Berlin Street Experiment) were staged to test an experimental situation: to 
deconstruct normality, to destroy our familiarity with the world, which entails a process 
of deterritorialization.23 The idea was to create an imaginary space as an exercise in 
‘reality suspension’, to access affective forces of creativity. Thus, the task in this thesis is 
to trace the way in which the innovation practices themselves create, utilize and stage 
affect as a source of creativity. On the one hand, these tools were considered as 
constraints or obstacles in the process of ideation, and, on the other hand, they 
provoked reactions and responses (as when the participants warrant their right to 
defend ideas). I refer here to the way in which the participants strategically made use of 
the crits, deadlines and tutorials as resources to act upon (for instance by withholding 
ideas at the crits to avoid criticism from the tutors or client). 
 
                                                
22 What comes to mind in relation to this experimental method is Garfinkel’s concept of ‘breaching 
experiments’, which address methods in order to show how people react when violating commonly 
accepted rules and social norms (See Chapter 5). 
23 Deterritorialization is defined as undoing of the world (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, p. 13; 1980, p. 11), 
or the dismantling of any preconceived structures of the world. Deleuze talks about the assemblage as a 
‘provoked becoming of thought’ (Tomlinson and Galeta, 1989, p. xv).  
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The Problem of Affect 
The notion of affect has been defined by Massumi (2002, p. 3) with refrence to Spinoza 
as ‘an “affection [in other words an impingement upon] the body, and at the same time the 
idea of the affection”’ (Italic and brackets in original). This definition gives rise to concerns 
about the status of the concept of affect in ethnographic studies, as it is then seen as 
resistant to any observation or analytical description. It is even ‘destructive to it, because 
it appeals to an unmediated experience’ (Massumi, 2002, p. 2), However, according to 
Clough, affect is not pre-social. She writes that ‘[a]ffect constitutes a nonlinear complexity 
out of which the narration of conscious states such as emotion are subtracted’ (Clough, 
2007, p. 2). In this conceptualization, affect is not only seen as relating to the human 
body, but is also defined by the technologies that allow one to ‘observe’ affect. Artistic 
innovation entails, for example, the exposure or display of affects (such as pain, 
frustrations, stress) in relation to particular forms of artistic devices such as crits, 
brainstorm sessions, tutorials and artistic interventions. Such artistic devices can be seen 
to be inserted into what Clough (2007, p. 2) calls the ‘felt vitality’ contained in the pre-
individual bodily capacities to act, engage and connect.  
 
In this way, events like Rumspringa and the Berlin Street Experiment are not simply 
occurrences that incidentally deconstruct the made world, but occurrences that 
deconstruct the structure of making itself (deterritorialization). By investigating the 
notion of innovation through such experimental settings, these tools can be seen as 
‘objects that carry new realities, new ontologies, with them’ (Mol, 1999, p. 75).24 Thus, 
my focus on deterritorialization and reterritorialization reaches beyond the merely 
conceptual task. Rather, I draw attention to the techniques of innovation as affective 
tools of innovation that come into existence through the gathering of bodies and their 
subsequent transformation. As such, the artistic ideas are investigated through their 
material embodiment. Rheinberger (1997, p. 37) concludes that ‘a manufactury of 
epistemic things’ are being transformed into ‘technical things, and vice versa’. However, 
these are not objects that can be studied apart from the actions that they produce. 
Rheinberger writes: 
 
                                                
24 It is at the level of things or the focus on scientific objects that actor-network-theory (Latour, 2005) 
contributes to this ethnography by including human and non-humans as internal to the construction of an 
assemblage. The focus on scientific objects and the technical-performative conditions of their coming 
into existence locally situated in time and space.  
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The first I call the research object, the scientific object, or the “epistemic thing”. 
They are material entities, or processes – physical structures, chemical reactions, 
biological functions – that constitute the objects of inquiry. As epistemic 
objects, they present themselves in a characteristic, irreducible vagueness. This 
vagueness is inevitable because, paradoxically, epistemic things embody what 
one does not yet know. Scientific objects have the precarious status of being 
absent in their experimental presence; they are not simply hidden things to be 
brought to light through sophisticated manipulations. (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 28)      
 
 
Rheinberger (1997, p. 4) defines the experimental arrangement as a ‘filiation of objects, 
not as pictures of an exhibition, but as records of the process of their coming into 
existence’ inspired by the ‘temporal forms of artistic production’. Considering artistic 
innovations as epistemic things means to follow their coming into being, rather than 
following the representations of these as objects in themselves. In doing so, I trace these 
artistic events and their means of affection within innovation practice. Put differently, I 
consider these as interventionist techniques or devices, which ‘act or they make others 
act’ (Muniesa, Millo and Callon 2007, p. 2). What is so important in Rheinberger’s view 
is to take serious the fact that such devices cannot be directly observed, but only 
portrayed in their vagueness, that is, in terms of their constitutive action.  
 
The three steps outlined above – defining the experimental setting, its devices of 
innovation and their performative effects – point towards the field as a non-
representational space. The field site is seen as being assembled through particular 
performances, devices and objects enacting the notion of innovation. In this way, 
innovation occurred as a temporarily articulated and traceable gathering. During this 
study I came to understand that an investigation of artistic tools and innovation involves 
a different ethnographic challenge other than directly translating sociological methods 
into the study of creative practices.25 To achieve a measure of analytical distance where 
the field site is rarely remote or disconnected from the setting within which it emerges 
                                                
25 STS ethnographies of the laboratory have addressed the problem of upholding an objectively 
constructed distance towards the objects researched (Bowker, 2010, p. 123). Latour and Woolgar (1979, p. 
40-41) describe the scientists they followed as members of a foreign tribe. In this way, the notion of 
‘anthropological strangeness’ is used to explain ‘the activities of the laboratory as those of a remote 
culture and to thus explore the way in which an ordered account of the laboratory life can be generated 
without recourse to the explanatory concepts of the inhabitants themselves’. The notion of 
anthropological strangeness inherent in the definition of ethnography refers to the objectivity to which 
the process of observing foreign cultures gives rise. The principle applied is that even when the site is 
seen to be familiar, the participant observer must treat this as ‘anthropologically strange’, in order to make 
explicit the presuppositions taken for granted as an included member. It is in this way that traditional 
accounts of ethnographic studies have said to change the research object available for social studies 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 9). 
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(Hess 2001, p. 238) becomes an important issue for conducting an ethnography of 
innovation. This approach has been addressed as a post-structuralist turn in 
ethnography. It is a turn away from the ideal of ethnographic accounts as rendering an 
objectively given social reality (Marcus, 1995) and which also marks a shift from 
representation to performance (Mol, 1999, p. 77).   
 
The methodological challenge of this thesis is to look at innovation from the point of 
view of the materials and devices that constrain and enable inventive processes and, 
thereby, the production of the new. It is important to note that I do not attempt to 
describe the experimental methods as affective or in a phenomenological sense to access 
the bodily experience of affect, but to find ways in which to account for the staging, 
performance and enactment of affect and sensation as specific artistic constructs. The 
problem of affect leaves us with a number of methodological issues to address when 
investigating the staging of such experiments. In what follows I explore the various 
methods used to investigate a field that is endlessly constructed and re-constructed in 
and through the performance of relations and the enactment of artistic techniques as 
devices of innovation. I describe the use of methods as they enabled me to grasp this 
mechanism in order to develop a sensibility to the changing contours of the field that I 
study (and in order to evaluate its affective-performative capacities).  
  
Assembling Methods 
I return to the questions posed in the previous section on how to conduct an 
ethnography of innovation. In this section I attempt to answer this question by 
explaining how I draw upon multiple methods in collecting and analysing the empirical 
material, which might in itself constitute a ‘method assemblage’. I operate from the 
assumption that different art forms and economic realities are interrelated – explained in 
the previous chapter as differentially constructed through the way in which various art 
practices deploy the notion of innovation between the fields of art and business. In 
order to analyse such a complex field I make use of various methods. It is in this way 
that I want to reflect on the notion of the assemblage as a practical-analytical tool within 
social science research, as addressed by Irwin and Michael (2003, p. 113).  
 
‘Assembling methods’ is explained as the methodology of this research project – 
through a focus on multiple methods. The main ones include documentary evidence of 
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different kinds, such as participant observation, informal conversations and open-ended 
unstructured or semi-structured interviews. Such methods are considered as 
ethnographic techniques that access the participants’ experience of the devices and 
techniques of innovation deployed. In particular, the display of affect (or its 
performative enactment) becomes important as a way of explaining the experiences said 
to constitute the strategy of innovation enacted and re-enacted within the work-camp 
and the design brief. This perspective allows me to study the performative enactment of 
innovation in practice, which is so far something the discourse of innovation has said 
little about.  
 
Within the field of STS the notion of the assemblage as a methodological tool amounts 
to a study in which the empirical is seen as actively constituted out of relations between 
bodies, objects, practices, and words (Hess, 2001). For the sake of clarification, let me 
explain the notion of the assemblage in further detail. The assemblage has, according to 
Deleuze and Guattari, two sides – one of content and one of expression. The side of 
content has so far been explained as the temporary associations between a set of 
institutions, knowledge practices and artefacts that constitute the innovation process. 
The side of expression is defined by Deleuze and Guattari (1980, p. 88) as ‘collective 
assemblages of enunciation’, pointing to the reciprocity of acts and statements. It is this 
aspect of the assemblage that I turn to in the following part of this chapter.  
 
Enunciation refers to the statements and signs that enable the articulation, and its 
simultaneous construction, of reality. Deleuze and Guattari write: ‘An assemblage of 
enunciation does not speak “of” things; it speak on the same level as states of things…’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980, p. 87, italics in original). Enunciation is, then, what 
encapsulates or formalises the articulation of affect, which was also mediated through 
the ethnographic methods used. The notion of the assemblage acts as a heuristic that 
both informs my sociological perspective on the cases and does work as a strategic tool 
for analysis. This operationalization of the assemblage proposes ways in which to 
display the traits or patterns of invention.  
 
Participant Observation  
In the first case, following the artistic idea of experimental filmmaking, I draw 
extensively on the experience of being a participant myself. Thus, I gained direct access 
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and was not considered an outside observer. I worked on the brief set by a small 
entrepreneurial company – within a team of six other graduate students. As a part of the 
documentation for the client the process was recorded in written notes and 
photographic representations. I later reconstructed my experience of the work-camp in 
a reflexive research diary based on day-to-day events from the notes and results 
produced within the innovation team. One year later I conducted five interviews with 
the other students and four interviews with the practitioners who facilitated the work-
camp.  
 
Within the study of design I followed the project ‘Future Digital Manners’. On a daily 
basis I followed the process in the design studio and the public events, such as the 
project launch, artistic experiments and the various crits. These observations were also 
recorded in a research diary, which encompassed information on the experience of the 
innovation process as it progressed, e.g. control of access, specific events, adaptation to 
the studio or design environment and reflections on the research experience as it 
unfolded. According to Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (2001, p. 353) these are crucial 
ethnographic techniques for the way in which to frame and select the events of 
relevance for the further study.  
 
In both of the cases, the ethnographic documentation was accompanied by ‘material 
dictionaries’ (Latour and Woolgar, 1979, p. 48), like sketches, drawings and graphs 
illustrating the progress of the process of invention as well as the emotional states the 
students went through during their participation. These objects as well as the objects 
invented during the processes are taken as resources of innovation.  
 
I looked into the students’ diaries, sketches and prototypes as well as unpublished 
documents, including correspondence between the tutors and students (such as 
feedback letters, written evaluations of the process and applications of attendance). 
Furthermore, techniques such as written scripts, the use of props and then the artistic 
interventions helped to guide the analysis of such devices as ‘epistemic things’ internal 
to the construction of the experimental setting.  
 
As preparation for the ethnographic study, I gathered data on the artistic idea upon 
which the innovation practices drew. I collected data from their web pages and 
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conducted a few preliminary interviews with the founders of these practices. 
Furthermore, I read published reports and articles on these artistic ideas and its 
reception in the media as well as doing research on the intellectual attention given to 
these practices. At a later stage I interpreted these secondary data as well as drawing 
upon internal documentation, such as business plans, internal emails, reporting for 
funding sources, annual reports, projects proposals and media sources. From this 
material I extracted the statements and terms used to describe the artistic techniques, 
tools and devices.  
 
To capture the expressions and affective experiences produced and reproduced within 
the practice of filmmaking and design, the crits, tutorials, workshops and interviews 
have been audio-recorded and transcribed. Parts of these transcriptions, my notes and 
visual documentation in the form of photography were included as part of the internal 
documentary process conducted by the practice itself used to evaluate and provide rules, 
methods and principles for future innovation processes. However, the observations 
conducted in the case on filmmaking, came closer to an analytic auto-ethnographic 
account (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 159) based on my personal experience of 
the events.  
 
The second case study was based on confidentiality and trust from the students and 
organisers participating in the design brief, and this was assured by granting anonymity 
to those involved (see the later section in this chapter concerning ethical 
considerations). Through the organisers and the tutors in the brief I was presented as a 
research participant and considered an ‘outsider’ due to my academic qualification as a 
social scientist and not a design student. However, due to my position as a non-British 
student myself, I was in a similar position in terms of age and lifestyle to the 
participating students and was, by the students themselves, considered to be ‘one of 
them’. This theme will be explored further in Chapter 6.  
 
I have so far outlined this as an ethnographic study designed around the emergence of 
technological devices as tools for innovation or ‘epistemic things’. I have presented the 
way in which these tools can be investigated in and through their enactment in practice 
and the kind of affective and physical presence that was established. I have emphasised 
an explicit logic of association or connection among sites and objects that defines the 
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context of the ethnography. I take from Rheinberger’s notion of ‘epistemic objects’ the 
idea of tracing things in and through their context – things that construct the multiple 
occurrences of the specific site. It is in this way that the crits, brainstorm sessions, 
tutorials and artistic interventions are considered as devices of innovation, which also 
enact the experimental site observed. These are the things that in themselves were to be 
followed.  
 
Enunciation and Interviews 
Following the innovation process and its constitutive devices from the inside I attempt 
to reach a sense of the field of innovation as experienced by the actors within it. Beside 
my own participatory experience I conducted a range of ethnographic interviews. This 
included nineteen interviews with key individuals within the field, such as the 
organisational staff, designers, students, clients and funders. Furthermore, I conducted 
five preparatory interviews with external parties, such as the founders and partners of 
similar practices in order to get a sense of the field. These interviews were two to three 
hour sessions often during lunch and in connection with a tour on the premises and a 
demonstration of the objects invented through these processes. These interviews 
focussed on the notion of innovation while the founder explained their artistic vision.  
 
Inspired by STS, I draw upon the kind of analysis presented by Gilbert and Mulkay 
(1984) in their treatment of scientists’ accounts of research discoveries. They do not 
treat the scientific narratives as if they were transparent accounts of how the science was 
done, or reliable accounts of how the discoveries were invented. Rather, the analysis is 
an ‘attempt to identify and describe regularities in the methods used by participants’ as 
they make sense of the process in which they are part (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984, p. 14). 
Innovations are then analysed through the enunciations or statements by which they 
explicate the experience of affect. I compare the actual performance or exposure of 
pain, breakdown and crisis and how the students retrospectively reflected upon such 
experiences. My assumption here is that significant patterns can be observed comparing 
real-time events with past expectations and the retrospective construction of these 
events (Brown and Michael, 2003). This ethnographic method is used in order to gain 
insight into the temporality of the processes and the relations that extend beyond the 
duration of the practice itself. Thus, an ethnography of innovation informed by actor-
network-theory has more to offer than analysing the attributes of a network (Law, 1999, 
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p. 4). In this matter I hope to say something not about the order of things, but about 
how its durability is achieved, that is, how things get performed and perform themselves 
into relations that are relatively stable, showing patterns of destabilization and fixation 
as they occur in the course of innovation.  
 
The interviews conducted during the innovation process rarely happened within a 
formal interview setting – they rather happened as intimate conversations with the 
students as they were trying to make sense of the process in which they participated. 
Quite often they came to me to talk and very rarely did I have to ask them for an 
interview in the formal sense. This informed the choice of a relatively open interview 
structure where the participants were given room to direct the flow of the conversation 
and sometimes other participants would interrupt or add to the points made. By 
focusing on the experience of affect, I attempt to maintain a sensitivity to the ‘inner 
workings’ of such highly subtle devices of innovation. Said differently, I chose to focus 
on its performative potential in order to demonstrate its generative principle. Michael 
(2004) emphasises how the interview setting itself might contribute to ongoing 
processes of re-assembling, intervening, or co-constructing of the experimental setting 
itself (even in small mundane ways).  
 
An aspect of this is to understand that it is not possible to interpret affect outside of the 
setting in which it was experienced.26 Thus, the ‘actual’ enactment or experienced affect 
that emerged from the enactment of the artistic techniques and as a response to its 
effect were constituted (or re-constituted) in and through the interviews themselves. 
During the design brief, a few students came to me asking either to rehearse their 
presentation before the crits, or to discuss problems with an idea or a failed tutorial, as 
well as finding support in moments of crisis just after interactions with tutors or the 
                                                
26 Similar to Mol’s (2002) idea of performativity and enactment defined earlier in this chapter, affect is not 
to be re-presented but re-experienced. In order to understand this point, it might be useful to pay 
attention to the difference between affect and emotion as defined by Massumi (2002, p. 28). Affect is 
defined as happening ‘in the present’, an intensity that cannot rely on representation of a past experience, 
as it would then already have been consciously recognised as such. However, as soon as it emerges it will 
also be registered consciourly. He writes (p. 31): ‘One “wills” it to emerge, to be qualified, to take on 
sociolinguistic meaning, to enter linear action-reaction circuits, to become a content of one’s life – by dint 
of inhibition’, which makes affect, again in Massumi’s (2002, p. 30) words ‘a lived paradox’ and leads him 
to the definition of emotion. This notion refers to ‘a subjective content’, that is, a ‘socio-lingustic fixing of 
the quality of an experience defined as personal’. Massumi continues saying that ‘[e]motion is qualified 
intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically 
formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning. It is intensity 
owned and recognized’ (2002, p. 28). In this way, it might be said that the actualization of affect within 
the interview setting might be affect converted into socio-linguistic means of articulation. 
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designers. In the interviews, some of the students felt a more intimate relation with me 
as they were isolated from the rest of the participants. Very often they engaged in long 
confidential talks about their experience and the feelings they had while being involved 
in the brief. Other incidental conversations also took place, between me and a number 
of students, within the studio discussing issues around the innovation process and their 
mutual experience of this. In this way, my presence on the site came to be considered by 
the students as similar to the role of a therapist – that is, an outsider to whom they 
could speak without being judged or evaluated. A few students even expressed a relief 
after our conversations. Other students used them as a break or kind of ‘time-out’ from 
the pressure of endless evaluation and critique imposed in the tutorials and crits.  
 
This ‘other’ function of the interview setting created a context from where the students 
came to make sense of the events, reflecting upon the critique from tutors and 
legitimising their actions to me. Defining affect as a relational construct allows the 
interview setting to be addressed as a tool which co-constructs the semiotic-material 
relations in which affect is enacted, acted upon and performed.27 As such, the interviews 
came to be constitutive of the affectiveness of the process of innovation through their 
re-constitution of the experience of the event in my relation to the students.28 Thus, the 
operation of the interview as an ethnographic tool opens up an understanding of the 
processes of making and unmaking.  
 
The attempt here is not to seek truthfulness or to reach a kind of phenomenological-
intentional experience – as if the student expressed their ‘true self’ in the interviews. 
Rather, I consider the interview itself as a performative tool, in line with Callon’s (1998; 
2007) work on economic methods (which I will return to in the following chapter). His 
approach recognises that the economy is being remade by the tools designed to study it. 
According to Callon, the notion of assemblage is defined by its performance capacity. 
He writes that ‘the agencement acts in line with the statement, just as the operating 
                                                
27 The transformation in the enunciative capacity - from affect captured in the exposure of pain expressed 
in terms of anxiety, frustrations and breakdown to that of artistic suffering - is described by Scarry in her 
study on torture. According to Scarry, pain has no referential content – it is not in or of something, but is 
affective in itself. On the contrary, suffering has a referential context subvertible into language (Scarry, 
1985, p. 11). The interviews constructed a context from where it became possible for the students to act 
on the affective experience, to articulate and, thereby, re-create it. In this case, the specific notion of 
‘artistic suffering’ reproduces a stereotype of pain translated into creativity (cf. Barry, Born and 
Weszkalnys, 2008). 
28 This took place through my later interaction with the students (in both cases). Also personal friendships 
generated data from sources outside the formal context of the interviews, which are included as a part of 
the empirical material (see the later section on ethics). 
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instructions are part of the device and participate in making it work’ (Callon, 2007, p. 
320).29 The articulation of affect contributes to the constitution of the performative 
devices or tools of innovation, the effect of which the students expressed within the 
interviews. Affect, then, comes to play a role as the interface which co-constitutes the 
inside and outside of the assemblage. The performance of pain acts by distinguishing the 
fields of art from that of business. The affective experience of pain and its subsequent 
reflection as ‘artistic suffering’ justify innovation as an artistic activity, rather than a 
business strategy associated with the capitalistic value system. Pain, breakdown and 
crisis become a performance that, according to a particular idea of what it means to be 
artistic, defines innovation to be existential rather the analytical.  
 
Such a differentiation is defined by Law as a process of ‘othering’ (Law, 2004, p. 84). 
The enunciative capacity of the assemblage captured in the performance of pain 
internally describes the reality of the innovation process but also defines its context ‘out-
there’ (Law, 2004, p. 84). This is a process of differentiation, which according to Law, 
demarcates a field and its ethnographic context. Such a distinction between the inside 
and the outside of innovation practice is what Law defines as the method assemblage, 
that is, in this case, the way in which a specific relationship to the field of art and/or 
business is constituted and maintained.30 It is necessary for an ethnographic 
understanding of innovation to be analysed in relation to multiple and complex contexts 
(Irwin and Michael, 2003, p. 30). That is, contexts reached through the different 
methods used to collect and analyse data, such as the ethnographic interview. The 
relation between affect and its ‘objectification in language’ (cf. Scarry, 1985, p. 5) is a 
methodological one mediated by the interview setting and my presence in the field. As 
such, methods like participant observation, note taking, recordings and the interviews 
are devices which make accessible the external world through the investigation of the 
internal working of the innovation practices.  
                                                
29 I pay attention to devices of innovation fostering a sort of externalization of what might be considered 
internal to the composition of the assemblage. Informed by STS, ‘the notion of enunciation takes into 
account materialities: the context is not reduced to institutions, norms or rules; it is a sociotechnical 
arrangement’ (Callon, 2007, p. 327). I therefore consider these notions more like enunciations than an 
actual discourse, which includes the consideration of ‘things’ and ‘statements’ in the shaping of a broader 
economy of innovation (Callon, 2007, p. 327). 
30 The connectivity, relations and limits of the assemblage are defined by the process of ‘othering’, where 
an ‘out-there’ reality is reflected in the statements enacted ‘within’ the innovation processes. Law writes 
that ‘method assemblage is also about the crafting and enacting of boundaries’ (Law 2004, p. 85). Put 
differently, an inside reality is enacted by the act of differentiation enacted a reality outside (cf. Chapter 4 
and Chapter 8).   
 
 70 
    
In summary, the cases descriptively brought into being as assemblages and their 
methods of assembling provide a few key methodological principles that serve as 
valuable points of orientation for conducting an ethnographic study of innovation. 
Firstly, the heterogeneity of actors and entities and the various realms they represent 
(e.g. political, academic, artistic.) are brought into play in the spatio-temporal 
construction of the innovation process. This leads, secondly, to the relational 
composition of these actors and entities, i.e., the way in which they deploy the notion of 
innovation. Thirdly, this refers to how actors and objects are affectively tied to the 
specific contexts of the artistic practice in which they participate. Here, I draw on Riles’ 
(2001) notion of the connectivity of the field in order to understand the specificity of 
devices and techniques that are both mobilized as a resource of innovation and, at the 
same time, condition the assemblage in which they emerge.  
 
Reality Seen Twice 
Having described the way in which an ethnography of innovation comprises a multi-
sited field study and how it diverges from a conventional anthropological study, I 
explain its sociological implications. An ethnography of innovation is not only 
conducted by observing the techniques and strategies used to facilitate innovation but 
also addresses the ethnographic methods applied as constructing an inventive research 
practice in itself. In this way, ‘[t]he writing engenders a difference between the unfolding 
and its inscription. In ethnography, the event is always doubled – its taking place as 
unfolding is ‘re-enacted’ in a taking place as inscription’ – that is, through its 
ethnographic representation, and vice versa (Van Loon, 2001, p. 280). 
 
Debates on ethnographic practice have emphasised the idea that methods are seen to 
construct the social world (Atkinson and Silverman, 1997; Marcus, 1998). This is a 
concern that has also been associated with forms of anti-realism within ethnographic 
research (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 10-14). So far, I have accounted for the 
dual construction of the ethnographic field, and that field’s analytical tools were 
discussed in relation to the methods applied. I have argued that the phenomena of 
innovation are created in and through the affective-performative capacity of the 
processes studied and that this capacity is not to be considered external to the 
ethnographic methods applied. In the following section, these issues are discussed, as 
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well as the ramifications of getting access to the field, moral principles and ethnical 
concerns. 
 
Access to the Field 
Traditionally, ethnographic accounts claim that first hand ethnographic observation 
depends on the accessibility to the different sites. Such a claim is based on a principle of 
transparency, a claim which Clifford (1986) problematises while arguing that such 
accounts of the social appear authoritative. Now, instead of just saying that the 
ethnographer can have direct access to social structures as a discrete object to be 
revealed in the light of social science analysis and its methods, Pocock (1971) says, ‘the 
words used and the things or behaviour to which they refer are to be understood in 
their relatedness’ (cited in Macdonald, 2001, p. 65, my emphasis).31 This approach to 
ethnographic field studies is preoccupied with how the social world might be 
understood as ethnography, rather than conducting social research around measures of 
descriptive accuracy and analytical adequacy (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 212; 
see also Riles, 2001).  
 
In the design brief, access was secured through the innovation managers, who acted as 
‘gatekeepers’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 63). Even though obtained, the 
access was limited to public events, internal workshops and crits. Daily observations 
were discouraged in the first weeks of the design brief, as were individual interviews 
with the students. This was explained as a matter of protecting the ‘intuitive and 
subjective nature’ of the creative process. However, access to further observations and 
interviews was renegotiated throughout the innovation process. Suchman (1982, p. 23) 
explains that such constraints of access and the ethical concerns described in the 
following section are a part of the data production itself; it should not simply be seen as 
an obstruction to efficient research. Rather, negotiating access can provide multiple 
views on the issues involved showing what is regarded as ‘profane and open to 
investigation’ by the practice itself versus what is valued as ‘sacred or taboo and thereby 
closed to investigation’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 54). The protective 
                                                
31 Clifford (1986, p. 2) writes that ethnographic accounts ‘reflects the persistence of an ideology claiming 
transparency of representation and immediacy of experience’. In continuation, Marcus and Fischer (1999) 
advocate writing strategies such as personal accounts and the use of dialogues. 
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environment and the distance assumed between academic research and innovation 
practice might reflect an expressive strategy of innovation.  
 
Additionally, the intimate, private and secretive nature of these practices, justified by the 
intuitive and subjective account of the artistic process of creation, distinguishes the way 
in which the participants accounted for their own affective experience in practice – say, 
when students claim their right to defend their idea and projects presented at the crits or 
during the artistic interventions. Likewise, the relationship between the practices and my 
research constituted a major means of controlling the transparency of the research 
object (cf. Strathern, 2000). To investigate how these practices draw attention to 
themselves effected the assertion that ‘to perform is also to invent’ saying that 
transparency might be designed to construct the practice itself.32 In this thesis, the 
problem of access to the cases came to be considered as a methodological reflection 
relevant in its own right and is dealt with throughout the empirical chapters.  
 
Ethical Considerations  
An ethical commitment within ethnographic research is said to reach beyond 
pragmatically following prescriptive methods. Rules and guidelines, Garfinkel (2002, p. 
238) argues, oversimplify conceptualisations of the ‘constitutive features’ of social 
practices. Thus ethical guidelines must aim to sensitise the researcher to the actual field, 
its context, in terms of a ‘situated active interpretation’ (cf. Suchman, 1987, p. 59) 
appropriate to the events encountered during the fieldwork. Hammersley and Atkinson 
(1995, p. 23) write that: ‘all research is a practical activity requiring the exercise of 
judgement in context; it is not a matter of simply following methodological rules’. 
Nevertheless, the fieldwork and data collection of this thesis was conducted in 
accordance with the ethical guidelines and codes set out by the British Sociological 
Association and the Department of Sociology at Goldsmiths, University of London. 
 
The principle of data protection (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001, p. 342-343) was applied 
in particular with regards to personal and sensitive information obtained through 
                                                
32 Considerations on issues of transparency as it relates to the operation of power have increased 
substantially in recent decades, with the rise of the ‘audit society’ posed by Power (1997) and in relation to 
the points made by Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) presented above. In this case transparent 
accountability becomes a matter of visibility and of legitimizing the process of innovation within 
contemporary capitalism. 
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interviews and participant observation. All interviews conducted with or within the 
innovation practices are based on informed consent from the individual research 
participants. In this context, Murphy and Dingwall (2001, p. 340) define anonymity as 
an almost conventional practice within ethnographic descriptions to protect the field 
setting and the participants’ identity. Identifying features such as names, dates and 
places have been anonymised through the use of acronyms or left out to protect 
anonymity and maintain confidentiality with the participants involved. The second 
aspect of data protection concerns the technologies, prototypes and objects invented 
during the innovation process. In using these as empirical material, I obtained 
permission from the client to include these in my ethnographic descriptions as they had 
only been developed as ideas and sketches and would not represent the final solution 
applied by the company.  
 
In the translation of the field notes into written ethnographic accounts, I made 
references only to the material published on the Internet, books or scholarly journals in 
order to provide empirical evidence of the cases supporting my arguments which 
analyse the artistic idea upon which the innovation practices are based. However, the 
ethical commitment of this research is not limited to the way in which this information 
may or may not inform and, thereby, change the practices and principles applied in the 
field, but also to the way in which this study was expected to legitimize the artistic ideas 
and methods of innovation. To gain access to the innovation processes observed, the 
founder of each practice requested that their original name and artistic idea should be 
mentioned within the ethnographic descriptions. That is an aspect that in itself 
encapsulates the expressivity of the field which I engage with in more detail in Chapter 
4.  
 
In writing on the experience of the innovation processes, I have chosen to name the 
participants according to their profession and a single capital letter to indicate a personal 
name. The letter serves as an indicator or rhetorical figure that visualises the operation 
of power enacted within the innovation process. This choice is also meant to indicate 
that the ethical considerations of the cases are not just reflections of external moral 
concerns, but closer to the ethnomethodological connotation of reflexivity, which refers 
to ‘how what actors ‘know about’ or ‘make of’ and ‘do in’ a setting is itself constitutive 
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of the setting and informed by it’ (Pollner and Emerson, 2001, p. 121).33 This is what I 
observed, what I heard and saw, but also partly, as mentioned above, what they wanted 
me, the researcher, to hear and see, controlled through the way in which I was given 
access to the studio and the different events such as the crits, brainstorm sessions, 
workshops and tutorials.  
 
Following the route suggested by the innovation managers – leaving the anonymity 
unprotected – provided yet another way to understand these practices in terms of the 
social world they create by such statements. In this case, authorship seems to form an 
issue within these innovation practices, as the artistic idea is used as a brand strategy 
promoting a certain idea around innovation. However, for the time being I want to 
draw attention to the way in which such a request emphasises a strategic choice 
controlling the way in which I accounted for the data produced.  
 
Sociological Implications and Critical Perspectives 
Given the exploratory character of this research, I have not attempted to quantify the 
result and responses from my interviews with the intention of drawing out patterns 
across participant groups, research sites or individuals. As outlined in this chapter, this 
study of innovation is an attempt to roughly map out the field through investigating the 
operational modes of a few creative practices drawing out their similarities and 
differences. The methodological issues and principles at stake serve as valuable 
heuristics for conducting an ethnography of innovation. More importantly, the notion 
of ‘assembling methods’ refers to an ethnographic technique operationalised through 
anthropological studies of practice (Marcus and Saka, 2006, p. 103).  
 
However, being concerned with assemblage (the duality of methods assemblages and 
assembling methods) does not relate to the methodological frame affecting the object 
observed and changing the research setting as proposed by DeLanda (2006, p. 2). 
Rather, I claim that my ethnographic approach cannot renounce its own performativity. 
To explain this point, I follow Strathern’s (2004) idea that the network is defined by its 
relatedness, which, as Phillips reminds us, is the very definition of the assemblage taken 
from its French origin ‘agencement’ defined as ‘being-in-connection-with’ (Phillips, 
                                                
33 For a more elaborated account of ethnomethodology and the notion of reflexivity, see Chapter 5. 
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2006, p. 108). Explaining the performativity of such an ethnographic account I refer 
here to the aim of following ethical conducts and moral codes, such as the principle of 
informed consent and anonymity. These are ethnographic principles applied to protect 
the dynamic of the field (Murphy and Dingwall, 2001, p. 343).  
 
However, I take my ethnographic experience of the control of access, the requirement 
of anonymity (or not) and the transparency of the field also to comprise valuable 
sources of data. In doing so, I take these considerations to demonstrate the 
performative character of innovation where every statement about the assemblage is 
part of the construction of the assemblage itself (cf. Callon, 2007, p. 318). It follows, 
that the data are not taken at ‘face value’ (cf. Pollner and Emerson, 2001, p. 125), but 
treated as a field of inferences in which processual patterns can be identified. It is in this 
way the interviews are to be understood as objectifying the experience of affect in order 
to give expression to otherwise (subjective and intuitive) unarticulated experiences.   
 
Furthermore, Callon (2007, p. 318) writes on the connection between expression and 
technique, saying that, ‘the statement also indicates precise devices, operators, and 
operating modes which are not directly described but have to be describable … In other 
words, the statement contains its own context.  Rheinberger (1997, p. 29) also argues 
that ‘stabilized epistemic things turn into the technical repertoire of the experimental 
arrangement’. It is in this way – drawing on both Rheinberger and Callon – that affect 
might be seen as a ‘performative repertoire’ used as a resource of innovation. In 
Rheinberger’s (1997, p. 4) terms, it is an economy of ‘epistemic displacement’ that is at 
stake, which means that ‘everything intended as a mere substitution or addition within 
the confines of a system will reconfigure that very system’. Affective experiences are 
enacted as diverse and multiple – dispersed in space and time, in particular re-created 
within the interview setting – assembling innovation in a particular manner (Law, 2004). 
As stated above, affect cannot be known outside of its constitution, and its re-
experience in the interview setting becomes yet another affective experience that re-
enacts the notion of innovation in yet another way. Thus, processes of de-selving are 
analysed via participating, observing and interviewing – while providing yet another 
context from where the participants might sort out processes of self-actualization (see 
Chapter 7).  
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Method assemblages indicate not only the use of multiple methods in conducting 
ethnographic research, but also the hybrid mixtures that make up the context itself, a 
context in which the brief, letters of evaluations and visualisation of the object invented 
etc. are also taken as ‘material traces’ (Rheinberger, 1997, p. 3) that display the meaning 
and representation of the artistic ideas. I investigate the devices of innovation as means 
by which the network manifests itself by affectively engaging or attaching the 
participants to a certain artistic idea. The processes I pay attention to internally define 
the spatial and temporal boundaries of the assemblage rather than externally 
demarcating their territory.  
 
Assembling methods contests traditional accounts of ethnography by presenting non-
representational events, and produces a context that frames and presents these events in 
particular ways (Atkinson, 1992, p. 17; Emerson, Fretz and Shaw, 2001, p. 353). 
Therefore, I have chosen a rather unconventional form of presenting the text in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Inspired by Mol’s (2002) work in The Body Multiple, I present the 
artistic idea of filmmaking and design in a subtext usually occupied by footnotes. I do so 
in order to create a parallel narrative to the ethnographic account. I could have chosen 
to present this in a ‘background’ chapter that would come before the actual 
ethnographic account. However, I decided not to do so as it would abstract the artistic 
idea from its enactment in practice and presume too much in the reading of the 
ethnographic events. The subtexts are written in order to underpin the understanding of 
the artistic critique as it was enacted within the work-camp and the design brief. They 
can be read as a separate analysis or alongside the reading of the ethnographic 
accounts.34   
 
What I have put emphasis on in this chapter is exactly the relationality of innovation, an 
aspect that I attempt to grasp by this dual structure of the two ethnographic chapters. In 
this chapter I have described not only how the research objects are empirically and 
analytically constituted in relation to each other, but also, how they vary with the 
methods used (Marcus, 1995; Riles, 2001). I have shown that the endless ramifications 
of processes and context, mean that the outside of the ethnographic context is produced 
in opposition to what is considered as inside and also to what is invisible to it (that 
which has been ‘othered’ according to Law (2004, p. 88)).  
                                                
34 In the thesis I have put interview quotations in italics for the reader to distinguish ‘direct speech’ from 
the quoting of scholarly literature. 
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Conclusion  
In this chapter I have described the methodological framework and various methods 
employed in dealing with the challenge of conducting an ethnography of innovation. I 
presented the notion of method assemblages and assembling methods as a response to 
an overtly complex social phenomenon without simplifying or reducing the 
ethnographic study to that of the analytical perspective. The significance of these 
practices is not that they reproduce power by creating or recreating certain discourses, 
rather that they deploy the notion of innovation, which signals a change in the way 
discussions on, or rather representations of, affect find their way into the broader 
economy of innovation. The object is to analyse such enunciations like ‘artistic 
suffering’ through their affective response, which also acts as devices of innovation.  
 
By describing the case studies, I have explained the way in which the innovation 
practices came into view as assemblages constructing relations and network formations 
across territorial spaces. I have, thus, presented an ethnographic account as a way in 
which to bring the phenomenon of innovation into being which does not take its 
presence as directly representable, but as performed in and through the relations of 
institutions, disciplines and devices. Attention has been paid to the overall research 
strategy proposed by the dual construction between a descriptive level – to account for 
the research object as method assemblages – and their analytical account. What this 
approach offers is an account of how the artistic ideas of filmmaking and design enact a 
strategy of innovation which, in a broader sense, might bring closer an understanding of 
the intermingling of capitalism and creativity.  
 
To conduct a study of innovation as ethnography emphasises context and practice 
(Marcus, 1995). In this chapter I have defined the field as one of emergence and its 
context as hybrid, that is, as assembled not only in and through the practice itself, but 
also through ethnographic methods such as codes of ethics, moral principles and the 
interview setting. From this assertion, I do not objectively describe a territory external to 
or outside the experience of those participating within it. Rather, I explore how the 
external or ‘the outside’ is differentially constituted through the experience enacted by 
participants ‘within’. As such, the phenomenon of innovation investigated through 
method assemblages and assembling methods, amounts to a study where reality comes 
into view and is seen twice (Riles, 2001). 
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4. Mapping the Field: Performance, Industry and Differentiation  
 
Introduction 
As explained in Chapter 2, Porter is considered the founding father of the use of the 
concept of value and differentiation as a strategy for innovation. To be new to the 
market, to distinguish oneself from competitors seems to be the dominant strategy for 
innovation: what Kwinter (2001, p. 4-5) defines as the ‘becoming-ever-different’ – ‘an 
in-built wilderness’ that leads him to the definition of novelty. As shown in Chapter 1, 
this definition of innovation is relevant to the striving for a space of creativity and, more 
importantly, it is the way in which creative spaces are explicitly driven by an orientation 
towards effecting transformational change based on various artistic principles. One 
aspect of this is the organisation of innovation in accordance with appropriate 
functional or aesthetic criteria. In this way, the theoretical problem of inventing the new 
becomes a practical one.  
 
Having set out the conceptual framework for my research on innovation in Chapter 2, 
this chapter moves on to the analysis of the creative practices introduced as examples of 
the entanglement between capitalism and creativity. I investigate the ways in which such 
creative spaces are enacted, by analysing the way in which they justify and evaluate the 
selection of the artistic elements for the organisation of spaces of innovation. While 
mapping such relations it is the performativity of innovation to which I would like to 
draw attention. Muniesa and Callon (2007, p. 184) explain that experiments perform by 
bringing things into being ‘by assembling them ... in a particular manner (in a particular 
site, through particular trials, and for a particular audience)’. 
 
In the course of this chapter, I look into the performances that delimit, and thus, 
stabilise a particular field and, at the same time, open up the possibility of investigating 
its mode of operation. The notion of performance structures this chapter in a twofold 
way. It introduces the key argument of sociological accounts of innovation which claims 
that experimental activities are instruments that contribute to the construction of 
contemporary economies (Muniesa and Callon, 2007). Yet, these activities emerge in 
and through the settings which they also perform (such as the market, governmental 
institutions and artistic practices). 
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Firstly, I identify and map out the terms and statements presented by innovation 
managers, providing concrete examples of how an artistic vocabulary is introduced into 
the economic sphere. I analyse the way in which they perform the process of innovation 
in relation to their external audiences such as clients, funders, collaborators and 
competitors. I do so by looking into the various materials and spaces in which these 
relations are discussed and negotiated, such as websites, annual reports (including 
mission statements), policy documents (funding proposals and later evaluations), board 
meetings and also interview data. I then analyse the vocabulary deployed in detail to 
identify overlaps, patterns and structures – again – in relation to a broader economic 
perspective. I argue that this vocabulary operates according to a strategy of 
differentiation, by negating any association, similarity or identification with the 
techniques and methods employed within industrial or corporate forms of production. 
That is, it operates according to a strategy that aims to gain competitive advantage 
which – as was stated above – is in itself considered inherent in the definition of 
innovation.  
 
Secondly, I explain the way in which innovation is translated into experimental activities. 
Having set the scene of this operation and the categories through which such a setting 
might be analysed, I ask the following question: what is their credibility and how do 
such practices account for the value produced? More specifically, I look into the way in 
which innovation practice is both connected to and distant from the entities that they 
differentiate themselves from, such as industry, governmental institutions and academia. 
The activities organised within the experimental settings (such as camps, labs and 
workshops) bring together multifarious interests from educational learning, object 
design, research activities and strategic business planning to artistic evaluation. The 
innovation processes set up experiments that solve (or provoke) a problem set by the 
client, which leads to outcomes that are taken as a starting point for further actions 
within other innovative spaces, such as the funding institutions, the client’s in-house 
innovation centres and R&D departments. Such experimental activities are characterised 
as ‘trials of experimentation’, which test the economic realities that are simultaneously 
differentiated (Muniesa and Callon, 2007).  
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At the end of the chapter I hope to demonstrate the way in which these practices and 
the different spaces with which they collaborate work in and through each other. The 
spaces described cannot be defined in and by themselves, but they are constituted by 
their relation to each other, actualised through a differential strategy of innovation. 
Therefore, these practices do not comprise spaces to be juxtaposed, but need to be 
analysed through their performative capacities, a perspective that frames the two 
ethnographic studies presented in the following chapters. 
 
Setting the Scene 
 
The pace of change in technological, political, social and economic affairs worldwide creates a 
clarion call for many radical safe spaces.  
 
This is how a London based innovation practice states its mission of using theatre to 
organise innovation. The above quotation is taken from the webpage of this practice 
and expresses the notion of a ‘safe space’. A range of similar practices uses this notion 
in order to define a space of creativity based on a specific artistic vision that refers to 
inventing the new through the use of fiction. In what follows, I unpack the use of this 
notion and explain what it covers and the differentiations that it facilitates. The first 
example in this respect is from the practice of critical design where Dunne replaces 
usability with aesthetics and, thus, opens the discussion on innovation to the field of art. 
In Hertzian Tales: Electronic Products, Aesthetic Experiences and Critical Design (2005) Dunne 
proposes that:  
 
The most difficult challenge for designers of electronic objects now lie not in 
technical and semiotic functionality, where optimal levels of performance are 
already attainable, but in the realms of metaphysics, poetry, and aesthetics, 
where little research has been carried out. (Dunne, 2005, p. 20)  
 
 
The professor organising the design brief (which I present in Chapter 6) explained this 
quote as an aim ‘to disengage from a world where industrial production defines reality’. The 
professor will from this point onwards be referred to as ‘Professor A’. Putting these 
practices in connection with one another by comparing and evaluating their missions 
and their justifications of the use of fiction, the attempt to introduce an artistic 
vocabulary into the field of innovation is not only considered a rhetorical exercise, 
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marketing tool or way of promoting their practice; rather, the use of fiction to organise 
creative spaces is more specifically explained by the use of tools from filmmaking and 
role-playing in order to produce a speculative area – as Professor A said: ‘to imagine 
possible and impossible futures’.  
 
In this case, fiction is described as the ability to set up critical spaces that make it 
possible to speculate on how life can change. This vision was explained by one of the 
tutors interviewed during the design brief as an attempt to: ‘…create an experimental 
situation to be tested – a design for social exploration’. Professor A said further: ‘…the fruit of the 
invention is some understanding or insights … or design is a way of focusing the discussion in a way 
that a philosopher or social scientist wouldn’t do’. Professor A referred to processes of co-
creation, where the use of design, film and theatre brings forth a set of ideas that 
provoke different kinds of discussions. In this case, film is explained as ‘a subtle exchange 
of emotions’… used as some kind of transformational process which can be explained as 
what ‘… makes us find an identity in a changing world’.  
 
One of the practitioners from the design studio said: ‘…we are interested in using design as a 
medium … to ask questions and provoke and stimulate people, designers and industry…’. Another 
designer added to the conversation that ‘we are exploring things that exist somewhere between 
reality and fiction’. In defining the space of innovation, they also distinguish it from what 
are claimed to be industrial methods of innovation in order to reach ‘real’ 
experimentation. This is also shown in the design brief (see Chapter 6). On the project 
launch, Professor A said that ‘the project was to be presented with a semblance of truth to make 
people suspend their judgement about the implausibility of the narrative…’. It is the notion of 
‘imagination’ and the need to be ‘genuinely original’ that defines the activity of this 
practice. In a later interview, Professor A said:  
 
Our practice is like a catalyst… I think the other thing that is important is imagination that 
is being neglected, you know, that to be genuinely imaginative can be quite scary, I think, for 
people – as when they see the fruit of imagination as opposed to commoditised imagination, 
where they only see reflections of the magazines, television or in the branding of landscape. 
 
As if they were in direct conversation, another practitioner organising innovation based 
on the use of theatre and performing art (Director S) said in a different setting that:  
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... people are tired of lies from the media, politicians, bankers and so on…the truth is to get 
behind the news through evidence. And if there is a lack of evidence you fictionalise a story. 
Theatre is safe from censorship and provides a chance to mirror ourselves  – to tell the stories 
that cannot otherwise be told.  
 
This quotation also explains that a space of creativity is constructed in order to 
fictionalise a story and not as in scientific research to test a hypothesis. She explained 
this as a different truth-seeking exercise, saying that: ‘drama reveals the truth by picking away 
masks and behaviours that conceal reality...’. She claimed that such artistic methods could 
provoke a ‘suspension of disbelief’, making participants believe in a story that 
fictionalises a specific reality which is to be creatively investigated.  
 
As has been mentioned above, the methodology behind such testing is not meant to 
qualify or prove the truth of an already developed hypothesis. One of the tutors 
facilitating the design brief supported this idea, describing his mode of working in the 
studio in this way: ‘I discover what I do as it happens, not like I have a theory, and, then, this is the 
experiment to prove it.’  In a document published by another practitioner on their webpage, 
it said:  
 
Instead the art-world exposes a thesis, often as a provocation, for the audience to judge and 
draw their own conclusions. The logic of art has the ability and openness to accept the frame in 
order to break it, and to search for rules just in order to convert them. Moreover, the art-world 
dismisses the need to prove evidence of the rules, which can be helpful in the area of creativity. 
 
 
Professor A explained the aim of the innovation methods as being to ‘inflict 
strangeness’, to ‘provoke’ as opposed to being a form of ‘problem-solving’. One of the 
other designers said: ‘…my research interest is in new contexts of innovation that reach beyond the 
market place, which obviously calls for new methods and new ways of thinking … It expands the space 
from just the market to a critical space’. In this context, notions like user-driven innovation, 
open-source and innovation are dismissed from their vocabulary as mere trends, not 
based on genuine creativity. Instead, it is the ability to break away from such notions, 
frames, regularities and assumptions around innovation that is valued. The ability to 
investigate innovation through critique is explained as being the essence of artistic 
creation and that which, according to the filmmaking practice, can be translated into 
valuable innovation. Equally, these innovation managers express a shared scepticism 
towards methods like brainstorming and the use of Post-it notes as being industrial 
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devices and, therefore, non-creative. Brainstorming is traditionally defined as a collective 
technique to foster creativity through idea generation. The idea behind this method is to 
free individuals from the constraints of analytical judgements and leave the critical 
interrogation for a later stage in the creative process.35 The refusal of such methods 
emphasises the fact that innovation is seen as some kind of testing site, where critical 
interrogation is part of the artistic vision applied to innovation. Professor A said: ‘I think 
that creativity is hard work and not everyone can be creative, especially not original and creative, and 
you have to research, think and reject your idea, rethink, experiment and confirm and validate, all in a 
kind of informal sense’. The method of brainstorming is considered to be ‘consensus 
building’ and not ideation: ‘…It gets everybody in and everyone’s words are taken on board. But I 
think that originality comes from different routes, things that are genuinely innovative are scary, 
shocking and new’.  
 
Explaining how an artistic vision and being critical of the creative industries at the same 
time are used as productive means of innovation, Professor A referred to a recent 
project conducted with the internal research team form a high-tech industrial company. 
In this project, they used an artistic approach of design in order to explore the future of 
digital money, speculating on how digital money may give rise to ‘new forms of interactions, 
possibilities, neurosis and poetics’. This project attempted to provoke thoughts while 
‘addressing the mind of the client’ and not inventing just another consumer product for the 
market. A tutor from the brief on design explained:  
 
… we do not come up with product ideas or service ideas. We try to come up with new ways of 
working at what they are doing. Like when we did the project on the future of money, it was to 
try to find a new perspective on that, so new ways of thinking that are turned into concrete 
media scenarios, prototypes, props, performances to dramatise and make them more interesting 
as opposed to writing some kind of report.  
 
By suspending an industrial reality through the use of the tools and methods of art, the 
practice interviewed organise innovation processes according to this artistic vision, as 
distinguished from the rules and norms assumed within the industry, which are said to 
prevent and limit the sources of creativity. Instead they claim, as Professor A explained 
                                                
35 In brainstorm sessions a group work together to find a solution for a specific problem. Alex Faickney 
Osborn (1953) introduced the term in his book Applied Imagination. The method has been very popular in 
the industry as methods for creative problem solving. The two main principles rely on ‘deferred 
judgement’ and ‘reach for quantity’ (Osborn 1953; cf. Toubia 2006).  
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in an interview, to open up an ethical perspective or to look at its ramifications or 
possible consequences, in what they consider to be valuable innovation. In a similar 
way, a range of the managers claimed that they did not produce functional solutions; 
they aimed not to be identified with what they call ‘just’ problem-solving, but to be 
about ‘questioning who you are and what you do’.36 
 
In this way, the notion of safe space does not relate to scientific knowledge production 
(where a given hypothesis is proved true or false), but rather to situations of industrial 
or commercial testing, producing what they called ‘open-ended results’. In a test something 
is happening, but it is not quite for real – the experimentation is presented as a test of 
exactly these methods and tools of innovation. In this way, the processes of innovation 
I have observed and participated in are meant to provoke and test an external reality. 
The use of the notion of a safe space does not only demarcate a distinct practice of 
innovation, but also suggests the way in which these practices externalize an industrial 
reality – in order to set up a space in which it might be tested. Muniesa and Callon 
(2007, p. 165) have argued that this is exactly the distance that is normally maintained by 
the spatial formation defining the laboratory: ‘it is about setting oneself apart from the 
“world out-there” – or at least keeping some distance – and manipulating objects 
specially devised and configured for the laboratory’.  
 
In the narrative so far described, innovation is staged as the making of realities in a 
complex process of imagination. The premise that these practices operate from implies 
a kind of realism, as ‘alternative futures’ are to be realised through the fictionalisation of 
business (see Chapter 6). The focus has been on the notion of a safe space, defined by 
Director S as a hybrid between the artistic, the non-industrial and the market. However, 
the connection to laboratory practices, drawing on Muniesa and Callon’s (2007) study of 
the experimental economy, will only suffice at the level of describing their internal 
differentiation from the market. In the rest of this chapter, I look into how the 
boundaries that are made between the innovation processes and an outside market 
equally condition the way in which the notion of innovation is being deployed in the 
broader economy. 
                                                
36 However, it needs to be said that some of these managers do also distinguish this practice of innovation 
from the field of art, differentiating themselves from the gallery space, museums and elitist association 
with the artworld (se Chapter 6). Rather it is a ‘functional’ application of art that is advocated in these 
practices.  
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A Non-Existing Industry 
From the way these practices deploy the notion of innovation, the creation of value is 
defined in relation to film, art and reflexiveness and not in terms of sale and business 
said to be directed by profit. Describing the artistic practice within the industry as a 
‘viral anti-movement’ they do not consider themselves to be a conventional breakout, 
such as art-in-business or residential labs. However, the distinction between art and 
business that has been put forward so far does not in itself prove a movement. Instead, 
it indicates that these practices are associated with one another, if not directly by 
affiliation, then indirectly by their approach to innovation and a shared artistic vision. 
That is, the definition of a ‘safe space of experimentation’ is defined by reflexivity, 
aesthetics and metaphysics and externalise innovation to an industrial-functional reality.   
 
In the rest of this chapter, I focus on this externalization of business as an example of a 
differential strategy, as an expression of how practices like the spin-off, the performance 
art lab and the design studio manifest and justify their existence in the wider context of 
capitalist production. In particular, I aim to understand how these practices are part of a 
wider network which is both connected to and differentiated from the creative 
industries. Professor A said: ‘we are not anti-capitalistic, but we are not industry-lovers either’. 
The artistic vision is to produce or invent a critique of the capitalist system itself, instead 
of reproducing its circulation. This is practised by the use of art to fictionalise business 
in order for its logic to be experimentally tested. All of them are based on Manifesto-like 
statements such as Dogma95 and A/B the design practice (See the subtexts of Chapters 
5 and 6). As Director S explained, their aim is ‘to express themselves and their mission in a new 
and emerging field’.  
 
The claim to produce the new within a safe space means to produce for a ‘non-existing’ 
industry, which is considered a risky process within the business world. Director S again 
said that ‘the process, much like the process of making great art, thrives on risk-taking and not-
knowing – on the part of the artists themselves and adventurous funders’. The question of what 
values are produced and what kind of funding can be provided for the organisation of 
the innovation processes was addressed by Director S, referring to a current project 
funded by Skillset37, saying that: ‘they fund people, even though there are no jobs – they fund people 
                                                
37 Skillset is ’The Sector Skills Council for Creative Media’ and funds activities within the creative 
industries in the UK. 
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for an industry that is not there, which is weird’. In a practical sense, I pose the question: how 
do these practices fund the promotion of a non-existing or future industry? In asking 
this question, I aim to explain how these practices are both differentiated from, but also 
connected to, an industry (broadly defined as the creative industries). In this way, these 
practices consciously destroy and then reconstruct the boundaries between art and 
business, whereby the practice of innovation can be said to territorialize the assemblage, 
constructing creativity as an integral part of capitalism. As Deleuze (1986, p. 503) 
argues: ‘Every assemblage is basically territorial. The first concrete rule for assemblages 
is to discover what territoriality they envelop, for there always is one.’  
 
Such a map illuminates the operation of these practices, which are related to codes and 
signs that are not quantifiable and therefore not significant for the creative industries 
(which have traditionally been measured in terms of scale).38 The value of the creative 
industries and their impact on the national economy are evaluated in terms of GVA 
(Gross Value Added), number of businesses, number of employments and their share of 
foreign sales/exports.39 However, the artistic practices of innovation, such as the spin-
off, camps, the design studio, as well as the labs cannot be captured or justified in terms 
of scale, as these practices do not have such a quantitative significance in terms of their 
size, income or tangible output. In fact, some of these practices have a charitable status 
and are not even issue-based, which means that they cannot be categorised in traditional 
industrial terms. Although these practices are of an artistic character, they are not unlike 
the field in which these industries are portrayed. Finding other means to justify this 
sector and its impact on the wider economy, the innovation managers indicate the 
emergence of a hitherto uncharted territory, a new emerging industry operating 
according to a logic of differentiation.  
 
This industrial chartering is meant to render such a territoriality visible by analysing the 
way in which an artistic vocabulary is introduced to the field of innovation. This can be 
thought of as mapping a kind of grammar of business imperatives, an ‘industrial 
                                                
38 A lot has already been written on the creative industries, particularly in the UK, and statistical data have 
been provided and presented, especially from NESTA and Demos. These are institutions that I came 
across during my initial explorative interviews and conversations with people executing different kinds of 
creative practices or innovation strategies within the EU.  
39 For instance, in the UK in 2006 the GVA of the creative industries was estimated at £57.3 billion  
representing 6.4% of UK GVA. The sector is a major employer, employing 4-6% of the UK's working 
population. These numbers and their presence in the public discourse on innovation are an example of 
institutional justification. 
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archipelago’ (Arditi, 2003), where a new territory is marked out or rather performed by 
certain practices which are intimately bound up with new sites of action (such as the 
formation of camps, labs and workshops). This is a method used to map the structure 
of the field of those innovation practices that operate in similar ways. This means that 
from ‘overlapping “manners of speaking and ways of seeing”’ (Conley, 2007, p. 11), a 
map or a sense of direction can be conceived. 
 
Incubators of Innovation 
The creation of safe spaces indicates a research strategy where fiction is used as a tool to 
suspend an industrial reality or – as Professor A would put it – to create a speculative 
era. In order to understand this logic in more detail, I look into the specific narrative 
created around the funding structure. Additionally, in terms of the issue of funding, the 
practices observed like arts lab and the design studio take advantage of the art-world by 
copying a logic of commissioning where different grants or investors fund only parts of 
the processes or projects. Professor A said: ‘The funding for all of us is really non-commercial, it 
comes through grants, which are only small grants, so we fall between academic funding and arts council 
funding and NESTA type funding’.40  
 
In 2009, I attended the board meeting of the practice organising the art-labs. The future 
strategy of the practice was discussed. The organisation of a money lab was designed to 
serve as an internal research process to overcome the problem of future funding, which 
was threatened by the recent cuts in the public research sector within the UK (cf. 
Chapter 1). The lab was designed to address the issue of ‘intelligent funding’ 
investigating the cultural, poetic and social perspectives on money. The aim was to bring 
people together in order to investigate money as something different than as financial 
investments. In this way, money or the issue of funding is not only considered as a 
means to an end, as an external requirement outside the practice itself, but provides the 
very themes and issues to be tested within the labs.  
  
Another point to draw from this is the fact that the funding structure includes a wider 
logic of organising innovation and collaboration between the different creative sites, 
                                                
40 NESTA is the National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts. It is a charitable 
organisation promoting innovation by providing grants and investments mainly to support the creative 
industries in the UK.    
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practices and processes. The funding is not only an outside relation providing financial 
resources either through public institutions or private investors. Professor A described 
his practice as a ‘platform’ that captures and facilitates what happens in these different 
spaces. Director S similarly described how each innovation lab facilitates ‘discussions 
between policy makers and artists and scientists, for the producing of innovative ideas supported by 
practical production’. Professor A further explained that their ‘fuzziness’, ‘creativity’ and 
‘imagination’ are what differentiates them from academic institutions and funding 
bodies, such as the Royal Society, the Wellcome Trust Fund, the Arts Council of 
England and the EPSRC41. The representatives from these institutions explain that what 
they gain from supporting these innovation processes is some kind of ‘fresh thinking’.  
 
Each of these innovation processes is claimed to be a research exercise generating new 
insights and understandings that are being explored in the next lab. This is based on 
what Director S defined as ‘intelligence gathering’, that is, the gathering of accumulated 
intelligence on their internal innovation processes. Director S explained:  
 
My job is to be a researcher, I am keeping my ears open and picking up things. We gather 
knowledge the whole time. Our intelligence gathering informs our decisions about what to do 
next every time ... It is a continuing exchange of intelligence from practitioner to practitioner 
and then to us.  
 
So the policy-making in these practices (or the strategy implemented) is explained as 
being  ‘artist-led’, informed by practitioners who are producing artworks applied to 
other collaborative fields. Director S also explained another lab as being constructed 
through internal research processes – similarly to the money lab:  
 
The [Art of Enquiry Lab] was designed to support our own R&D process. Nineteen artists 
and arts practitioners and one scientist came together to interrogate their own questions about 
issues that challenge them in relation to their practice. We explored questions around yet-to-be-
invented Lab programmes. This experience informed [Art Lab’s] strategic thinking for our 
future. It inspired us to commission three of the participating artists to develop three new Lab 
programmes with us. These commissions increase our capacity to generate strong new Lab 
programmes while keeping a small and agile core team.  
 
 
                                                
41 EPSRC (Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council) is the main UK government agency for 
funding research and training in engineering and the physical sciences. 
 89 
One of the other practitioners explained this organisational structure as a ‘scratch’ 
methodology, as being a part of its ‘ladder of development for new work guided by an artistic 
vision’. Director S differentiated her practice from such courses as the Clore leadership 
programmes, which host two week residential programs for cultural leaders: ‘… even 
though they teach a course and try to preach a message for business based on the experience of artistic 
creation, which is not innovation...’. On the contrary, Director S described the practice as 
‘accumulating knowledge’, where the students, collaborators, tutors, clients and funders 
not only participate, but also define the processes in which they participate structuring 
their own activities. Director S explained that the participants all have a stake in the 
process of innovation and are therefore not paid. She said:  
 
People are engaged, so they continue to challenge the status quo of their practice and the context 
in which they work after the lab… we are not trying to preach or submit a message to an 
audience, but to explore ways of engaging people’s imagination or intellect. 
 
The strategy of intelligence gathering that informs what they do next is defined by the 
activity of the participants. One of the tutors in the design brief explained that the 
process with the students is very interesting and surprising, as it depends on the 
participants attending the specific process. In this way, they see the students as their 
internal research team. 
 
Spatial Prototypes 
The innovation process functions as a testing of problems, as a way of posing the 
problem to be redefined, explored and investigated as conducted within practical 
experiments, such as the work-camp or the design brief. The processes have a dual aim 
working both as a testing site for business as well as an internal research process, in 
which the innovation managers define their own projects as they explore the notion of 
innovation. Director S explains this saying: ‘We co-explore this way of working with institutions 
as well as examining the legacy for collaboration’. In the annual report from Art Labs 2010 it 
says: ‘[Art Labs] researches, designs and delivers experimental Labs with artists, scientists, 
educationalists, cultural policy makers and other creative individuals that are a catalyst for innovative 
thinking and collaborative practice.’  
 
These practices claimed that their innovation program was a ‘lived experience’ and in a 
publication uploaded on their homepage, the partner from the spin-off (Partner W) 
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draws on Engeström’s (1987) organisation theory, saying that ‘… innovation is a craft, 
which can only be achieved by doing, as a kind of learning by expanding … it is a creative process in 
which the entire person, that is, body and soul has to be involved’. The process of innovation is 
considered subjective and intuitive, depending on personal attachment, and not as a 
program or a set of specific rules to be taught and later applied within business. It 
requires the client to be part of the experience of ‘being there’. They claim that the 
creative process is ‘highly intensive and edgy’ and that it is fostered by ‘a disruption of 
normal practice’. Director S explained her facilitation of innovation processes as 
depending on an ‘intangible ingredient of alchemy, best explained by those having experienced it’. 
The notion of involvement is both what is being used to gather these innovation 
processes, and also what is being tested within the processes themselves. Partner W 
said: ‘To us the key word is involvement, which creates ownership and commitment. Involvement is the 
driving force that brings on successful change.’ The aim to fictionalise reality in order for it to be 
experimentally tested is performed as ‘involvement’, ‘suspension of disbelief’ or 
‘interactivity’. This is similar to what Muniesa (2011, p. 30) has defined as ‘the case 
method of instruction in business administration’. He claims this method is to enact a 
business situation, ‘living it almost for real, that is, in a very realistic fashion’.  
 
The processes might be characterised as ‘experimental trials’ in which their active 
possibilities, feasibility or marketability are being investigated. Writing on ‘experimental 
trials’, Callon, Méadel and Rabeharisoa (2002) claim that an altered problematisation is 
often produced as a result. These processes are said to enlighten the company to direct 
its businesses towards the future, helping the company to reorient their own perception 
of reality. The funding structure is not considered as external to the process of 
experimentation – rather, they have to buy into a world by investing their own physical 
presence. Muniesa says that: ‘The reality of business is, rather, rendered in terms of the 
reality of ‘mental courage’, of the making of a vital, psychological and exciting act of 
decision in the face of uncertainty’ (Muniesa, 2011, p. 30). The use of art to fictionalize 
business serves to deconstruct old structures in order to let the companies and clients 
reinvent new ones themselves through interactive processes of innovation. This creates 
the feeling among the participants that they have facilitated the invention themselves 
taking complete ownership of the ideas and creates a commitment to the aesthetic 
principles applied.  
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The practice of innovation is made up from performative capacities that reconfigure 
relations between users, clients, funders, competitors and collaborators. Not only do the 
funders also act as the users or consumers, but the clients’ participation within the 
innovation process means that they also act as tutors. These innovation practices 
operate in highly ambiguous spaces and times; it is not clear what outcome, if any, their 
processes (or experimental activities) will produce. There is no clear account of what 
will happen or what they are doing, but there seems to be a confidence to invest in this 
uncertainty. Not only do the funding bodies set the brief to be tested, but they also act 
as clients said to integrate a modified version of these innovation processes into their 
own organisational structure. Director S explains how she sees her internal research 
process as informing the practices funding them: 
 
Each time we try out new and different elements – identify the elements that might work – like 
a pilot study where we identify the problems and difficulties, ways to address these and then to 
test them . Then people will go out and do it themselves.  
 
The intended product of these innovation processes is considered to be the labs 
themselves and not the objects, strategies or solutions that are invented within the 
innovation processes, which are if not quite incidental at least not central. The client has 
to buy into a world and not a ‘packaged programme’ considered as a consumer product. 
The processes are not ‘packed, branded and sold’. None of the outcomes are proven 
and tested in defined models. Furthermore, the labs are said to be ‘pro-prototype 
platform innovations’ (Director S). Director S explained that most of the work is pre-
commissioned by funders who want to test strategies of collaboration before 
implementing these into their institutions at large expense (which is also the definition 
of a safe space). The rigorous logic of the processes and the processual model, Director 
S explained, means that each lab has to be a ‘testament’ to the different artistic 
principles or methodologies tested across disciplines.  
 
An important aspect of this was elaborated by Director S, claiming that a four-year 
funding program from NESTA affected the establishment of their own in-house lab, 
such as the ‘FutureLab Initiative’ and the ‘Connect Programme’, which support 
innovation through what they call ‘extreme collaboration’. These programmes are all of a 
similar character to the labs run by Director S during the time when her practice was 
funded by NESTA. In the same way, such practices are both differentiated from – and 
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connected to – such places as the Helen Hamlyn Centre at the Royal College of Art and 
the InnovationRCA. These are all places that represent the networks which both 
participate in and fund the innovation processes. The practice of innovation acts as a 
platform that brings together spaces that were not connected before in order to ‘test the 
basic grammar of interactivity’ (Director S). In this way, networks of practices, devices 
and processes of innovation are said to migrate into funding bodies, private 
corporations and governmental institutions, but without being an established part of 
these.  
 
To sum up, these practices are performed by the innovation managers as ‘research 
engines’, acting as incubators of innovation within the wider field of the creative 
industries by facilitating processes of ideation before these get implemented into a 
market or an organisation. They view themselves as research practices more than as 
corporate entrepreneurs, constructing experiments for their own internal development 
of processes of innovation. The innovation processes (labs, workshops and camps) are 
funded and copied into the institutional setting of such larger organisations as NESTA. 
In this way, innovation is presented as processes of self-reproducing prototypes.  
 
Performing Authenticity 
Having defined the multiple spaces in and through which the field of innovation is 
performed, I have left out an important factor – the academic context of innovation and 
its relation to scientific research. Before moving further into the analysis of this 
relational construction of the field of innovation by defining its performative capacities, 
I draw on my own participatory experience in accessing the field of innovation – that is, 
how my presence as a social scientist affects the performativity of such spaces.  
 
One of the first interviews I conducted was with Practitioner N, who was recommended 
by Partner W. The interview focused on my research interest in innovation and the 
practitioner seemed slightly interested. He emphasised that his interest would be in the 
practical side of my work, as he would like to know more about the spin-off and their 
methods of innovation. I then started to explain my experience of participating in the 
work-camp and the way in which it had informed the practical side of my academic 
research, naming the filmmaking movement and the name of the film instructor 
initiating this movement. In the middle of the sentence he stopped me and said ‘Sorry, 
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this is interesting. Let me get my secretary. I want her to listen to this too’. After a few minutes, the 
secretary entered the room and asked if she could record our conversation. I was then 
included as a practical researcher contributing with my practical experience from the 
work-camp and informing their internal research on facilitating innovation. This weird 
experience of being the one recorded and interviewed changed the set-up, as if I was the 
one who was supposed to inform their experimental research process by providing data 
for the next process. I was included as a part of their performative capacity, turning the 
interview setting into an exploratory system (which contributed to the process of 
intelligence gathering). 
 
Defining innovation as a ‘living experience’ dependent on the involvement of the 
participants and the presence of the funders in the process, which they also commission, 
means that every participant has to be actively involved. Director S emphasised that the 
labs should not turn into events that serve as objects of academic research. When I 
asked for permission to investigate the money-labs, which were in preparation at the 
time of this research, Director S explained:  
 
We only allow people into the labs who contribute with tangible outcomes and who want to 
challenge their own practice. Therefore, we do not allow observers or anyone else who doesn’t 
contribute to the collaborative process. I want you to consider what your contribution would be.  
 
All of these practices reject observation from any kind of researcher or academic who is 
not also an artist or entrepreneur who participates in the labs, camps or workshops. 
This insistence points to aspects of authenticity, which I explore in the following 
section.  
 
While discussing the opportunity of collaboration with the spin-off, Director S called 
Partner W, who once participated in one of her labs. They both tried to convince me to 
observe another innovation process called ‘CultureLab’, which was being organised as 
an internal research institution at Newcastle University in the UK. In this way, I was 
suddenly being treated as internal to the construction of their labs, i.e. as acting as part 
of  their operation as a means by which they could gain information on other practices 
that run similar processes. Director S said further on the subject of the collaboration 
with the spin-off: ‘I want to know from your thesis how they think’. Later that day, Director S 
considered the opportunity of collaborating with the spin-off on the future labs. Then 
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she said: ‘If [Partner W] sends you here to spy on our processes he can forget about it!’ Not only did 
I feel like an integral part in the extension of their work, I also came to be included as a 
mediator of their internal competition.42 They wanted my research to legitimize their 
practice within an academic context and in return to gain insight into other ways of 
organizing innovation processes. One might say that I was being differentially included 
as one of them, which also involved an effort to exclude the others. 
 
When discussing this issue, Director S took the opportunity to distinguish her practice 
from the spin-off by emphasising the difference between her labs and their camps. She 
said on the use of rules to impose constraints on participants: ‘I think it is cruel, if you look 
at [the spin-off], everything out there is cruel…I would never lock people in a room.’ Director S 
emphasised that her vision of innovation was different from the filmmaking practice 
that the spin-off used as a tool of innovation. She continued: 
 
I do things very differently from the [filmmaking] process and the structured rule-based process. 
I provide no rules and I do not impose any structure on the participants. I am not someone who 
is able to create ideas, which I do not believe can be done by imposing a structure. I have no 
religious belief in creativity. Some people believe in it as a gift from God that they have to 
impose on other people as the only way of doing innovation.  
 
This differentiation – or internal competition – was a chance for her to emphasise her 
artistic ideal performed around the notion of ‘authenticity’, as opposed to cynicism and 
provocation. Instead, she claimed that the environment she builds for the labs is 
protected by rules based on confidentiality and that it therefore creates a free and 
protected atmosphere – ‘pure exchange, generous and trusting exchange of ideas and knowledge, 
that happens naturally on a need to know basis’.  
 
These examples do not only serve to illustrate the competitive relations or difference 
between these processes and practices of innovation, but more importantly, the way in 
which these differences are means by which the founder and organisers perform 
themselves as artistic inventors authorising specific artistic ideas, such as design and 
filmmaking as means of creativity.  
 
                                                
42 See Simone (2010 p. 325) on how collaboration leads to competition and comparison and thus value 
judgements. 
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In the interview after the design brief, Professor A explained his relation to the notion 
of design, claiming it was not a label that the students can apply or a frame that they 
must obey: it is not a discipline. Again, a claim to authenticity is performed. Professor A 
said that:  
 
In schools, [design] gets misinterpreted, it gets misused and dramatically reduced to non-
practical design and becomes an excuse for everything that does not solve a problem. The 
students should therefore be critical of critical design; that is healthier. I am now writing on 
[design] to clarify it from other critical activities and I don’t want the students to get tangled up 
in it.  
 
The two specific configurations of such authors are the ‘design genius’ and the 
‘eccentric film instructor’, which attract, or have an appeal, to business. The people who 
are engaged in the innovation process collectively enact the performance of such 
individuals. The spin-off organising innovation in concert with the creative application 
of the film-manifesto consider themselves a part of the company, participating in the 
rituals and culture of this company, such as the singing of Christian hymns, skinny 
dipping and gatherings in the sauna and other characteristic events. The participants 
have all been involved in the filmmaking, in one way or another, such as being a script-
writer, game designer or artistic curator. The other enactment concerns the notion of 
design, which depends on Professor A’s artistic vision of employing every one of the 
other facilitators, controlling the re-interpretation of the design concept, which is 
applied by staging himself as the inventor.  
 
Those individuals frame the rules and keep together the network, creating a specific 
attraction for the businesses and funders who are engaging in these processes – a 
performance akin to those of the management guru (Heelas, 1996) and the genius artist 
(Barry, Born and Weszkalnys, 2008). In spite of the dependence on the performance of 
specific charismatic individuals, the practices claim that they never take ownership or 
copyright of the elements defining the structure of the processes. Partner W said ‘we give 
copyright to the people’ and that ‘ideas only live on by being shared’. These processes might live 
from this sort of ‘generosity’ attracting private investors and public funding. One might 
even say that the innovation methods are protected or are held together by the 
charismatic performances of specific individuals.  
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As has been explained above, funders come to the labs for its tools and methods, which 
are to be disseminated at a later stage. The practices never do the same lab twice, but 
inspire people to do their own versions of them. In this way, the processes are never 
repeated in a completely similar manner as copies. Director S described their role in 
terms of aiming to make themselves redundant: ‘we design, document and form prototypes for 
viable outcomes and ingenious applications through creative teamwork.’ As soon as one lab is 
implemented in an institutional context, that institution stops funding the processes and 
the innovation practice moves on to organise other kinds of projects. This presents an 
innovation strategy that is ‘invested-in’ and simultaneously ‘bought-out’ by other 
innovation environments. 
 
These are processes transported by the promise of generic creativity held together by 
charismatic individuals.  In relation to organising these processes, Director S said: ‘.... it 
is the who-you-know network… it is a network that creates a bureaucracy of its own’. Innovation is 
based on the performance of affective relationships and having their own hierarchies 
and criteria played out between them. ‘Each lab is research for me, I look out for interesting 
people to build up relationships over time’. She said further: ‘We build a matrix of people’. The 
processes defined as spatial prototypes produce a feeling of connectedness or 
authenticity, which serve to legitimise the organisation of innovation. This is supported 
by the fact that innovation, in these cases, is limited to specialised spaces – between the 
stakeholders who are often defined by the funding context and do not travel into 
mainstream news channels or media.  
 
From the description of the funding context and my experience of being performed in 
and through this context, the contours of an industry start to emerge. Funding is 
considered not only as a means of gaining financial support but as a means of 
connection, exchange and competition. The meeting with Practitioner N showed that I 
was not supposed to be the one to narrate the story of innovation, but the one to be 
observed. My role as an investigator was turned inside-out. To grasp the way in which I 
was also performed as the mediator of their internal competition, Clemens Thornquist’s 
words are particularly pertinent. He explained to me in an interview on the Rob Wilson 
practice that ‘they use academia as an obscure mirror’ (Interview London 2009). These 
practices produce spatial prototypes, which are not fully replicable (not a developed 
method to be implemented in a context outside the space in which it happens), but 
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which operate as an effectuation of innovation that re-enacts parts of the reality 
negated. The spaces considered external to the practice of innovation, such as the 
funding institutions, academia and business, provide a structure from where the 
practices enact their own internal research process testing methods and devices of 
innovation and, thus, turning the assemblage inside-out (Riles, 2001).  
 
An Expressive Strategy  
The innovation processes are considered as prototypical structures; however, they take 
place in the course of an alteration where the process is always different from itself –  
always in a temporary construction that is ready for change and is never fully articulated 
or developed into a model. So far I have explained the notions and terms that are used 
by these practices to present themselves. I have provided a sense of how performative 
capacities are also constructed in and through the audience addressed in the articulation 
of innovation. The operational modes of these practices produce relations by 
differentially distinguishing themselves from the market and their competitors. From 
the overlap of the terms used to define these practices of innovation, it seems as if they 
constitute a distinct vocabulary that operates according to a mobile and multi-purposive 
logic of differentiation. Funders and competitors are differentially included, which 
means that they are also constructed in and through the articulation of such difference.  
 
Looking into their funding structure, the artistic vocabulary applied by these practices 
also appears on the webpage of the funders. NESTA, for instance, made a clear 
statement about the purpose of funding the Art-labs, saying that ‘it is a unique artist-led 
process which evolves the piloting, making and launching of ideas’. The fact that the labs are 
mentioned on their webpage and the follow-up marketing report evaluating the four 
years funding shows that it also plays a part in performing or expressing the funder’s 
own capacity for innovation. In this case, it seems as if the terms that are used to 
describe the practice of innovation are to some extent ‘owned’ in and through the 
funding contexts. This means that the outside market determines or performs the 
valuation of these innovation processes by affecting the internal configuration of 
creativity and innovation. I explain this in the following section by considering the ways 
in which these practices account for the value created within the innovation processes 
(or what outcomes are produced).  
 
 98 
The significance of these practices is not that they reproduce power by creating or 
recreating certain discourses. On the contrary, I argue that their methods and politics 
(critique) are performative. Callon (2007) suggests that performativity is ‘co-
performation’, highlighting the collective aspect, as well as the fact that performativity is 
an activity, not just a property of statements. The collective aspect of enunciation relates 
to the relations that these practices either create or destroy in their articulation of 
innovation, that is, how these practices strategically connect to the notion of art and of 
business. The organisational self-image of these innovation practices, enacted through 
an artistic vocabulary, possesses, like a map, a ‘language’ of its own that does not pertain 
to a linguistic field of study. This study does not belong to a study of language structure 
or grammar, but provides a semantic space defined by Law (2004, p. 69) as materially 
produced through words and concepts, signs and symbols. It is a way in which a 
grammatical structure of what can be said and what cannot be said is produced. This is 
not a language form but a performative structure that reaches a particular audience 
defining an industry of innovation.  
 
A further point in this performative structure is to consider not only the content of 
what was said, but also the way in which it was said. To elaborate this point, I consider 
the literary forms by which these practices present themselves, including funding 
proposals, annual reports and evaluation material, as well as board meetings.  
 
Firstly, I turn to the role of the students and the ways in which they were performed as 
innovation assets. Constructing the innovation processes as experimental trials by using 
the students as internal researchers was performed in the design brief in relation to a 
notion of ‘unemployability’. This was presented as a goal for the students to pursue, as 
they are trained to be artists rather than consultants. A student in the design brief 
explained to me that: ‘the way they inform you and make you believe in the concept of [design] 
means that you cannot be employed afterwards, as you don’t want to be’. Professor A explained 
that his students are trained to see the world differently and that the students thereby 
might be thinking too radically to be employed in a company afterwards. He said: 
 
Our students are a little bit niche … in a team of ten or twenty there may be room for one that 
can shake things up a little bit and question things – kind of, like, disruptive you know –  
creative in a positive way and obviously two, three or four are gonna be a bit of a disaster… to 
produce original ideas and communicate them well is what makes them valuable and it does. 
They go and work for Yahoo, Nokia and Sony … and you know these others, like Microsoft 
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research lab. So they go into the industry being asked to bring originality and a fresh angle 
rather than to do a what-is-expected sort of job. 
 
They are trained to practice the artistic idea upon which the innovation processes are 
based, such as design, in order to provoke creativity in the company for which they are 
later employed. The training of the students to become creative thinkers is performed as 
an asset migrating into institutions, funding contexts and academic settings. Professor A 
explained that he interpreted the employment of his students to show that there is 
economic value in the processes he organises.  
 
In the design brief I followed, one of the tutors (Tutor J) also acted as the client 
representing the company setting the brief. She was a former student graduating from 
the design program a few years ago and is now employed in the industry, leading the 
client’s internal design centre. I return to the organisational aspect of this relation in 
Chapter 7. For now, I draw attention to the fact that she wrote a second brief for the 
company’s internal board in order to convince its members of the value of such an 
investment. The second brief materialises the dual construction by which the funding 
bodies are performed as an outside, which the innovation practice addresses by 
adjusting the internal documentation and methods of validation to a business context.  
 
The second brief is a specific device that adheres to an outline dictated by the funding 
bodies in a search to evidence the output of these processes. In the annual report 
(2009), the spin-off promotes their innovation program as a ‘cost effective R&D research 
process’. In this case, the balance sheet is also a ‘technical device’ (Callon, 2007) that 
contributes to the performativity of the practice oriented towards the future and 
potential value creation. Another aspect of this capitalization is the use of free labour, 
such as that of the students.43 In the case mentioned above, Tutor J acts as a mediator 
of the dual construction by performing herself as a former student trained to be a 
creative inventor, or by selling the principles and methods of innovation as ‘spatial 
prototypes’, which migrate into other institutional or industrial contexts mediated by the 
literary forms or devices mentioned above.  
 
                                                
43 Lazzarato (2011) and MacRobbie (2011) have discussed the aspect of free labour as part of post-Fordist 
production claiming creative work and intellectual labour as the new ‘precarious labour’ in the culture 
industry and the art world (see also Rauning, Ray and Wuggenig, 2011).   
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The practice of innovation is performed in and through these various spaces providing a 
context for the operation of innovation. Value is not performed as a progression along 
the line of the value-chain (Porter, 1990). Rather, it seems that space is in itself 
distributed across the different actors (clients, funders, academia) by which the inside 
and the outside of the assemblage come together. In Riles words:  
 
The inside and outside of the artifact are not text and context to one another ... 
Rather, it is all within the recursivity of a form that literally speaks about itself ... 
and thus to generate a sense of reality or dimensionality, each serves as the 
inside or outside of the other (Riles, 2001, p. 69).  
 
Arvidsson (2009, p. 17) claims that the value chain’s geographical extension also 
stretches to include the public and consumers. Considering the work-camp, design brief 
and artistic labs as experimental trials it can even be said that the market itself is 
differentially included in transforming the linearity of the value-chain. Not only is the 
market considered to be an object of investigation, but such trials also include the 
involvement of governments, authorities, public institutions, private corporations and 
academia. The process of capitalization is performed as an outside to creativity, 
however, at the same time, it provides external validity to the experiments. These are 
mechanisms by which expression form part of the fabric that it produces performing 
the assemblage from the outside-in.  
  
What I have described so far is a system that sustains itself by setting up an 
experimental system where the funding context informs the innovative research process 
providing the basis for multiplying the qualities or attributes of the prototypes – as well 
as managing the relations between these entities. In order to understand this system, let 
me go back to the connection previously introduced between the experimental activities 
and the laboratory. The creation of a market of innovation is not exactly about 
transporting things outside the laboratory ‘but more about constructing different 
experimental sites that go beyond the pure laboratory conditions and that redefine (or 
even abolish) the boundaries between the inside and the outside (Muniesa and Callon, 
2007, p. 184). The system described in this chapter is one that leaves room for infinite 
flexibility in its articulation of its relationship to business, which signifies the market, 
performed as an outside reality, within the parameters of the design of spaces of 
innovation. 
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Introducing an artistic vocabulary into the field of innovation changes the discussion 
from talking about innovation models to a discussion of realities. Instead of exploring 
corporate efforts to create particular affective environments, the further study of this 
thesis investigates, more generally, the way in which the innovation devices provoke, 
test and suspend realities that may stand as sources of knowledge for the purpose of 
innovation. I analyse these as what Muniesa and Trébuchet-Breitwiller (2010, p. 323) 
calls ‘performative achievements’, rather than natural or given conditions provoked 
through the aesthetic principles applied in order to fictionalise business. The boundaries 
are not only transformed but also constructed by the strategic use of aesthetic 
principles, such as imposing rules or regulating activities and also through the activities 
of the actors within them. The assemblage consists of a series of mechanisms which 
filter not only the flow of capital and creativity, but also organisational forms, devices 
and methods that are negotiable and contestable.  
 
In the following chapters, I examine two variations of such designs. In Chapter 5, I look 
into the use of provocation as a tool of innovation, where rules are externally imposed 
defining the structure and design of the process. In Chapter 6, I explore the unfolding 
of the design brief investigating the notion of design applied as a research strategy 
where rules and norms are internally generated within the processes of innovation. The 
difference is framed in terms of whether rules are imposed from the outside or whether 
they are generated within the innovation processes themselves.  
 
The articulation of innovation as the enactment of a space fictionalizing business in 
order for companies to reinvent their own perception of reality builds an environment – 
as Thornquist writes on the Watermill Foundation – that ‘is more of a living installation 
than a staged illusion; it is in itself a work of art’ (Thornquist, 2005). This means hiding 
a ‘real reality’, otherwise the artistic vision cannot be separated from its performative 
capacities. It can be said that the backstage is not separated from the front-stage (Marres 
2007, p. 187). The ethnographic studies that I examine enable me to analyse the 
performativity of the assemblage following Muniesa and Callon (2007, p. 184), when 
they say that ‘[e]xperiments are a particular instance of performativity. The experimenter 
performs in quite a basic sense. She brings things into being by assembling them in a 
particular manner…’. The characterization of the practices outlined in this chapter 
equally provide opportunities to examine situations in which participants are expected 
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to perform as internal researchers in order to test the artistic approach to innovation. I 
am interested in how the participants are affected by such a task – being ‘enactors’ 
rather than merely objects of innovation devices.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have mapped out the vocabulary by which the practices of innovation 
are constituted – in order to gain a sense of their articulation of space. It may be that 
specific techniques of innovation cannot be captured, but their actualization can be 
mapped and its performative capacity analysed. Such a map is foreign to the practices 
themselves as they employ a claim to resist any categorisation, mapping or articulation 
of their methods, tools or devices of innovation.  
 
Each of these innovation processes act as sites of experimental trials – they are each 
discrete experiences and thereby also theatrical sites that in themselves perform. The 
way in which the spaces within the assemblage are related to each other is closely 
connected to the activity of the participants acting within it, that is, their experiences 
and relation to each other. The spaces are not held together in a formal network defined 
by territorial occupation of land, such as an industry defined by external measures of 
scale (GPA), but by their performative capacities, by the activities and investments they 
at once promote and enable. That is, a territory constructed in and through a funding 
context, which acts as a configuration against which these art practices define the notion 
of innovation and, at the same time, more or less justify their value. The funding 
structure not only facilitates the organisation of innovation processes, but also includes 
the logic of the market to be experimentally tested within the processes of innovation.  
 
The performative capacities – being both connected to and differentiated from the 
market – are what makes these processes distinctive and commercially valuable. That is 
not to conclude that these practices fail to create the creative economy they attempt to 
endorse. On the contrary, these maps are powerful tools that work according to the 
logic of differentiation where the measure of value or the capitalization of the future 
becomes a part of the performative capacity of innovation. The map underlines what 
these practices are and what they do, but it also visualises the internal contradiction (or 
binarism which they put to work); this split brings into view a site where a critical 
relation can begin to indicate the emergence of a territory. 
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5. A Study of Cinema: Dogma, Rules and Reality  
 
 
A constraint is a limitation or obstacle voluntarily accepted by the artist…The 
obstacle is gratuitous in the sense that it has been set up solely for the pleasure of 
overcoming it. 
         (Rodriguez, 2008, p. 39, 41) 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I present my first ethnographic study, that of cinematic innovation 
through my participation in a 5-week work-camp. The process was organised by a small-
scale consultancy firm – a spin-off from a Danish film company associated with the 
production of New Danish Films. More specifically, the organisation of the camp takes 
its inspiration from the Dogma movement (introduced in Chapter 2) presenting the 
rather abstract idea that the use of constraints might bring about a process of ideation. 
The Dogma95 was a movement announced in a manifesto that gives the filmmaker ten 
commandments to be applied in the filmmaking process. The artistic vision builds upon 
‘liberation through relinquishment’ (Schepelern, 2005, p. 83). The translation of this 
artistic technique into business is conceptualised in the description of the practice by its 
proponents as ‘dramatic innovation’. Focusing on the development of the work-camp 
and the progression of the process of invention, this chapter explores those cinematic 
techniques as they were applied in the camp. 
 
The innovation process took place in a fencing hall located in the film city outside 
Copenhagen. The process builds on the notion of ‘skunk-work’ emphasising a form of 
collaboration that does not cohere to corporate norms and values. At first glance, what 
is significant from this practice is the notion of the camp defined as ‘a temporary site, a 
spatially delimited location that exists only for a limited period’ (Diken and Laustsen, 
2005, p. 17). This spatial structure together with the physical setting, the location and 
artistic orientation emphasise the subversive, secretive or alternative character of the 
process. An obvious reference that comes to mind when thinking of camps in general is 
Agamben’s (1998) notion of the camp as a space of exception. The camp has been 
traditionally defined as a piece of land placed outside the normal order (Diken and 
Laustsen, 2006). Gilroy (2000b) speaks of camps such as labour camps, refugee camps, 
death camps etc. claiming that what racism demonstrates is a ‘camp-mentality’. 
Although Gilroy’s (2000a, p. 83) concern differs from mine in that he is directed toward 
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race, nation and ethnic difference as sources of camp-thinking, it should be obvious that 
the solidarity of the camp can be constituted around dimensions of division other then 
race.  
 
This chapter explores the way in which sociological accounts of the camp might bring 
us closer to an understanding of the spatio-temporal structures enacted within                            
the innovation process and the way in which the spatial configuration of a camp enables 
this practice to theorise rules, constraints and conflict as a creative strategy. The camp 
might not solely be understood as establishing an external order or straightforward 
exclusion – such as the camp distinguishing itself from its corporate context (promoting 
a divide between art and business). Agamben (1998, p. 170) says that ‘[w]hat is excluded 
in the camp is, according to the etymological sense of the term “exception” (ex-capere), 
taken outside, included through its own exclusion’.    
 
In the course of the chapter I examine the way in which the camp-space came to 
subvert the nature of the relations of representation by the application and 
appropriation of rules inspired by the Dogma movement. The rules of abandonment of 
any technological devices manipulating the natural setting in which the film is to be shot 
aims to reach a documentary effect, however, without ‘just’ representing reality 
(Rodriguez, 2008). However, I do not compare the events happening in the camp to 
Dogma as a predefined model of innovation. Rather I look into the ways in which 
Dogma is performed or translated into a model of innovation in practice. Therefore, I 
present the enactment of this artistic vision in the footnotes explaining the cinematic 
tools and techniques which create a documentary effect and analyse the way in which 
                                                
 
The camp serves as an example of how the Dogma manifesto with fully articulated rules is 
translated into a creative principle guiding the structure of the innovation process. This subtext 
examines the enactment of Dogma by analysing the Dogma manifesto and other published 
material, having categorized the Dogma-method as an invention, which breaks with both 
fictional and documentary styles of film production (Rodriguez, 2008). The most important 
aspect of Dogma is the fact that it represents an attempt to reach reality by imposing 
constraints. One could define this as a ‘more-than-representational’ effect of rules. Such an 
endeavour expresses a formalistic demand. The movement refers to Stravinsky’s edict that ‘the 
more constraints one imposes, the more one frees oneself of the chains that shackle the spirit 
… the arbitrariness of the constraint only serves to obtain precision of execution’ (Quoted in 
Schepelern, 2005, p. 76). It is this relationship between reality and constraints that I analyse in 
this subtext usually occupied by footnotes. This text is meant to underpin the ethnographic 
reading of the main-text. However, it can both be read alongside the ethnographic material or as 
an independent narrative (cf. Chapter 3).  
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Dogma is re-enacted in practice as the more-than-representational. This investigation 
emphasises the paradoxical relationship between inclusion and exclusion as it unfolded 
in the work-camp, which accounts for what Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 113) define as 
its extra-territoriality.  
 
At a practical level, what is investigated is what happens when rules imposed from the 
outside become a tool for self-transformation instead of a condition of control. This 
chapter addresses some of the practical questions around the construction of such a 
topological space. It asks: what are the tools, techniques and devices used to enact 
dramatic innovation? What are the objects produced as a result of the camp? What are 
the rules and norms imposed and how to make the participants voluntarily accept these 
as creative constraints? What does it mean to be a camp-member and how is that 
experience in itself considered to produce value?  
 
The chapter is in three parts. Firstly, I describe the camp from my participatory 
experience and explain the way in which it constructs a space of exception. I follow here 
the continuity of the process of invention as it happened in the camp. In doing so, I 
consider the use of props, models, rituals and the rhetoric operationalising the 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion demarcating a space of exception by its ability to 
break down the distinction between ‘pretence and belief’ (Lury, 2003, p. 313). Secondly, 
I analyse the way in which these experiences contributed to the relational construction 
of the camp in and through the events that happened in the last weeks of the invention 
process. In order to get a grip on the complex structure by which the camp is 
composed, I analyse the performance of relations. Therefore, arguments, strategies and 
tactics are analysed in terms of the objectives and rules they produce, the enemies they 
identify, the alliances they seek and the collections and divisions they enact.   
                                                
 
Dogma 95 is an avant-garde filmmaking movement started in 1995 by the Danish directors Lars 
von Trier and Thomas Vinterberg. The movement began with the signing of the Dogma 95 
Manifesto and the ‘Vow of Chastity’ announcing the Dogma artist’s ‘ten commandments’, 
which are aesthetic rules that suggest alternative methods for film production. The main issue is 
restricted access to cinematic technology to ensure that technical obstacles obstruct the 
production process at a number of critical points. The goal of the dogma collective is to purify 
filmmaking by refusing expensive and spectacular special effects, post-production modifications 
and other devices to strategically manipulate the film image. Furthermore, the manipulation of 
the audio-visual is restricted; no optical work or filters are allowed; no special lighting is 
permitted and sound and images must not be separated.    
 
 106 
 
Recruitment 
Starting with the beginning, in what follows, I explain my entrance point to this field of 
innovation through my application to become a camp-member. In the summer of 2007 
I was invited – based on a written application – to participate in a recruitment day, 
together with 80 other masters students out of whom 40 would be selected to 
participate in the camp. Furthermore, my invitation to participate in the recruitment day 
was also subject to the completion of three different personality tests online. From this 
event the camp is presented as a ‘gated community’ in which the exit is open but access 
is closed (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 96) and based on voluntary participation. I will 
come back to this distinction of the camp as a space of exposure and the voluntarily 
application of rules later in this chapter. For now, let us first get a hold on what actually 
happened in the recruitment process. 
 
On the day of the event I was asked to meet in a fencing hall, where the camp would 
later run. I was welcomed by one of the tutors and asked to fill in a form to specify my 
academic qualifications, which was compared to the results from the personality tests. 
After a brief introduction to the practice of innovation explaining the agenda of the day, 
I was asked to put a paper sign specifying my academic specialization and personality 
type around my neck. Not quite sure of which one to pick, I was advised to take the 
green one signalling my business education.     
 
We were separated into groups of five students where we had to negotiate the optimal 
mixture of colours. We were then to exchange members with the other groups in order 
to get the most optimal team. I was one of two green members. It was decided that I 
was to be exchanged for a ‘yellow’ member. A tutor asked me to step up on stage for 
the other groups to make an offer in order to adopt me as a member of their group. 
                                                
 
The rules also relate to the interference with pro-filmic settings grounded in the requirement to 
shoot on location and not to bring in props. The requirement to use a hand-held camera has the 
effect that actors are given more freedom to improvise their characters, rather than having to 
keep their predetermined blocked-out movement – as to limit the space for directorial 
manipulation of what is in front of the camera. The emphasis on technological constraints is 
intended to force the filmmakers to focus on the actual story and the actors' performances. The 
goal is also to make the audience more engaged as artificial settings would not alienate them 
from the narrative, themes and mood shown on the screen (Bondebjerg, 2003). 
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Luckily for me not many candidates had a green sign person and another group quickly 
adopted me.  
 
When all the groups were complete the task was launched. We had to make up a 
strategy for the survival of the Danish Royal Family over the next one hundred years. 
While the groups began discussing and drawing to express ideas and solutions to this 
problem the tutors were surveying the activity. During the discussion a tutor asked me 
to show my colour-coded sign so they could take note of my name for their records. 
Our solution to the problem was a suggestion to privatise the Royal Family and make 
fake princes and princesses as a marketing exercise.  
 
At the end we were told to step up on the stage and, then, to pitch the idea in two 
minutes, the audience being the other students, tutors and organisers of the event. I 
remember the anxious moment in which I was looking at the others and everyone was 
waiting for the first person to speak. One of the other members in the group broke the 
silence and was very eager to talk: everyone knew it was a matter of being heard – 
presenting oneself as a leader and a team player – in order to be selected for the work-
camp. It was an ambiguous feeling of being exposed and at the same time having to 
struggle to get attention.  
  
When all the presentations had finished we were asked to fill in a few questionnaires. 
These were meant to map our experience of the event and asked us to give our view on 
the other group members’ experience of our own performance in the team, as well as 
evaluating the other group members. I looked out into the large hall in which we were 
all seated. While answering specific questions evaluating any of the other group 
members I knew that they were equally evaluating me. As a final test we were 
individually called in for a 5-minute interview with the facilitators. I was asked to explain 
why I would like to attend the camp and what my contribution to a team working on a 
                                                
 
This edict was also followed by members of the literary group OuLiPo established in 1960 by 
figures such as Raymond Queneau, Georges Perec and Italo Calvino working with creative 
obstacles and inspirational rules. Also, it needs to be mentioned that art, from the renaissance to 
the romantics, develops under formalistic demands, for example sonnets, terzains and quatrains, 
which apply a system of ground rules as a source of inspiration. The Dogma has obvious 
parallels to earlier movements and initiatives in the cinema, such as Vertov’s Kino Pravda and 
Italian Neo-realism. 
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business case would be. During the interview Tutor D explained dramatic innovation as 
‘a proprietary framework’ providing guidelines for creating the environment, staffing 
and process needed to generate and qualify radically new ideas. He further stated that 
when a play or a film is based on a script, dramatic innovation is initiated by a challenge 
and built around a case description, as in the case of privatizing the Royal Family. 
 
Staging ‘Dramatic Innovation’ 
The colour-coded signs, the auction and later negotiation among team members were all 
dramaturgical activities carefully planned and used explicitly as evaluative measures for 
the facilitator to gather the right mixture of divergent personalities and academic 
specializations. The staging of a gated community based on voluntary participation is 
according to Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 8) associated with a double meaning, both 
with a liberating and restrictive power as in detention centres and gated communities, 
voluntary as well as restraining camps. However, they emphasise that in each case 
‘camps seem to function as two extreme horizons that attract or repel the consumer-
citizens’ (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 9).  
 
The rest of the camp was shaped by similar style events formalised in a script taken 
from filmmaking. The structure was organised by defining different sets of rules 
depending on the specific cases and dynamics within the teams. However, some basic 
rules were given from the outset. Temporal and spatial constraints were to be followed 
equally by all participants, defined by the structure and the physical setting of the camp. 
It is in this way that the camp serves as an example of how the Dogma manifesto, with 
fully articulated rules, is translated into creative principles which guide the structure of 
the innovation process.    
                                                
 
The parallels in cinematic history to these self-enforced limitations are films that operate under 
particular rules such as the French New Wave films represented by directors like Alain Resnais, 
Jean-Luc Godard and Jacques Demy, which serve as direct inspiration for the Dogma 
movement and especially Lars von Trier. With the ten rules of cinematic restrictions, Dogma is 
also categorised as an anti-establishment reaction, an initiative taken to counter the trend 
towards bourgeois and superficial entertainment. Dogma answers this aim in the liberation from 
technique and money stating an anti-capitalistic project against Hollywood and the commercial 
film (Stevenson, 2003; Schepelern, 2003; Hjort and MacKenzie, 2003). 
 109 
The structure of the camp was divided into different stages which guide the process of 
invention. Partner W illustrates the structure in a diagram published on their web-page 
(Figure 3).  
 
 
   
 
Figure 3. The structure of Work-camp 2007  
 
 
 
The process consists of different stages: flirtation, conception, incubation, birth, upbringing and 
examination. This model is divided into sequences ruled by specific themes such as 
ideation, analysis, process handling, prototype development, marketing and business 
planning.  
 
Its most important function is to structure the dynamics and the dramatic elements of 
the innovation process. The script told the organisers when to give more freedom or 
introduce constraint, when to impose breaks or induce stress and when to facilitate 
collaboration or inspire competition among the teams. In a later interview, Tutor A 
presented the process of innovation as a dramatic story with conflicts, climactic 
moments, resolutions and so forth. More specifically, he explained that they attempt to 
                                                
 
The most significant example of this mode of production is the The Five Obstructions (2003), a 
theatre documentary about the production process of experimental film. The film is directed by 
Lars von Trier and Jørgen Leth. The film is focused around an investigative journey into the 
phenomenon of ‘documentary’, based on manifestos written by each director. The story is about 
a filmmaker recreating one of his first films, The Perfect Human (1967), which is an ironic 
interpretation of the world of advertising. The film exposes the human as an object of 
investigation by the visual imaginary and the voice over asking questions like ‘how is it 
functioning? how does it function? We have to look into what kind of thing it is - what it can do 
and how it looks? 
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apply three main points from dramaturgy within the work-camp. The first being ‘the 
respect for expectations’, the second is ‘the need of surprise’ and the third is ‘the 
importance of conflicts’. He claimed the main themes in the process of innovation to be 
‘rituals, staging and ceremonial leadership’. 
 
The events that I follow in the present chapter were organised as theatrical 
performances. The dramaturgical structure set out in the script presented the frame of 
the camp, which was established in order to provoke an experimental trial solving a 
specific brief set by a client. The brief introduced to my team was called ‘Evoke’, 
defined as ‘Digital Emotional Communication’ and the task was to invent an object that 
would transmit emotions across temporal and spatial distance. The object was supposed 
to be qualified or tested through market analysis, user surveys, prototypes and business 
development. At the end of every week we had to present specific ‘deliverables’ for the 
organizers, the client and the tutors. The case description served as a navigation device 
and as an initial description of the desired outcome. 
 
Below I give a taste of how one aspect of this world unfolded in the camp during a 
specific event where the activities were regulated, constrained and specified by the rules 
imposed. This event served as a way in which to radicalise the students in order for 
them to be critical of the case and step out of the world in which corporate principles of 
justification and valuation guide the space of invention. Also, the event serves to 
illustrate how the artistic idea of Dogma was executed in practice by imposing rules and 
constraints on the students. This event was the realization of the second stage of 
‘flirtation’ presented in the script – an event intended to manipulate the actors, i.e. the 
innovation teams, to experience and actively join the dramatic story.   
 
                                                
 
The aim to reproduce this film five times limited by five different obstructions examines this 
investigative method. The Five Obstructions has been described as a theatre documentary, as it 
is both a result of dogma production techniques and an experiment documented in film. The 
challenge to reproduce this film five times in five different versions with a new set of 
increasingly demanding preconditions (that is technical, ethical or even moral types), functions 
as an examination of the method of Dogma itself. 
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Initiation, Control and Ritualization  
Having spent the first week with the client analysing the case and defining the problem 
of Evoke, in the second week we were asked to show up for a sleepover. No 
preparation was required except to leave a telephone number in case of an emergency. 
Arriving at the entrance to the fencing hall with my sleeping bag I was – as was 
everyone else – curious about what would happen and how long we were expected to 
stay. All kinds of technological and digital devices were confiscated (mobile phones, 
watches and laptops). The hall was empty, equipped only with one pallet of tools and 
materials (office appliances) for each of the teams. I noticed that the windows were 
blocked and after a while the doors to the hall were also locked.  We were told that we 
would stay in the hall for the next forty two hours and that anyone breaking out would 
be dismissed from the camp. 
 
During the hours of imprisonment we were led through a rigid sequence of tasks 
delivered to the team by a messenger. In best ‘Robinson-expedition’-style a man entered 
the hall with a letter explaining the task and under what conditions it should be solved. 
The messenger was not allowed to talk and none of us in the team knew what to expect, 
which created a strange kind of anxiety and group-dynamic. What could the tasks 
involve? Would anybody be singled out? Would I be singled out? We were, after all, a 
fabricated group with different skills. Would the tasks challenge our morality or even 
our bodily boundaries? This anxiety mostly disappeared with the first task and in the 
following heat and rush of things, where playing the game took over and replaced 
anxiety with adrenalin. A shared sense of togetherness was aroused when we all 
understood that the tasks were problems to be solved collectively within the team. The 
task was to be completed with no outside intervention at all.  
 
                                                
 
After each remake Leth and Trier discuss the results, their negotiations are recorded on video 
and edited into the film. The hindrances from Trier were an attempt to force Leth to think 
differently, to economize and improvise in the same way that the manifesto attempted to force 
filmmakers to use limitations as creative offsets and to incorporate the moments of combating 
those limitations into the film. This experiment is the exact opposite from a pre-designed or 
storyboarded film, where the style, structure and themes have been predetermined in advance by 
the auteur as film illustrate an open-ended journey for both of the directors. This openness is an 
important concern for Trier extending his belief that cinema should extend the authors’ and the 
viewers’ ways of thinking and perceiving, leading beyond ordinary frames of expectation 
towards the new, the unseen and even unthought (cf. Rodriguez, 2008, pp. 48-51). 
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First we had five minutes to reformulate the brief given by the client. The next task was 
to come up with one hundred ideas in two minutes. Then we had to define the criteria 
for an inventive idea in 5 minutes. After that we had to select the ideas matching the 
criteria. A timer on the wall counted the deadline for each of these tasks. The next forty 
two hours continued like this (except for time scheduled for eating and sleeping). This 
structure created an awareness of the fact that every task was scripted and that we were 
being put under constant scrutiny from a largely invisible production crew (the 
facilitators). Within the group we started wondering if they could watch us working and 
if they would control the light to disrupt our sense of time since the windows were 
blocked.  
 
During the fourty-two hours we all got a sense of being objects in a game show or on 
reality TV, similar to ‘Big Brother’ surveillance. In this situation, the conspiracy we 
imagined where we were thinking that we were under surveillance from the facilitators 
could, according to Erving Goffman, be defined as a way of making sense of, or of 
interpreting, the situation. He writes that the operations of teams in such specific 
interactions act in order to maintain a relevant definition of a situation in order to keep 
up some kind of stability – he emphasises that while participating in teams ‘we must all 
carry within ourselves something of the sweet guilt of conspirators’ (Goffman, 1959, p. 
108).    
 
Guided through the tasks, we came up with a solution to the concept of Evoke. Our 
suggestion was to develop an object to be used by a subculture or emerging artistic 
movement in order to later make it a mainstream application. We wanted, furthermore, 
to develop a marketing strategy through producing a fictional film about Evoke and not 
through the traditional commercial media. Later in the camp we came to define our 
                                                
 
Furthermore, the documentary illustrates how self-transformation is at stake in the process of 
artistic creation, expressed in the comments in the discussion between the two filmmakers 
(Dwyer, 2008). The digital artist Hector Rodriguez describes the five obstructions as an 
unfolding conversation as its artistic content and value is inseparable from the dialogic process 
of its production, and therefore not as an attempt to produce a documentary effect (Rodriguez 
2008 p. 39). Both filmmakers start out by agreeing on a basic constraint. Trier invents new rules 
in the moment as a response to casual comments made by Leth, (e.g. when Leth mentions his 
love of Havana cigars Trier immediately states that the next film must be shot in Cuba). The 12-
frame-shot reflects Trier's awareness of Leth's preference for long-take style. Trier adopts a 
special attitude regarding the utterance of Leth as material from which to elaborate new 
constraints. 
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target-audience as ‘extreme users’, referring to the users that are not considered 
mainstream, but rather represent a subculture. This notion was based on the inverse of 
Eric von Hippel’s (1986) concept of ‘lead users’, which was presented in the written 
material handed out prior to the camp.  
 
Towards the end of the forty two hours we got a note saying we had fifteen minutes to 
prepare a presentation on the idea selected. When the time was up, the team was called 
on stage to present it to the client, the organizers and the tutors. The solution we 
presented received positive feedback and was evaluated as a great idea that illuminated 
the soul of Evoke and that captured the spirit of dramatic innovation itself.  
 
After the final presentations we were all taken for a walk outside and asked to bring all 
the material and notes we had been working on for the last forty two hours. We stopped 
by a fireplace and were ordered to burn everything we were carrying. The fourty-two 
hours ended with a gathering around the fire with a glass of champagne and Partner W 
declaring: ‘…all the presentations were good, just not good enough’ and that ‘the best ideas will 
survive in the mind’. This statement functioned as a ceremonial closure of the encampment 
– like the final applause in the theatre, which in a Goffmanian sense ‘wipes the make-
believe away’ (Goffman, 1974, p. 131). The event marked the return back to everyday 
reality.    
 
We all knew that the confinement and different tasks were staged in order to provoke 
innovation. But the feeling of having been manipulated became more and more 
disturbing to many of the students. I started to wonder what kind of game I was part of 
– was it all a joke? Other students were walking around cheering and saluting with their 
glasses with glances of reciprocal (self-) admiration. One of the members from my team 
walked up to me and said: ‘Wow, this is really Carl-Mar-Møller like!’ Carl Mar is a Danish 
                                                
 
The interplay between self-revelation and the formation of constraints is suggested by Dwyer 
(2008) as the theme of the film. Trier describes in an interview how his methods and techniques 
of film production are situated between irrationality of religion as an artistic expression and an 
ironic provocation: ‘Although the film isn’t an introduction to religion, it is an expression of my 
religiosity, but it’s also, once again, an attempt to provoke myself’ (Hjort and Bondebjerg, 2001, 
p 220). It is implicit in the whole programme of restraint that renunciation is used as a valid 
artistic principle. Imposing limitation on yourself is considered a means of becoming powerful., 
i.e. to be able to control yourself to such degree that it becomes possible to overcome yourself 
(as seen in asceticism). 
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provocateur known for his creative and provocative psychotherapy, which has caused a 
lot of controversy in the Danish media because of the orgy-like experiments he has 
conducted on public television.  
 
Reality Suspension and Dramaturgical Tools 
In later interviews partner W explained the event as functioning as an ‘intensive 
initiation ritual’ named ‘Rumspringa’ taken from the Amish tradition of accepting the 
temporary excursion of adolescents into non-Amish territories. The intention is that the 
students suspend the real world. For this exercise Partner W explained their 
specialization of expertise to be ‘to choose and establish a set of spatial and temporal constraints’. 
This rigid process of spatio-temporal constraints constitutes a framework as a set 
construction that serves to realize this initiation ritual as a mean of innovation (cf. Leth, 
Raffnsøe and Holm-Pedersen, 2011). The process is designed as a journey to facilitate 
the analysis and deconstruction of a given community of practice in order to open it up 
for radically different perspectives. Rumspringa is explained as fostering such a process 
of transition – to effectively separate the team from the reality and constraints of 
everyday life. Several factors render the fencing hall a distinctive component staging this 
environment – by its location in the film city, a discarded military base now functioning 
as a site for film production, media companies and game-designers. In the later 
interview Partner W explained that ‘…the function of this was the demonstration of a doorstep 
into the special world’ and further described its purpose: ‘…. entering the arena should be like 
crossing the threshold into a magic space where anything is possible.’ The fiction is sustained 
making everyone aware that they had entered into a world that is not their own. In the 
camp such a performance was supported by the use of specific material devices; the 
glasses, the fire and the champagne are materials used to stage the transmission to an 
imaginary world.    
 
                                                
 
The requirements set by Trier are intended to restrict Leth’s directorial control, making it more 
difficult for the director to force a possibly idiosyncratic vision onto reality. However, the 
ontological transformation exhibited by the dogma principles of film production is attributed to 
Trier’s individual talent as an auteur escaping the constraints of established uses and meanings 
of genre by set-up of obstructions. Paradoxically, the process of innovation has therefore a great 
sense of authorship centred on the name of Lars von Trier. In the film we see a power 
relationship where Trier is performed as the creative genious and the one in control as he gets 
the right to define the constraints.  
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Partner W said that this instance was the most important part of the staging of the 
innovation process. Dramaturgical tools were used to enact the event as ‘an exercise in 
reality suspension’ that tends to leave the participants ‘exhausted’, ‘exhilarated’ and 
‘somewhat bewildered’. The myth of ‘Hero’s Journey’ (Figure 4), also introduced by 
Partner W, echoes this vision. The myth of ‘Hero’s Journey’ or the ‘Monomyth’ was 
coined by Joseph Campbell in 1968 and later applied to screenwriting by the Hollywood 
filmmaker Christopher Vogler (1998) and is now functioning as an actual guide for 
screenwriters. Campbell writes that ‘[o]nce having traversed the threshold, the hero 
moves in a dream landscape of curiously fluid, ambiguous forms, where he must survive 
a succession of trials’ (1968, p. 97).   
 
  
 
Figure 4. The Hero’s Journey, material from case description 
 
 
                                                
 
The dialogues between Trier and Leth concerning the punishment of Leth after evaluating each 
remake evidently illuminates how Trier not only attempts to make Leth strange to himself, to 
de-author his artistic style, but he has Leth create the very vehicles that manifest that 
strangeness, as he indirectly defines the punishment himself (a kind of self-produced and 
reinforced violence). ‘The provocation is always initially inwardly directed, and then it becomes 
other-directed as a side effect’ (Hjort and Bondebjerg, 2001, p. 221). Trier says that: ‘In all 
actuality, it’s a kind of masochistic play with pain for me’ (Schepelern, 2005, p. 77).  
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We are here presented with a generative version of creativity where ideas must be 
created from the imaginary or subconscious world supported by the use of 
‘psychological tricks’, such as Rumspringa, guided by the structure of Hero’s journey. 
Rumspringa has been characterised as an attempt to provoke the making of the new by 
‘manipulation of mental dispositions’ (Michelsen, 2009, p. 68). 
 
This approach shares a major characteristic with what Heelas (2008, p. 202) has defined 
as ‘inner-life spirituality’. The tools and devices to facilitate innovation taken from 
filmmaking indicate that creativity is seen to come from a subconscious world beyond 
rationality. Thomsen writes on dramatic innovation:  
 
…in order to find something new we must become aware of our assumptions and 
limitations and be prepared to have them challenged… Beyond the horizon lies 
islands with unexplored or sparsely occupied land, and the task is to find and 
explore those…. In a carefully choreographed process the teams are brought 
further and further along into the unknown. (Thomsen, 2007, p. 3) 
  
Rumspringa enacts a specific process of innovation by staging this distinction between 
an outer and inner reality. The hero’s inner journey defined as ‘an emotion-laden register 
of human experience’ (Campbell, 1968, p. 75) is primarily said to be the unconscious 
experience of the external world (the outer journey).    
 
Rumspringa happened in an artificial and ‘unnatural’ environment imposing forced 
constraints upon the participants. In this way the organisers gave the teams the 
awareness that every task is scripted and observed from the outside. This setting 
assembles the camp as ‘a practice of identifying and organising persons in such a way 
that certain aspects of human experience can be induced in isolation from what are 
typically thought to be their natural environments’ (Brown, 2012, p. 64). Moreover, this 
event separates out the constitution of an outside by maintaining a differential 
distinction between the inside and the real world, what Heelas (2008, p. 202) explains as a 
‘progressive disassociation from this-worldly sentiments or attachments tending to an 
                                                
 
This approach to technical restrictions in film production is often conceptualised as an attempt 
to reach a more authentic way of representing the real on the screen. However, the dogma 
structure is not an attempt to produce a documentary effect (Schepelern, 2005), but rather 
constitutes a social technology in itself, which transforms our conception of dramaturgy and 
film production in general. The claim to purity is maintained by the focus on contemporary true 
and realistic subjects with open-ended plots.  
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‘acosmicism’ of indifference to the condition of the world’. Diken and Laustsen (2005, 
p. 112-113) point out that such spaces create ‘zones of indistinction, into which people 
can ‘exempt’ themselves from their usual identities or territories’. Rumspringa is an 
instrument of self-exception from an industrial reality. The participants were considered 
as ‘being in’ by submitting to the event as a sort of purification ritual where the students 
were considered as taking the role of the hero departing on the innovation journey. This 
was demonstrated by the celebration at the end of Rumspringa. This act emphasised the 
experience of voluntary abandonment as ‘a hedonistic excess or enjoyment’, which 
Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 11) refer to in relation to low-profile camps such as theme 
parks and sunbathing ressorts. Simone (2010, p. 324) refers to the experience of a talent 
show as an ‘interment camp’ exposing the participants to ‘various exaggerations of 
religious sentiments pointing to rebirth’. Huizinga (1950, p. 15) considers the rite to 
facilitate such a transition as demarcating the ‘stepping out of reality’ – the self-
exception and suspending identity – saying that ‘the rite produces the effect which is 
then not so much shown figuratively as actually reproduced in the action … it causes the 
worshippers to participate in the sacred happening itself’. That is, a process which 
promises a paradoxical form of belonging in the shape of abandonment and which is 
experienced as ‘freedom’ (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 113-114).. 
 
Rumspringa envisions a space in which the students participate in its construction – a 
space enabled through staged interventions whether these take material or psycho-social 
forms. This brings me to the second other principal aim posed in the opening of this 
chapter: to question and explore some of the spatial structures arising from the 
ethnographic details, which might depict a picture of the relational construction of the 
experimental setting of the camp. To the extent that the empirical evidence permits, I 
also address the question, how much does the experience of ‘being within’ matter to the 
reality performed? The following ethnographic descriptions provide details on the 
performance of relations, the alliances and divisions enacted in the final weeks of the 
camp.   
                                                
Realism in Dogma means that the narrative deals with actual contemporary life; it questions 
social, political and ideological aspects of life by experimenting with reality. Relatedly, the point 
Trier claims with the second obstruction to be shot in Mumbai is to see whether the 
unrepresented context will somehow creep into the scenes shot. As such this cinematic practice 
brings the unpredictability of the event into play. Dogma presents a challenge to fictional film, 
creating a ‘dialectic between fiction and the pursuit of truth’ (Schepelern, 2005, p. 84). 
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Evoke: Enactment of Rules 
The weeks after Rumspringa were spent developing the idea for a solution to the brief 
set by the client. However, the transformation that took place in ‘Rumspringa’ meant 
that the members in the team had been ‘connected’ and a kind of trust and confidence 
developed as a group against the ‘establishment’ in the form of the client and the 
facilitators. In my team, we began to become critical of the brief’s introduction of 
Evoke as just another consumer product. The idea of communicating feelings across 
distance seemed absurd and somehow meaningless, and we all had difficulties working 
with the concept of Evoke. We spent some long nights together in the fencing hall 
negotiating our feelings around the project, and at this stage we used the more 
traditional methods of brainstorming. In the end we decided not to follow the brief and 
not to produce yet another consumer product, a new gadget for a possibly already 
oversaturated market. 
 
Instead we came up with the idea of inventing a device for people with autism. One of 
the other students had a lot of experience with the developmental disorder of autism, 
which she characterised as impaired social interaction and communication. In our 
discussions, autism was held to result in the difficulty of sharing or communicating 
feelings, showing a lack in the ability of emotional expression and control. The idea was 
then to make Evoke a tool, which might reduce this disability. At first the tutors 
supported this idea and we started to prepare the research needed in order to develop 
this tool.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
 
Dogma 95 opposes what is called ‘the film of illusion’. In the manifesto it says: ‘By using new 
technology anyone at any time can wash the last grains of truth away in the deadly embrace of 
sensation’ (Stevenson, 2003, p. 22). In this statement there is a search for reality, for the truth 
without illusions and a movement towards the genuine and the humane. The rules function as a 
kind of production code used on the set and establish a specific aesthetic line to be complied 
with. The manifesto claims that ‘the film of illusion’ does not reveal actions as grounded in 
psychological states, that is, events that occur in real time. In the manifesto it also says that 
superficial action is banned, and so are genre movies, which are likely to have predictable plots, 
being driven by generic patterns, rather than letting their plots be directed by their characters’ 
inner lives (see Gaut, 2003, p 89-101). Furthermore, the manifesto implies that the film of 
illusion is now an individual film, made by the individual artists’ ‘free choice of trickery’ (cf. the 
dogma manifesto). As such, the Vow of Chastity combats both the film of illusion and the 
individual film. 
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While we were working on this proposal however the client suddenly appeared. We now 
had to justify our idea before it was fully developed into a proper proposal. As we tried 
to explain the new idea the client seemed more and more reluctant to accept this 
approach since they felt it opposed the initial brief. At some point the discussion broke 
down and the client completely rejected the idea. A long and exhausting process of 
negotiation with the client started, lasting for the next two days.   
 
The negotiation process was facilitated by the four partners and a few tutors. In 
particular, Tutor B assisted in drawing a story line of our conceptualization of Evoke in 
order to illustrate our disagreement. The client claimed that the new idea did not capture 
the spirit of Evoke and that it had been changed too much from its original purpose. 
One of the representatives from the client directly opposed the idea of the device being 
able to solve emotional disorders and another member tried to oppose the idea by 
making the new proposal be about consumer life and stress-related diseases.  
 
We tried to argue that autism might be used as a point of departure in order to develop 
the idea further and question the function and purpose of digital emotional 
communication. Partner W, who had tried to enforce the radical nature of our ideas, 
supported this proposal again, referring to the notion of ‘extreme users’. However, the 
client was not so easily convinced. Further negotiation was then facilitated by the use of 
non-verbal tools and a collaborative game called ‘Vision Pool’. This is a visualization 
tool to foster dialogue between the participants explicating their inner pictures of a 
given object or situation. The game is based on the participants choosing among a range 
of images (on bricks) and explaining their associations in relation to Evoke. It turned 
out that the images which we chose to visualize our understanding of Evoke radically 
diverged from those of the clients. One of the client representatives said that it was not 
                                                
 
The Dogma-method combines personal therapy with artistic discipline and is thereby said to be 
a kind of aesthetic sadism/masochism (cf. Rodriguez, 2008, pp. 51-52). Trier acts as the psycho-
therapist in relation to Leth inflicting a form of self-imposed punishment. This is what 
Schepelern (2003, p. 64) defines as ‘an artistic flagellation intended to cleanse the artist of all 
commercial vices, leaving him purer and better’ and he continues by claiming the dogma rules 
express ‘a spiritual cleansing process that touches on religion, sexuality and, in the last analysis, 
on aesthetics’. Non-contemporary milieu and strange, artificial settings had to be abandoned 
making the project a way of investigating how artistic expression would find its way without its 
usual tools. This aspect of the process can be seen as a development of cinematic expression 
through an artistic and technical liberation of the method. In these obscure methods Trier has 
taken the role of generous leader figure – a guru to whom we turn for the sake of creativity.  
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a consumer product and another said it had to be produced for young resourceful career 
women. While discussing the reasons for choosing each brick the client disagreed on the 
concept’s meaning and development, which came to cause further frustrations within 
the team.   
 
Having been through Rumspringa the confrontation with the client felt like being put 
under new constraints as we were asked by the client to be aware of the commercial 
value of Evoke. At this stage the client came to act as the facilitator initiating conflicts 
by contributing their own strategic resources, and staging a particular context of action, 
of interpretation and of interaction in which we had to engage. According to the script 
the client was not supposed to interfere in the second week, as this week was devoted to 
the creation of ideas outside the reality of the client. The stated aim was to render visible 
the ‘subconscious world’ of the client, defined as the implicit assumptions and 
blindfolds that might limit innovation. However, in this case, the client was contacted 
and the idea rejected as an invalid solution to the initial brief. I felt betrayed by the 
facilitators and tutors, as I found out that they had called in the client in order for us to 
renegotiate the idea. In the team we felt that the conflict with the client somehow 
foreclosed the possibility of a radical new solution for the concept of Evoke. In the 
following days we had to find a quick solution to what had now been negotiated. 
However, in light of our different academic specializations, but also very strong 
personalities, the conflict continued within the team obstructing further development. 
The tutors decided to exempt us from the final delivery as they thought we would not 
be able to deliver a new solution within the short time frame. Disappointed by the 
facilitators, I realised that the enactment of rules did not define a repertoire of relations 
by which I could form alliances, but instead were actively being redefined depending 
upon the specific situation. Let me explain this relational construction a little further.  
 
                                                
 
Bondebjerg (2003, p. 75) writes that Dogma states a new realism and that Trier aims towards a 
search of the genuine. In continuation, Leth explains in an interview that the film is a result of 
Trier’s romantics believing that truth is revealed through extreme humiliation (see the later 
considerations on Scarry’s account of torture as it relates to innovation in Chapter 6). Leth says 
that ‘Lars [von Trier] has this crazy theory that truth come out if you are broken’ (quoted by 
Rodriguez, 2008, p. 52). However, Leth dismisses this vision as naïve and sentimental. Thus, the 
intended dogmatic and obstructing realism intended to counteract other strategic movements 
might be said to invent a new illusion. 
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Alliances and Divisions 
In the same week I was asked by Tutor B, who was also a PhD student, to give an 
interview elaborating on my experience of the process I had been through. The 
conversation was not a part of the camp, but was supposed to inform his research. He 
drew a diagram showing his assumption of the level of stress and anxiety of my team. 
He expected it to diminish once we got exempted from the final delivery of that week. 
This was the first time since entering the camp that I felt I was able to step out of the 
game and reflect on what I had been through. I realised that the most stressful element 
was not the conflict but the staging thereof. The exception meant that we had failed to 
deal with the structure set out in the script and that we might be considered as having 
failed the project. The result of the last few disruptive days was suddenly reflected as a 
confused and embarrassing break-down.    
 
However, this newly found awareness of acting within a scripted (and even manipulated 
space) fostered a new engagement with the team, making us realise that we had to fight 
the structure imposed on us in order to make the project of Evoke work. Therefore, we 
now insisted on presenting the delivery expected at the end of the week. In the 
presentation we held in the third week of the camp we approached the client and 
suggested three frameworks for a new direction in which we could take the concept of 
Evoke. These were Play, Body&Mind and a Communicator Device. We presented three 
personas and a revised explanation of the concept of ‘extreme users’ now defined as a 
target audience. We got the go-ahead for the idea of Body&Mind as it fulfilled the idea of 
Evoke as a device to help people cope with the stress of everyday life.  
 
In the feedback session the client criticised the perspective as being simple and said that 
it was too shallow. In this situation I felt the need to speak up and to defend the ideas 
                                                
 
The critique raised of these methods of filmmaking has been posed against Dogma’s creative 
vision and the idealistic abandonment of the Hollywood industry as a ‘dream-factory’ depending 
on a capitalistic narrative. The possible problems of this approach relate to the extent to which 
these techniques can be seen as in themselves an illusion, and whether indeed the use of Dogma 
to enable creativity in business is itself a form of corruption. In this context, such critique enacts 
yet another form of fiction – the fight against illusion transforms into self-delusion revealing the 
recursive structure of the dogma movement. Giralt paraphrases David Bordwell on this subject, 
saying that, ‘the modern realism of European Art cinema is no more real than that of classical 
Hollywood representation of reality rooted in late nineteen-century realism’ (quoted in Giralt, 
2009). It may just ‘reinforce the production of Hollywood’s dream factory in its persuasion to 
reach reality’ (Giralt, 2009). 
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and respond to the critique, but I was quickly silenced by Tutor D who pointed out that 
none of the team members were allowed to comment on the feedback. It was then up 
to us, the team, to decide which comments to act upon and which advice to respond to 
in the following weeks. It was argued by the tutors that the productive value of this 
method is exactly the fact of the emerging structure, that is, the method is constituted 
by the team, in terms of distribution of roles and selection of tools. . 
 
However, the character of the tools provided by the facilitators made us question the 
radical nature of this methodology while working with it.  Until now the perspective 
seemed to be rather user-focused and we had been forced into a rigid process qualifying 
our ideas in relation to a business reality, which seemed only to present further 
obstructions. The reaction from my team towards the conflict and process of 
negotiation could be explained as a means by which to protect our vulnerability within 
the team. This is explained by Meyerson, Weick and Roderick (1996, p. 172) as 
‘cultivating adaptability and the feeling of mastery that “I can handle anything they 
throw at me” coupled with ‘”distancing” oneself form the settings’’. Furthermore, they 
describe the feeling of mastery is as a ‘cognitive illusion’ that creates resilience in the 
system. Such emotional states contribute to a sense of self and otherness (Gilroy, 
2000b) externalising an outside world to the dynamic of the team spirit. The tutors, 
facilitators and the client came to represent an outside – an externality we as a group 
had to fight in order to present a solution to the brief.  
 
The paradox played out was one between the obstructions being imposed on the team 
in order to provoke invention and then, on the other hand, the expectation of the team 
to destroy the ‘taken-for-granted’ reality of the client. The most difficult process in the 
work-camp was for us to balance the obstructions and to actually overcome these. The 
idea of ‘extreme users’ was renegotiated not to invent a concept for people with autism, 
but to help people with lifestyle problems such as stress and anxiety in a corporate 
environment. This became a way to combine the call for radical innovation with the 
                                                
 
Regardless of the critique, the Dogma-method entails a reconfiguration of the way in which we 
understand representational filmmaking such as documentarism. The claim to reach the real 
puts forward a vision where authenticity is decoupled from reality. In The Five Obstructions we are 
presented with a documentary effect that does not represent the real, but fictionalises a story, 
which investigates and puts issues of power at stake in the debate on creativity. 
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requirement of a stronger user focus and marketability of the concept..  
 
The fourth week of work-camp consisted in validating the concepts each team had 
developed. Even though its process was now on track and fitted into the planned 
structure of the process, my team always felt like it was running late, which, of course, 
was enforced by the structure of the process and the use of deadlines. The deadline for 
the final delivery was 2 p.m. the day before the final presentation. This deadline resulted 
in a long night where the team worked to meet the deadline. At 1 p.m., when the 
intensity and stress was at its maximum, the deadline was postponed to 8 p.m. Again, 
working close to this deadline it was further postponed, this time to 10 pm. This meant 
that the level of stress and the pressure to finalize the presentation were manipulated 
and maintained for a lot longer than we had expected when deciding what to do the 
night before. This distortion and the expectations assumed by the team members 
imposed a transformation in the individuals’ self-discipline, the group dynamic and the 
conceptions of control. Afterwards, the feeling increased of never completing the task 
and never being able to leave the imaginary world, as if the journey had never ended.  
 
The camp performed a space in which the exemption would only be a temporary break 
in an unforgiving motion towards the next demanding phase, staging yet another 
conflict. The exemption became an obstruction that intervened in the team spirit and 
obliged the participants to cooperate and coordinate their movements, while being 
motivated by emotional investments such as blame, guilt and betrayal. The guilt of 
conspiracy meant that the rules were re-enacted as the exemption came to be thought of 
as a disruption to the progress of the camp – constituting yet another obstruction. 
Innovation consists here in the experimentation of a stage where the client and 
producer (facilitator and students) are involved in live and situated relations. The 
activities were not regulated by a disciplinary power as rules were reconfigured to fit to 
                                                
 
Following del Rio’s analysis of experimental film, The Five Obstructions might be considered an 
exemplary instantiation of the realism at stake in these cinematic techniques. Reality then is not 
considered as what might be externalised outside the fictional space of the film. Rather as, 
Crandall (2006) is arguing with Zizeck: ‘[T]he real is only able to be sustained if we fictionalize 
it. To look for the real, then, is not to look for it directly, it is to look to our fictions, discerning 
how reality is transfunctionalized through them…. It is to look to the cultural fictions in which 
the object becomes lodged’. To utilise the social sphere, means to fictionalize a story, to pervert 
the social in order to investigate it – such as the way in which Trier forces Leth to explore the 
human. It is in this way, that Dogma is said to be an explorative approach that have been 
translated into innovation.  
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the purpose of the camp. In order to frame this point let me give one last example.  
 
After the final presentations, I waited until everyone had left the hall. I was still 
uncertain of the outcome. Did we invent a solution to Evoke and were we intended to 
do so at all? What was exposed and what was revealed? I was not sure about these 
relations at all. Did the ambiguity of the process construct nothing else other than its 
own disruption and endless conflict-ridden journey? While reflecting on these questions 
I felt exhausted and closed my eyes for a few seconds. When I looked up again Partner 
W was stood in front of me. ‘Are you okay?’ he asked. I looked at him a bit confused. 
‘No, sorry’ I said, ‘I am just very tired, we did not get much sleep over the last few weeks’. ‘I know’ he 
said, ‘sometimes I worry what we do to our students in these processes’.  
 
In this incidence Partner W expressed the guilt of conspiracy, making a self-conscious 
act to take responsibility for the manipulation enacted in the camp, at the same time 
implicating the students as the subjects of a social experiment. In doing so, Partner W 
performed himself as a facilitator taking the position of an executioner and thereby re-
installed the binary where the students become victims. At the same time, again, 
following Gilroy’s definition of camp-mentality the one obstructing the processes might 
also become a future alliance. Rules were transformed and used as shifting devices but 
not absolute imperatives that configured and re-configured the relation between the self 
and other in terms of friend and enemy – meaning that the actors’ position in the game 
was constantly twisted and contorted. In the innovation process this relates to how the 
enactment of rules distinguishing friend from enemy – represented by the client and 
tutors – became a binding agent that motivated the progression of the camp.  
 
Place, Space and Objects of Exception 
The complex structure of the camp provoked by the appropriation and application of 
rules points to a paradoxical move forcing the participants to navigate within a space 
where any given order is only temporarily stable and at the same time conforming to a 
rigorous logic of regulative/imperative methods. Within the team we discussed the issue 
of how to deal with the stress and the deadlines up until the final presentation. We 
decided to divide the tasks among us. Student J and I got the task of preparing the 
presentation for the next day, while others were finishing the prototype and the 
technicalities of the Power Point slides. The conflictual relations entailed in having to 
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endlessly renegotiate the rules of the game both with the client and the tutors, as well as 
between us, took away both time and attention from rehearsing the actual presentation. 
In frustration over this situation, Student J and I decided to leave the campsite in order 
to rehearse the presentation elsewhere. Once we left the campsite Tutor D called us 
emphasising that we had to be present at the camp and that no rehearsal outside the 
fencing hall was allowed. We had to rush back to the site again. Our presence was a part 
of the game promoting a kind of improvised yet structured activity.  
 
My later discussions with the team members revealed that we all felt that the task was 
never completed, but endlessly obstructed. The result and the shape of the weekly 
presentations were based on accidental decisions made at the last minute or even 
improvised on the stage, which meant that internal disagreements were also exposed on 
the stage in the act of presenting. We performed the findings from the five weeks in 
three ‘customer journeys’ illustrating the use and function of Evoke. Through the three 
sketches we presented hypothetical uses of the device and demonstrated its function. 
The device was an oval object that could record the sensations of an experience (sound, 
images, vibrations and smell). After recording the device could be separated in two 
parts, the one being able to send a signal to the other part to play the sensation at a later 
point in time. We presented Evoke as a tool to re-experience the sensation of a 
memorable event.  
 
The object invented manifested a doubling of the theme analysed in this chapter. It 
presents the problem of emotional impact in innovation – which adds yet another layer 
to the camp. The fact that we were left to produce an object reaching the audience and 
ideas that we had been opposed to in the beginning seemed like an unavoidable 
capitulation, almost a consequence of applying the rules of the game. In the process of 
inventing an object that would communicate emotions we were subjected to the very 
same mechanisms that we were supposed to invent; it felt like performing a double 
pretence. Nothing ever seemed to emerge from it, and the solution to the brief ended 
up being the commercial device everyone had felt reluctant to produce in the first place. 
In the end we were left with the feeling of not having fulfilled the task set by the client 
or the organisers of the camp. The brief was staged as a real-life interaction – a film in 
which the client and facilitators invited us to participate – which effected nothing other 
than a pretence acted out on stage.  
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The final presentation took place in a film studio where the majority of the Dogma 
films have been shot, emphasising the feeling of playing a part in a reality film. At the 
very end of the camp, when every team had presented their solutions, one of the 
filmmakers initiating the Dogma movement gave the final speech. He declared that the 
camp was now to be remembered as nothing but an act or pretence. He compared it to 
the invention of Dogma which, in his view, only expresses the essence of ‘poor’ film-
making, motivated by financial concerns. He promoted the Dogma movement as an 
effective business strategy for producing low-budget film turned into an artistic 
invention, gaining worldwide publicity without the high costs of special effects and 
advanced technical equipment. In this case the economic field is presented as an 
obstacle (or creative constraint) that generates the climate in which the Dogma 
movements were invented. At the same time he proposed the invention of the Dogma 
filmmaking not as a creative strategy, but as a strategic manipulation. This salute is an 
excellent example of how the spin-off buys into a film world where Dogma is appraised 
as an excellent marketing exercise. Not only was the artistic vision behind Dogma 
revealed as strategic but also my own resistance to the method used in the camp was 
exposed as contributing to the enactment of innovation. For a moment I felt caught in 
my own criticality, realising that it just turned out to be yet another strategic tool in the 
process of innovation. The relation between iteration and order, inclusion and 
exclusion, makes the experiment progress by the involvement from the participants.  
 
I have presented the interrelation between the imposed constraints and the complex 
relations which they foster by drawing attention to my own participatory experience, 
being subjected to and witnessing the enactment of rules and the feeling of confusion, 
distress and guilt that accompanied such an enactment. This double reflection 
encountered both the object and its observer (Riles, 2001) insofar as my experience of 
guilt, blame and betrayal were the performative devices which constituted the 
innovation space. The distancing effect, the resilience and the detachment were what 
guided the process of invention. The use of Dogma as a strategy of innovation basically 
manifests a kind of spatiality suspended in-between ‘exclusion’ and ‘inclusion’ (Diken 
and Laustsen, 2005, p. 96). The rules are not only externally imposed, they are 
constitutive of the intrinsic experience of success, failure and break-through, the 
purpose being to build a framework to access unconscious ways of thinking (Rodriguez, 
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2008, p. 47) presented through a liberating rhetoric (as in ‘Hero’s Journey’).  
 
Being under the close direction of a backstage team who monitored and supervised 
what was produced created a kind of ‘isolation-in-visibility’, a paradoxical form of 
inclusionary exclusion, a kind of ‘state of exception’ (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 81), 
that is, a space which promises a paradoxical form of liberation through constraints. 
Such an act or promise is what Thrift argues is produced as formative spaces: ‘the most 
important reworking of experience that is currently taking place is the production of 
new kinds of not just attentive and responsive but formative spaces which act’ (Thrift, 
2008, p. 23). This re-working of experience happened via the symbolic representations 
(such as the fencing hall, the fire, the champagne) provoking ‘decisive moments’ (Thrift, 
2008, p. 23), critical events or break-through. This performance was emblematic of the 
nature of the camp. The outside is included not simply by means of confinement, but 
rather by the means of the suspension of the rules’ validity. Following Diken and 
Laustsen’s argument that the suspension of the rule is what gives rise to exception, I 
argue that the particular ‘force’ of Dogma consists in this capacity to maintain its 
existence as a relation to an exteriority.  
 
This actioning of space establishes its own momentarily non-democratic power enacted 
through codes, rules and rituals (cf. Simone, 2010, p. 325). The structure of the camp 
facilitates the performance of disruptive interventions and, as such, instantiates a 
process of striation only insofar as it destabilises our established world (the outside) at 
the same time. Distinguishing an inside from an outside means installing a principle of 
order. The spatial dynamic behind innovation is framed as a topological approach to 
sovereignty (Agamben, 1998; Simone, 2010, p. 307). This is not to say that there is no 
outside to such processes of change, which has been argued elsewhere (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000), but that the outside is exactly what is being performed and provides a 
background upon which the exception (or Rumspringa) occurs as an exception. Neither 
does the outside/inside divide exist a priori to its performance – which is what is meant 
by a more-than-representational space. The innovation camp is a hybrid organisational 
form. Its essence is the materialization of a space of exception, constituting a space 
topologically different from that of mere enclosure (a point I will elaborate in relation to 
Kafka’s The Trial in Chapter 7).  
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Conclusion 
Through my participatory experience this chapter has presented the innovation camp as 
a specific social technology. This chapter has also provided a way to account for more 
complex understandings of the emergence of new, mobile spaces of exception. The 
participatory experiences achieved during the recruitment process, Rumspringa and the 
following weeks of negotiation and conflict, anticipate such relations characterized by a 
logic of exception and self-exception characteristic of the camp. The notion of the camp 
offered a way in which to examine the relational dynamics as a specific form of de-
organization taken partly from the film world and re-enacted in Rumspringa through the 
staging of rigidly structured activities.  
 
The documentary style of filmmaking characterising the Dogma-method explained in 
the footnotes and the unfolding of this method in the camp means that innovation was 
enacted in a two-folded way. Firstly, the Dogma movement is considered as an 
innovation in itself, which is then secondly translated into the rules and constraints 
enacted within the camp. Dogma envisions not only the dis-integration of certain forms 
of territorialization, as explored in Chapter 4, but also discerns new modes of 
interaction that affect a call for the transformation of a process where rules, norms and 
expectations are explicitly at issue with, and are also used as tools to navigate and 
organise, the process of creativity; in this way the translation of Dogma into a tool of 
innovation contributes to the integration of its participants, and to changes in relations 
of power. The organisational form of the camp is a territorial phenomenon marking its 
spaces in between established centres of power, but in its own un-democratic form. 
 
Taking material devices and cinematic techniques such as script, models, props and 
rituals that contribute to the performance of camp-like structure as well as the relational 
configuration, the conclusion to be drawn is that a vision of the future is enacted from 
the promise of ‘another world’ – a world beyond consciousness enabled by the 
appropriation and application of rules. In the following chapter, I move on to analyse a 
different promise: that is, a design practice concerned with the construction of an 
orientation to the future. The development of an anxiety about the future in this context 
frames a critique of current consumer culture, and the following chapter explores the 
staging of real-life scenarios probing the anxieties and fears which arise from current 
techno-scientific developments.    
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6. A Study of Design: Critique, Pain and Affect   
 
Beneath the glossy surface of official design lurks a dark and strange world 
driven by real human needs. A place where electronic objects co-star in a noir 
thriller, working with like-minded individuals to escape normalization and 
ensure that even a totally manufactured environment has room for danger, 
adventure and transgression. 
                                                         (Dunne and Raby, 2001, p. 6) 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I explore the idea of ‘Design Critique’ as it was applied in a practice-
based innovation process. In doing so, I present an ethnographic field study conducted 
in collaboration with a London-based design studio. The studio produces work on 
different projects and pioneers an approach which uses design as a medium to stimulate 
discussion and debate amongst business, industry and the public. The brief I present is a 
four-week process aimed to investigate the future of ‘digital manners’, that is, the 
emergence of etiquettes modelled around the invention of new digital technologies. The 
task was set by an international telecommunications company and aimed at a group of 
Masters students being taught to practice critical design. The project took place at an 
academic institution in London and was organised as a collaboration between a design 
studio, a large scale international company, their in-house innovation centre and 
individual practitioners (tutors).  
 
The professor, whom I interviewed in 2009 to access the brief, explained that ‘the 
principal aim of [Design Critique] is to use methods from fine arts in order to provoke debate, which 
allows the designer to investigate how users cohabit with new digital technology.’ He further explained 
this aim as being to create fictional worlds and not to predict the future, but always to 
ask ‘what if?’ This question was reproduced in the brief, on their webpage and later 
repeated in my interviews with the tutors and again with the students. In order to deploy 
this vision the projects of this design practice are all embodied through a range of 
designed artefacts, which employ a hypothetical critique of, or commentary on, modern 
consumer culture.  
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However, critique was not only embodied in the design objects, but also used as a tool 
of creation within the brief itself. The design ‘crit’ is a shortage of critique (Horton, 
2007) and defined as a pedagogical tool used in the studio to make the students 
communicate their ideas and evaluate the proposals (cf. McCoy, 1993). This method, 
together with artistic interventions and tutorials, was to be deployed as a 
‘confrontational technique’ meant to provoke a debate by questioning the practices and 
norms of everyday life. In order to investigate how the utilization of critique as a 
method of creation affected the progression of the ideas stemming from the brief, I 
follow the invention of three design objects. I do so by reporting a few crucial incidents 
in order to reveal the methods and techniques of innovation applied by this design 
practice. In this way, the projects represent three fragmented snapshots from the brief, 
each telling their story of Design Critique. 
 
Professor A explained the duality of the concept of Design Critique in the following 
way: ‘The critical thinking side is analytical, to break things up; then there is also the speculative side – 
to build it back up as alternative visions of how things could be – what we do here is using design to 
make these two work together.’ The aim to provoke results rather than to design functional 
objects is a material manifestation of the assumption that challenging assumptions and 
intentions provoke creativity. This seems to provide a direct reference to Garfinkel’s 
(1967) idea of ‘breaching experiments’ as a way of describing this method of research, 
which leads us to the second aim of this chapter. That is, to discover how the tutors, 
organizers, partners, clients, funders and students perceived the devices and what 
actually happened in the conduct of those devices. That is, how the students and tutors 
account for the techniques as a ‘reality’ destroying practice or as moments of ‘unmaking’ 
(Scarry, 1985) by breaking down any kind of logical reasoning or sense of the rational 
order of the world. I analyse these as characterized by a process of territorialization in 
order to also problematize the self-evident practice of artistic tools and its utility in the 
design process.  
 
More specifically, the comparison with the notion of ‘breaching experiment’ enables me 
to focus on the students’ experience of breakdown, stress and anxiety in the search for, 
or observation of, the performative order by which this vision of design is enacted. I 
trace the distinctions they draw on and make use of in detaching themselves from a 
corporate world. This is a vision constructed by the use of affective devices of critique 
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in order to make the students reproduce a specific kind of reflexivity oriented against the 
business world (represented by the client). In this way I conclude that the exclusion of 
an outside construct is an inclusive mechanism explained as the inside-out of the 
assemblage (cf. Riles 2001). However, before explaining the broader perspective and 
methods of experimentation let me first introduce the brief by referring to my first 
encounter with this design practice. 
 
The Brief 
In the autumn of 2009, I met with Professor A, the designer who founded the studio 
practicing Design Critique and whom I had been recommended to contact in relation to 
my fieldwork. Furthermore, he practices the idea of Design Critique in a design studio 
in London. The interview comprised an informal discussion of the role of design, its 
methods of engagement and its public reception.  
  
In the middle of the conversation, he handed me a green coloured booklet with a very 
simple and seemingly neutral surface, a front-cover without any title or letters. I 
skimmed through the pages of the book, which contained illustrations of design objects 
accompanied by a number of short stories. Each page was dedicated to the work 
produced by the students within the department over the course of the last year. Each 
design object was portrayed on the same green background as the front cover. The 
booklet contained no descriptions, only objects and their stories written by a well-
known British writer. In the booklet, ‘poetic objects’ are exposed on the green surface, 
as they have ‘to speak for themselves’ as the professor explained to me in the interview. 
 
The booklet is based on the idea of the green screen used in film and television to stage 
a location that cannot be represented within the physical settings of the studio space. In 
this way, the coloured front and background used in the booklet signify the 
transmission of the objects that it presents from one reality into another. As such, the 
green front serves as an analogy for the ‘what if?’ scenario embraced in this design 
approach, that is to enter a fictional world through the invention of new technological 
objects, not for a predetermined consumer market as predicted in forecasting models, 
but in order to provoke a fictional reality (Professor A, interview London 2008). The 
professor differentiated Design Critique from the traditional use of design by explaining 
the aim of the design studio as being to ‘expand design’s potential beyond narrow commercial 
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concerns, thereby decoupling it from the industry’. The objects in the booklet use speculative 
design proposals to challenge narrow assumptions, preconceptions and givens about the 
impact of new technologies. In this way design becomes a tool to produce a speculative 
area materialising issues, concerns or beliefs about the future (cf. Beaver, Kerridge and 
Pennington, 2009). 
 
In the last page of the booklet, I found the manifesto of this design practice entitled 
‘a/b’ serving as the afterword to the design objects presented. This text states the idea 
of Design Critique, along with its own agenda, as redefining the discipline of design. In 
this move, design is recast from being a form of problem solving to one of intervention. 
Design is proposed as being a means for materialising issues, concerns or beliefs about 
socio-technical futures by the making of ‘poetic objects’, which are meant to shock and 
thereby provoke a debate around social controversies. The booklet is illustrated in the 
figure below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5. Photographic documentation of the Booklet 
 
 
Following this trajectory of design, the booklet – the green colour, the exhibition of the 
students’ work and the associated small stories – are intended as a rhetorical 
intervention to reach this re-conceptualization of design. More specifically, the booklet 
embodies the aim, in line with the design projects illustrated within it, of stimulating 
discussion and debate amongst designers, industry and the public around the emergence 
of new digital technologies.  
 
Returning to the brief, the experiment consisted of two tasks. Firstly, to invent new 
research methods to document so-called ‘e-behaviour’. These methods are expected to 
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be an advance on current innovative research in capturing unusual habits of interacting 
with new technology. Secondly, the students were expected to build on and interpret the 
research findings and stories in order to subsequently model ‘unconventional products’. 
These products had to construct a narrative, which might engage the consumer or user 
in ways that would allow them to question future forms of user-interaction with new 
digital technologies.  
 
The project included a project launch, a two-day workshop taking place at the clients 
innovation centre in Berlin, a round table discussion with the tutors, individual tutorials, 
as well as an interim crit and the final crit where the final prototypes were presented. 
The course of these events is illustrated in the figure below. The horizontal line is the 
continuation of time and the vertical lines indicate the key events announced in the 
brief.   
 
Figure 6. Timeline for the Design Brief on ‘Future Digital Manners’  
 
 
Altogether, nineteen students participated, two external tutors (freelance designers) and 
a few internal tutors (employed at the academic institution), as well as two 
representatives from the client’s in-house innovation centre. The two external tutors are 
named Tutor M, Tutor O, Client R and Client J respectively. In following the process, I 
have paid detailed attention to a few of the students’ work and methods used in the 
invention of such ‘poetic objects’ as illustrated in the booklet. On the basis of this, I 
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wish to explore the way in which Design Critique entails a process of social ordering 
mediated through the design of ‘poetic’ objects. In this matter, I ask: how does the 
experimental status of this design process relate to the invented objects and the critical 
status of this design approach? Or, put simply, what is the critical in Design Critique? 
  
In presenting the brief, I explain the idea of Design Critique as it was considered in the 
project of ‘Future Digital Manners’. However, this also points towards another and 
perhaps more important theme for this thesis as a whole: that the idea and practice of 
Design Critique comprises a double view of innovation. On the one hand, the artistic 
idea of Design Critique is an innovation in its own right and, simultaneously, it may be 
applied as a means of enabling processes of innovation to take place. In order to capture 
this double configuration, and similarly to the previous chapter, I separate the text into 
two parallel narratives. The sub-text explains the way in which Design Critique is 
constituted as a critique of the capitalistic values, which are said to prevail within the 
field of interaction design. By analysing the manifesto written by this design studio and 
other published material that addresses the idea of Design Critique, I explain how this 
idea of design is based upon a reframing of the discipline of design. In the main text I 
show – through the use of artistic performances and interventionist techniques how 
design is cast as provoking rather than serving the industry, aiming to create insights 
rather than produce functional objects. In this text I outline the artistic idea enacted in 
the project of ‘Future Digital Manners’.. 
 
The Berlin Street Experiment 
In the second week of the design brief an experiment was conducted at the clients’ 
innovation centre in Berlin. The students were expected to set up spaces of intervention 
in order to investigate social behaviour – in this case, in order to explore the etiquettes 
surrounding digital technologies.. The experiment was to be conducted in the streets of 
                                                
 
Apart from my study of Design Critique as it was applied in the brief of ‘Future Digital 
Manners’, I also engage with its conceptual implications outlining the way in which this notion 
has been the subject of intellectual debates. This subtext serves to contextualise the use of 
Design Critique in the brief ‘Future Digital Manners’. The most important point is that Design 
Critique entails a reconfiguration of design by focusing on the sculptural aspect to produce 
objects within the realm of ‘metaphysics, poetry and aesthetics’ (Dunne, 2005, p. 20).  
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Berlin and the students were cast as artists, designers, thinkers, or provocateurs that use 
the city space to investigate the social construction of etiquettes by provoking norms of 
social behaviour. One of the tutors explained: ‘I am interested in extreme examples of the 
context in which etiquettes arise rather than defining the etiquette itself… like what leaves us with a 
turn which will create a situation where there will be etiquettes bubbling up’. The students were 
encouraged to stage a social gesture inspired by mundane technical things like traffic 
lights, automatic doors or coffee shops with wifi. 
 
The two external tutors facilitated the experiment and described this kind of exploration 
as ‘experimental tourism’ or a form of ‘counter-tourism’ that reverses an expected or 
traditional situation. The response to the experiment had to be captured by video or by 
photographic documentation. This documentary proof of the experiment was to be 
presented as an artwork in itself to be evaluated by the designers, tutors and the client. . 
 
The most significant presentation as evaluated by the tutors and the client, and therefore 
the one that I have chosen to pay attention to, was an experiment conducted as an 
artistic performance within a shopping mall in the city centre of Berlin. The experiment 
was conducted by a group of 5 students. Firstly, they performed a gesture, acting out a 
photo-shoot session done with different probes like a plastic camera, post-it notes and 
then just the bodily gesture of shooting without a physical camera. Then they tried the 
same experiment with a verbal conversation, and then a non-verbal text-based 
conversation on post-it notes. The two students performing the conversation dropped 
the written post-its on the floor around them.  The post-its on the floor created a trail 
of the conversation between the two. In the end, the crowd of people gathered around 
them created a circle demarcating a stage for the experiment to take place. The students 
intentionally played with the situation to test a social line of politeness. That is, how 
                                                
 
Design Critique is mainly associated with design projects done by small independent design 
studios and in association with an academic institution. A number of notable developers of this 
field of design are: Anthony Dunne and Fiona Raby, practicing in association with the Royal 
College of Art; the Interactive Research Studio at Goldsmiths, University of London, lead by 
Bill Gaver; the Culturally Embedded Computing Group at Cornell and Agre, who has 
developed ‘Critical Technical Practice’ within artificial intelligence research. However, a few 
other designers make similar projects, such as Jurgen Bey and Martin Guixe. The term has also 
been referred to as ‘reflexive design’, ‘Speculative Design’, or ‘Critical Design’ (Zigelbaum and 
Csikszentmihályi, 2007). I refer to the notion of ‘Design Critique’ as an umbrella term for a set 
of related approaches which aim for similar ends by producing designed artefacts that afford 
critical reflection. 
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long could the distance between the two students having the conversation be stretched, 
depending on the time, the distance, and the amount of people gathering around them. 
The visible paper trail and the different colours triggered people’s curiosity and worked 
as visual cues for the audience to reconstruct the conversation by picking up the written 
post-its. The content of the conversation was based on the question of what to do with 
the people watching them. As such, by following the trail of the conversation, people 
would engage in the performance from a second order perspective by reflecting on their 
own participatory role in the experiment. The development of the experiment is 
illustrated in the figure below. 
 
           
 
Figure 7. Photographic documentation from fieldwork, the Berlin Street Experiment Oct 2009  
 
 
This artistic performance was designed to violate the unspoken social rules of everyday 
behaviour in the streets of Berlin in order to study them and reveal data for issues 
around etiquettes in the digital sphere. The reactions provoked, such as curious 
questions, aggressive shouting or anxious avoidance of the situation, had to be captured 
by video or photographic documentation. . This documentary evidence was to be 
presented as an artwork in itself, which claimed to construct a fictional reality. The 
assertion was that the documentary evidence was a non-representational construction of 
what Dunne and Raby (2001) in their study on Design Noir call ‘a’ social reality 
                                                
 
Design Critique is not about transmitting a message through the designed artefact, which 
according to this approach would reduce design to sign-making and pure semiotics. The 
assertion is that the possibilities offered by the conventional semiotic-based approach depend 
on ‘recognition’, whereas the more experimental forms of design could open the way for an 
active critical receptivity provoked by the object (Sengers et al., 2005). As such, design might not 
only be reduced to an aesthetic representation of things, but to processes that affectively engage 
the consumer. 
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provoking ‘real’ human needs and desires. The deliberately constructed and artificial 
nature of the experiment questioned the nature of truths (as a given social reality). The 
exercise was not an attempt to define or represent already existing etiquettes, but to 
provoke and then capture the provoked reaction to an absurd or experimental situation. 
Tutor M described the experiment as follows:  
 
…the spoken and unspoken is an interesting edge, I see the project as being about edges, about 
negotiations of edges and whether you speak about it or don’t speak about it. The interesting 
thing about the video experiment was the exposure of this kind of probing of those edges.  
 
The experiment might therefore be seen as a provocative method of investigation rather 
than a representational ethnographic exploration of the user who is assumed to pre-exist 
the design object and, in this case, who is associated with commercial design.. 
 
The Studio-Crit: Three Inventions of Poetic Objects 
After conducting the experiment in Berlin the students were back in the studio and had 
the first crit a couple of days later. The crit was meant to give the students a chance to 
reflect on their own work while explaining it to others. The students were expected to 
relate the findings from the Berlin experiment to social ideals and belief systems and, 
finally, to synthesise all of these understandings into a design proposal. The crit was 
meant for the students to present their work and explain the criteria for the proposals. It 
is a space where the tutors were also meant to challenge the students’ assumptions 
(Percy, 2003). For the roundtable discussion the students had to make a 10-minute 
presentation and then get 10 minutes feedback from the tutors. At the interim crit and 
the final crit, the students were expected to present the prototypes in 5 minutes, 
followed by a feedback session and a discussion around each presentation. At those crits 
the tutor, designers and clients were present and participated in the feedback session. 
                                                
 
The idea of using design as a form of critique was inspired by the Italian Radical Design 
movement from the 1960s – 1970s, which was highly critical of the values prevailing in the 
current society. This movement was formed by ‘Archizoom’, ‘Superstudio’, ‘Global Tools’ and 
‘9999’ among other groups. Radical Design was ideologically close to what might be known as 
‘Anti-Design’. However, the latter was generally more interested in the intersection of art and 
politics. Instead, radical designers expanded the field of design into the fields of 
environmentalism, urban architecture and alternative lifestyles, raising issues around the 
limitations of capitalism and the role of the consumer. Their objects acted as ironic post-
functionalist commentaries on the modern consumer movement and they especially directed 
their commentary against the inadequacies of modern aesthetics  (Bosoni, 2008, p. 11-12). 
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The relatively short time allocated for the final presentation follows from the 
assumption that the designed prototype had to tell a story that necessarily escapes its 
own description, and since it cannot be captured in the objective structure of language it 
therefore needs no further explanation other than to demonstrate its function. 
 
At the roundtable discussion the students were seated in the design studio and Tutor O 
started saying: ‘We will go around and see what everyone is up to and ask general 
questions to see where you are’. Tutor M then started the discussion by asking: ‘Who 
would like to speak. To bear witness to the group and report the last four days of striating work’. No 
one replied and Tutor M asked one of the students if he would mind telling us about his 
work. He started to show the design proposal, while tutors M were sketching in a black 
notebook.  
 
The tutors judged whether the students had understood the terms of the project and 
whether their proposals and ideas aimed to define, create, monitor or apply etiquette. In 
what follows I pay attention to three such projects representing different stages of the 
innovation process; some are only sketches or scenarios, whereas others are finished 
objects or prototypes. At the roundtable it was concluded that the projects engaged with 
Design Critique at different levels as a response, reflection and interpretation of the 
Berlin experiment. In what follows I present the three objects that I followed, each 
telling a different story of Design Critique and interpretations of a poetic object. . 
 
 
                                                
 
Whilst Sengers et al, (2005), Gaver and Martin (2000) and Agre (1997) have emphasised design 
as a means of intervention provoking debate around the invention of new digital technologies, 
Dunne (2005) in particular has based this development on a concept of ‘psycho-social 
narratives’. This term refers to the production of design objects that use technology to construct 
conflictual social situations. One example of this approach is shown in the critical design project 
Do you want to replace the existing normal? by Dunne&Raby (2007/08). One of the prototypes of 
this project is a statistical clock. This object functions as a clock that not only measures time, 
but also communicates, via a connection to the BBC website, every time a technologically 
mediated fatality happens (like car crashes or train accidents). This design object represents a 
poetic object or what Dunne (2005) defines as a ‘post-optimal object’ used to show how reality 
appears to be stranger than fiction. In this case, the objects were meant to make use of 
technology to give rise to psychologically changed subjects.  
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Object 1: Thinking with Others 
The first project I turn to explored issues around public or private digital space, as 
related to the future of MRI scanning technologies. In doing so, I follow the insight and 
reflections presented by Student P. In this case, the student translated the insights from 
the Berlin-experiment into the mobile phone context. The student described his first 
tutorial in this way:  
 
Before the tutorial I had read a lot about genes and cells that respond to light (optic genetics) 
and how to control the brain with light. Then I was thinking about public and private space, 
being in a phone call and in relation to the computer while talking with someone else. Then I 
got inspired by things happening in my own life, completely separate from the project, like 
talking to my brothers over Skype for hours while doing other things, so just being in each 
others’ presence.  
 
In the later interviews, the student explained that he came up with the idea before the 
experiment in Berlin, as he had always been fascinated by neuroscience. In this way, the 
experiment served to test that idea and transformed it into something else, which might 
fit better with the brief set by the client. At this stage of the process, he had a second 
idea to develop a digital funeral, so that people might acquire a digital presence after 
their own death. In relation to this idea, the student explained how this second idea was 
destroyed: . 
 
At the big dinner in Berlin I sat next to [Tutor M] and I presented the idea and he just said 
‘Swamp! Don’t go there, it is a swamp, not a useful area to look at’. So I skipped it for a 
while… it seemed too far and [M] thought it was a bad idea, so I changed from the digital 
funeral to the neuroscience. 
 
After that criticism, the student went back to the idea of MRI scanning and how it 
opens up the possibility of understanding and recording brain activity. He then related 
this to the mobile phone context and thought about how to detect what people were 
thinking. At the interim crit, he presented a short performance with one of the other 
students to illustrate a scenario of making a phone call in the mind. This means 
                                                
 
The social and psychological discomfort that such a situation provokes is counted as the 
outcome of the project. That is what Hill (2005 p. 287) refers to as ‘ambiguous objects’ where 
the user is said to construct the meaning that the object might entail. In this way Design 
Critique does not circle around the qualities – it does not fulfil a need in the market – but 
addresses a way of managing a human relationship to the artificial world. In this approach, 
objects are brought into being as discursively and materially enacting values, identities, agendas 
and beliefs. 
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telecommunicating with other people though the transmission of signals in the brain. 
The sketch was meant to show how this technology would enable the control of others. 
The student demonstrated an exaggerated future use of MRI as a new digital 
technology, raising issues about the control of others.  
 
Fragments of the feedback session sounded as follow:  
 
Professor A: ‘Great presentation! By going away from the screen it makes the presentation 
alive’.  
 
Tutor M: ‘I want to know: how does this work in mundane everyday life? That’s what you 
have to focus on and find a specific angle to work on for the next week until the final crit’.  
 
The client J:  ‘I like the acting as a way of representing the technology, but what will the 
everyday behaviour look like with this, how does it play out?’   
 
 
In the later interview, the student explained his conversation with the two external 
tutors after the crit as he asked for more detailed feedback. He explained to me:  
 
At the interim crit, I presented the general idea and it was too concrete. I have gone beyond an 
idea to a physical concept that could be materialised without doing much experimentation and I 
think the tutors were worried about that, that I had a full idea that was not explored. So [M] 
said I had to ‘crank the handle’. I asked if he could explain that in a less metaphorical way. 
He said it was not a metaphor and that ‘there is a big handle in your head and you have to 
crank it’…. So I was really confused…. I did not really know what to make of that, but 
what I decided was that I had to do more work.  
 
The time after the interim crit was characterised by a struggle to make the physical 
embodiment of the idea come to life.. For the final presentation, the student proposed a 
prototype based on the research and new MRI technologies combined with thoughts on 
programming the body that the student had raised: ‘How in the future will the mobile phone 
interact with this device so that we can have conversations in our heads and essentially be able to control 
                                                
 
The user is left to reinvent the purpose of the technical aspect or the scientific goal and thereby 
to question social behaviour. In continuation, the design product becomes a kind of ‘role 
model’, bringing about transformations of perception in the user as a ‘protagonist’ by 
embodying unusual psychological needs and desires. Ballard states that ‘[i]n a world “ruled by 
fictions,” the writer’s task is to invent reality’ (quoted in Dunne 2005, p. 63). Underlying this 
perspective is the assumption that design driven by poetry, imagination and intuition rather than 
reason and logic constitutes a rationality of its own, that is, an alternative to the ‘scientific-
industrial rationality’. 
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and script our behaviour from that?’. The future scenario of this situation was played out in a 
short film. The film illustrated a scenario where a girl is shopping, having a conversation 
with her friends and kissing her boyfriend at the same time. Furthermore, the student 
had developed the project into a business plan for a company that he had called ‘Mimic’. 
The student presented ‘Mimic’ as a market place for scripting human behaviour. He 
stated that: ‘In the future we will essentially have movies and also scripts to go along with that, so 
instead of watching it we might actually act it out with our friends’. In order to illustrate this, the 
student acted out a scenario of going to the shop, downloading a script to his phone 
and then later interacting with it in his head. The student played out a dance scene as a 
small performance, illustrating the application of the script that he had bought from the 
shop.  
 
In the feedback session, the tutors emphasised a lack of provocation in the project. In 
particular, they claimed that he failed to address the consequences for everyday life. 
Tutor M said:  
 
The mimic stuff and body inhabiting stuff seem less convincing, less able to communicate. I 
think it was an interesting jump off point with the idea of controlling by others, I’m not 
thinking of the last part with the script and the dance scene, but more in terms of the 
interaction between people. The project has moved on nicely since the last crit. I thought the way 
people connected to each other was disappointing, almost a step back from the last time you 
presented it, as there could be much more interesting ways of exploring this human interaction.  
 
Tutor O continued: ‘you could have played with more subtle negotiations than what you did show in 
the scenarios’. In the later interview, after the final crit, the student reflected on the design 
process. He described how the streams were right before both crits:. 
 
…so these moments help focussing – but I don’t know if they were valuable…. Up till the end 
I doubted my idea. I was excited about the idea, but doubted how to make it tangible. To 
                                                
 
These projects are supposed to provoke an exposure towards our own unspoken and invisible 
assumptions about social behaviour. Design Critique does not offer a critique of technology or 
of the consumer culture but offers an approach to design that can devise speculative methods of 
critical engagement with the future. That is, to apply strategies of defamiliarization and 
estrangement from modernist aesthetics (Bell, Blythe and Sengers, 2005; Mazé and Redströem, 
2009). Objects and materiality serve to critically engage its audience as consumers, questioning 
how reality could be differently expressed through the language of design. This is a language 
that is claimed to be closer to metaphysics, aesthetics and poetry, rather than addressing the 
optimal technical or semiotic functionality, which according to Mazé and Redströem (2009) is 
already attainable in the present.  
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develop the idea and understand what to deliver was an uncomfortable process and there were 
many moments of just staring blankly at my computer. In the end, I returned to the brief and 
they seemed from the feedback to be most interested in the interaction with other people. I 
wanted to have this scripting element – so I had two ideas, like talking to someone else and 
then being someone else.  I liked both and tried to integrate them in the end in a deliverable 
way…  
 
Object 2: Etiquette of Pornography  
The second project that I present is called ‘Etiquette of Pornography’ and investigates 
the interaction between etiquette and pornography by following the experience of 
Student J. The goal of her project was to discover the etiquette of pornography and to 
use that information to propose a future manifestation of pornography by testing the 
current etiquettes surrounding the use of pornography. . 
  
At the interim crit, the student presented the idea for a website that would filter 
pornography. The student focussed on the semiotics of pornography in relation to 
gender. The goal was to make a visual representation of Judith Butler’s concept of the 
‘performative speech act’ (Butler, 1997). The student explained her view on how the 
concept of a speech act relates to that of etiquette as it addresses the use of language in 
relation to behaviour around pornography. She therefore suggested the need to 
investigate the semiotics of pornography. The aim was to change the notions by which 
the pornographic discourse constructs the image of gender roles. The student presented 
a programme where a pornography site is altered by changing words like ‘mummy’ to 
‘liberated woman’, ‘teenager’ to  ‘young woman’, ‘ass’ to ‘bottom’ etc. The etiquette-
filter will than produce a new scene, having changed the narrative in the pornographic 
story told on the website. The student explained that her next step would be to film a 
scene from a pornographic movie, not in order to make a ‘porn-movie’, but to test the 
etiquettes and stereotypes that are produced by the different versions of pornographic 
movies. 
 
                                                
 
This vision of the future is also expressed in the term ’fictional functions’ presented in ‘Design 
Noir’ as ‘cautionary tales’ stated as leading to the subversion of function, as being related to not 
being able to find the right words, ‘leading to the coining of neologisms that bend language to 
accommodate something new’ (Dunne and Raby, 2001, p. 6).This function is inspired by the 
genre ‘film noir’, which implies a ‘not-always-happy-ending’. This vision entails a rather strategic 
use of design for research, which has been claimed to entail a rather dark or depressive vision of 
the future (Ibars, 2007). 
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In the feedback session, a general lack of justification for the reason why the project is 
relevant was addressed. Tutor M said:  
 
…you have produced a transformation from etiquette to speech act, but where is the design brief 
in this proposal?’ … … … This is too much of an intellectual approach that can be applied 
to almost everything. It is as if you have moved away from what was interesting about looking 
at pornography itself, with all the different emotions and discomfort that it produces. The 
project you present now seemed to have disconnected itself from the project of studying etiquette 
somehow.  
 
 
Professor A focused on the way in which she integrated her own intellectual interest 
with that of the client. He said: .  
 
When we do the industry projects, one of the underlying purposes is to see how you negotiate the 
relation of your own set of interests to the external brief and end up with this hybrid, so you 
end up with this individuality, your own interests cast fresh light on a topic that someone that 
does not have those interests would not be able to do. I feel when you go too much into your own 
agenda it loses that.  
 
 
Finally Tutor O ended the session by commenting:  
 
You only got to the ‘if’, you should have gone beyond that, you should be generating stuff from 
your insight, you only have sketches. Taking different audiences to different places… You have 
to start designing, not thinking. It is interaction design, not interaction thinking.  
 
 
For the final crit, she decided to test the idea by making a movie herself. Also, to shoot 
the film she decided to escape from the studio space and to do it off-site, in order to 
avoid interference from the tutors. She explained, in a later interview, that she felt this 
was the only way she could control her time and thereby the making of a deliverable 
                                                
 
One of Design Critique’s roles is to question the limited range of emotional and psychological 
experiences that are offered through designed products. It emphasises the dark and complex 
emotions previously ignored in design in order to address the complex, contradictory and even 
neurotic nature of the human world, in which people came into view as ‘obedient and 
predictable users and consumers’ (Dunne and Raby, 2001). In a continuation of this idea, 
Design Critique projects are made to reveal a different ‘psychological truth’. Design Critique 
provokes unexpected behaviour and an inverted use of objects’ functionality. This refers to 
functions that reach beyond their intended use, creating narratives which never correspond to 
the predetermined usability that the objects are said to inhabit.  
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product for the final crit. However, a few days before the final crit, one of the external 
tutors asked to meet her for an individual meeting, as he felt she was on the wrong 
track, which he explained to me later.. After the tutorial, the student entered the studio. 
She was very upset and had been crying about the direction the tutors wanted her to 
take with the design project. She stated that she wanted to quit the program. She later 
explained that she wanted to make a movie and the tutor found that to be a very bad 
idea. She was advised not to do the movie, as she had no experience within film 
production. They told her that the risk would be too big, that the film would be ‘crap’. 
After this incident, she said in the following interview:  
 
I avoided tutorials, as the tutors do not believe in the idea if you cannot visualise it properly 
and then they judge you on it. They want to bring us into some kind of common denominator of 
thinking. My idea was destroyed a few days before the final crit – it is about personal taste, 
who you talk to, it is a bit of a lottery, so it is important who you listen to – you need to listen 
only to one voice and not take all of it in. 
 
Another student continued:  
 
‘… each tutor says something different and gives different directions, as they all have different 
perspectives and different backgrounds and that makes you question your own thoughts. I 
ended up doing one of my initial ideas, which I was most excited about.’ 
 
 
For the final delivery, the student went back to her original idea about producing a 
website that filters pornography. The final prototype was a mutated version of the 
client’s website called ‘T-Porn’, which touched upon issues about making a kind of 
pornography that is more accessible to women and minorities. She had programmed it 
to be a pornography-site that would make ‘etiquetted’ pornography. Together with this 
idea, she also presented an edited version of the film that she had produced. The film 
                                                
 
This inspiration from film produces a narrative space where the users are left to invent their 
own reality. Ibars quotes Dunne as saying that ‘as designers, we cannot always change reality, 
but we can change the perception that we have of it’ (Ibars, 2007). Within this realm, solving 
problems with the use of design strives to change or fix the world, whereas Design Critique is 
directed towards changing perceptions, values and social behaviour (cf. Beaver, Kerridge and 
Pennington, 2009). It is claimed that the current space of design is preoccupied by future 
forecasts assigned to the commercial world, design scenarios assigned to the corporate world, 
and then utopias or dystopias, which might be assigned to the literary or cinematic world. ‘It is 
for imaginary purchases of reality, not in the traditional ways that scenarios work, but more 
aesthetic, as the narrative happens as imaginations’ (Dunne, 2005, p. 16).  
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attempted to reproduce the opening scene of a pornographic movie while applying 
different etiquettes. The student presented her prototype as being less of a design 
project and more of a critical artwork. She explained in the crit that the prototype aims 
to provoke a debate on what pornography is and how to produce ‘better’ pornography, 
that is, more ethical, socially acceptable and therefore consumable pornography.. 
 
The project was evaluated by the tutors as representing ‘a switch between logic, 
etiquette and philosophy’. Tutor M said:  
 
The end point for me would not be to create etiquettes for pornography, but the thought process 
you brought to it is the project and it has been interesting to follow it through. What is the 
sliding scale between philosophy, etiquette and logic and how could you redraw those lines?  
 
That would mean to go back from the extreme situations presented and think about 
what he called more ‘subtle things’ around etiquette, rather than focusing on the logical 
and systematic ideas that she presented.  
 
Object 3: Fashion and Etiquette 
The last project – and probably one of the most conflictual – was called ‘Fashion and 
Etiquettes’. This time I follow the process and reflections of Student M. At the 
beginning of the design brief, this project was presented as an investigation into the 
relationship between etiquette and the field of fashion. However, as a consequence of 
the radical transformation that the student went through during the process, the idea 
changed completely towards the end of the brief.  
 
The student presented the initial idea as focusing on fashion gurus in order to address 
the idea of fashion as constituting a social order of exclusion. In this way, the idea was 
to use fashion as a medium to investigate social power relations and how technology 
                                                
 
Instead of reinforcing the identity of the consumer, the ideal of design as critique is to 
invite the consumer to imagine another world where different values prevail. In her 
writing on design as a research method Laurel (2003) distinguishes this approach from 
what she claims to be traditional branding strategies. Rather, new ideas are tried out in 
the imagination of the user, whereby the designer becomes an applied and conceptual 
artist, socialising the practice of art by moving it into a larger and more accessible 
context than in the case of fine art projects (Gaver, Kerridge and Custead 2007).  
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might be used to express oneself in daily life. She suggested, as an example, conducting 
electricity to garments so that they become a means of interacting. At the same crit, she 
also presented another idea about facial expressions, especially yawning. This idea 
investigated how to spread facial expressions, or communicate them as a virus through 
the Internet. She presented drawings and manipulated pictures of situations where 
yawning was used as a means of communication.  
 
Before reporting the feedback given on this presentation, let me add that the student 
had had individual tutorials with Professor A before the crit in order to clarify her ideas. 
She went to see him because she felt confused, as she had too many ideas that went in 
different directions. The professor told her that confusion was good – and that he 
would be concerned if she was not confused. He encouraged her to follow the initial 
idea and not to produce a final product, or settle on a single idea, but to explore the 
narrative of each idea a bit further. . 
 
The feedback started with Tutor M commenting on the idea about facial expression, as 
it was not as well developed as the fashion idea. The feedback was as follows: 
 
Tutor M: ‘…it has not really moved on from our last meeting. The presentation and the idea 
about yawning do not express the kind of thinking you have gone through. Very quickly you 
have to go through some specific ideas. The way of expressing and the scenarios turn into a 
dead end, as it turned into the objects performing more than the people’.  
 
Tutor O: ‘You are projecting conclusions without examining them very well. It is a good set 
up, but very broad; you are proposing a platform as your solution’. 
 
Tutor M: ‘You ‘platformatise’ by taking sample use cases at the edges of the platform and 
then you generalise, rather than starting off with a generalisation. So find those use cases at 
various points and generate from there’.  
 
                                                
 
The outcomes of these critical projects are said to be ‘conceptual design proposals’ that offer a 
critique of the present through the material embodiment of functions derived from ‘alternative 
value systems’ (cf. Seago and Dunne, 1999, p. 16-17). The poetic aspects of this design approach 
are used as a design principle to ‘defamiliarize’ and ‘making-strange’ routine modes of 
perception (Bell, Blythe, Sengers, 2005). That is, design as method for characterising and 
demonstrating new sensibilities and imaginations becomes an end in itself (Macnaghten, 2010, p. 
32). Such techniques are often associated with the artistic movement of the Situationist 
International, which was formed in the 1950’s and 1960’s rooted in Marxism and the 20th 
century European avant-gardes.  
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The student expressed her frustration with the diversity of the tutorial guidance during 
the brief. In the later interview, she reflected on the feedback in this way:  
 
After [M]’s criticism, I realised that I had to be honest with myself; I had to stand up for my 
idea and make it, and give a surface or platform for discussion. I did not do a problem 
solution; it is fiction, a theory. He did not get it, and it was too abstract for him. You need to 
be very self-confident and trust your idea…. My mood goes up and down very heavily during 
this project. I know the others feel the same way. Yesterday I was crying after the tutorials and 
they had to comfort me – a thing like this sets you back and it takes time to find your track 
again. 
 
A few days before the final crit, the two external tutors went to the design studio to 
have individual tutorials with the students. . The tutor asked Student M to completely 
abandon her idea and again gave her a new direction to follow. Her reaction after the 
feedback was as follows:  
 
The weekend before the final crit I almost had a nervous breakdown and I was crying. I felt 
that the idea was not working and I did not get any support. Monday was the terrible 
breakdown. [O] made me feel like I was stupid. It was a personal thing. I did not ask him for 
a tutorial – so he pressed me to talk to him. He was afraid that people would not deliver 
something that [the client] would like. [M] came to my table and wanted me to tell him my 
idea – he came to disturb everyone, just in order to question their ideas … in the end I had to 
make a decision and not give shit about the different opinions of the tutors.  
 
The student explained in a later interview:  
 
At the interim crit, I needed to have an almost finished idea but I just had the field. I actually 
did the project in two days and two nights just before the final crit … it was very stressful for 
me, the whole project, so in the end I just decided to do something. I was so confused. I learned 
more about methods, and the way I should be working than I learned about the work itself... I 
decided in the night of confusion what to do – how to bring my idea to life and how to present 
it, which is the most important thing. 
 
 
                                                
 
Design Critique is situated in relation to what Branzi has defined as the end of historical-avant-
garde and the raise of a permanent-avant-garde (cf. Dunne, 2005, p. 92). The critical 
engagement afforded by a poetic perspective on design is constructed around such an anti-
capitalistic narrative (Zigelbaum and Csikszentmihályi, 2007, p. 3). This critical engagement 
seems to owe a lot to the tradition of the Frankfurt School. However, Dunne has strongly 
upheld a distance towards this critical heritage in favour of what Mazé and Redströem (2009, p. 
30) call ‘active critical participation’. Design Critique might be critical towards consumerism; 
however, it does not negate materialism, but reaffirms it through a kind of poetic investigation. 
.  
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For the final delivery, the project was re-titled ‘Emotional pop-ups’. The project 
addressed a way of transmitting emotions through the Internet. The project investigated 
how to invade the web with emotions and the example of yawning was presented as one 
possible way to manipulate the emotional experiences transmitted through the web. The 
student explained her perspective on the project as being to ‘take it to the extreme’ and 
aimed at a sarcastic approach towards the transmission of emotions through digital 
communication.. Yawning was presented as a physical gesture that spread between 
people, an observation that she wanted to translate into the digital communication 
space. The student presented an edited video of a few experiments investigating what 
makes people yawn. In preparation for the video, she had sent out a You Tube video to 
some friends asking them to film themselves while watching, and this resulted in 
everyone yawning in front of the screen. 
 
In the feedback session, Tutor M emphasized the lack of more realistic and subtle 
aspects of the project, like ‘how it would work as a small application and not as a full-screen 
interruption – how it might play out as another socially provoking thing, that is how would it fit with 
the Facebook context of always having an up-to-date status?’’  
 
In continuation Professor A said:  
 
Yawning is interesting and kind of neglected, but it might also be interesting to look at the 
video context, to look at how it’s functioning by asking if it is only visual? To ask how to get 
to grips with this weird little social gesture. I would have liked to see some experiments testing 
how much you could have stretched it, so that it looks like a shape, and if it would still have 
the effect of making people yawn?  
 
Professor A emphasised this in order to make a move sideways to consider gestures 
other than yawning that can be transmitted in this way.  
 
                                                
 
The differentiation from the Frankfurt School entails a vision to overcome the post-structuralist 
critique (Riles, 2001) where no outside to the practice being criticised might be obtained. Mazé 
and Redströem (2009, p. 30 describe this approach in terms of ‘critique from within the 
conventions practice’ (Italics added). A few critics have claimed that this concept of design 
might not have the impact that it claims to have, as it is only exhibited in galleries and design 
shows and therefore never reaches the politicians or scientists that it is meant to criticize (Hill, 
2005; Natarajan, 2007). As such, Design Critique is criticized for only producing a theoretical 
critique without any ‘real’ impact (Ibars, 2007) or of purely promoting ‘products of the mind’ 
(Natarajan, 2007). 
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Design for Research  
As we can see from these incidences that happened during the brief, the ‘crits’ and 
tutorials were more then just an opportunity for the students to explicate their ideas. 
They were also tools for the tutors to discuss design issues, check on progress and judge 
where the students were at, and if they have understood the aims of the project. It 
seems that the critique enacted the goal of the brief – to impose critique in order to 
disarticulate traditional design methods. To design for subversion by means of 
provocation was the main criterion for the evaluation of the design proposals, explained 
by the tutors, to challenge the assumptions surrounding new digital technologies. 
Professor A said: ‘We are not only transmitting an unambiguous message of likeliness – it still 
introduces ambiguity… when adding all these extra layers of emotional detection it will only enrich the 
process if they are going to be subverted’. .In order to enact this artistic ideal, the design 
methods (conducted as an artistic intervention) attempt to create an imaginary space as 
an exercise in ‘reality suspension’ to perceive the world differently and thereby create 
what this design practice calls ‘alternative futures’. In a broader perspective, these 
methods break down the order of traditional design in order to reconfigure a reality 
where other values prevail embodied in a criticism directed towards the corporate 
world.  
 
‘Design for research’ then relates to the use of design as a tool for provocation, not only 
as it relates to the critical distance maintained towards the corporate world but also as it 
relates to the methods used in the process of innovation. The confusion expressed 
among the students related to the contradictory feedback at the crit and at the individual 
tutorials, as well as the negative criticism they felt subjected to. Student J explained to 
me after the event that:  
 
                                                
 
Furthermore, some critics have stated the ambiguity involved in being critical towards the 
concept of Design Critique. First of all, because it is not a fully established design discipline, this 
makes it difficult to establish criteria from which to propose a criticism of this practice of design 
(Smith, 2006). Bowen (2007) argues that Design Critique might constitute a new genre or 
movement within the field of design, which means that traditional design critique, measured in 
terms of the objects’ functionality, usability and the sales they might generate in a market, do 
not apply to this practice. Together with the rejection of any association with the Frankfurt 
School and with past Marxist critiques of capitalism, Design Critique reflects an anti-capitalistic 
ideal that rejects a nostalgia for the past, and is projected towards a post-capitalistic future.  
 
 150 
The roundtable was not a group discussion, it was rather an examination. They wanted to 
know which point you are at and what you have achieved. I avoided tutorials, as the tutors do 
not believe the idea if you cannot visualise it properly and then they judge you on it. They want 
to bring us into some kind of common denominator of thinking.  
 
The situation the students felt subjected to in these circumstances was being exposed to 
personal attacks rather than professional guidance from the tutor. In this context, a lot 
of the students associated the effects from the ‘crits’ with being judged and evaluated. In 
order to account for the incidences that happened in the crits, I draw a parallel with the 
ethnomethodological notion of ‘breaching experiment’ (Garfinkel, 2002, p. 8). The 
corresponding definition of ethnomethodology is ‘the study of the methods people use 
for producing recognizable social orders’ (Garfinkel, 2002, p. 6). In continuation, 
Heritage writes: ‘to breach reality entails a simultaneously destruction of a common 
sense of reality’ (Heritage, 1984, p. 29). . 
 
Enactment of Pain  
The ‘crits’ were not only instances where the tutors, designers and organisers imposed 
unreasonable critique, but were also used as a way to structure the process of invention. 
However, the students reported on how they tried to avoid the tutorials by meeting late 
at the studio or how they were hiding ideas from the tutors in order to be sure of 
showing some kind of progression in every crit. Apart from the intention of subverting 
the deadlines, this strategic choice of how to present the idea in relation to the tutor’s 
expectations also suggests that the ‘crits’ were perceived as potential points of control. 
Professor A further said: ‘…this reflects reality, like having a deadline for a client regardless of 
where the designer is in the mental process – having to quickly formulate and report the work is a good 
exercise.’ As such, the criticism given in the feedback sessions and the individual tutorials 
seemed to enable or provoke the students to subvert the structure provided for them in 
relation to deadlines, tutorials and research methods. The brief was organised so as to 
                                                
 
Considering these debates within the academic literature on these kinds of design practices, it 
might be argued that any criticism is seen as confirming its success by reaffirming the 
provocation that the objects are meant to produce (Smith, 2006). The controversy as to whether 
or not Design Critique has a ‘real’ impact touches upon different versions and contradictory 
representations of what the real is or what it might be in such a design aesthetics. The critical 
stance of this design practice is oriented towards advanced capitalist society embodied in the 
invention of poetic objects, by the use of experimental methods, which construct alternative 
real-life situations.  
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imitate the world of the client so as to challenge the students to orient themselves to a 
world where the reality of the client is intended to look like a fiction. That is, the client, 
who was said to represent the commercial world, was staged as an ‘artificial’ construct 
only then for the artificial construct to be subverted.  
 
The experience of this kind of subversion occurs in concert with descriptions of the 
pain and break-down inflicted after each crit. Student P explained his experience of the 
confusion and pain he went through during this time of the process: ‘… last night I had a 
total breakdown and I did not sleep at all… I am telling you it is exhausting. I did not sleep for the 
last days before the crits…’. These statements and the breakdowns illustrated in the above 
description seem to be an outcome of a process associated with the idea of constructing 
reality in order to destroy a given idea or perception of the world. It is in this way that I 
suggest the experiments should be understood, as their conduct resulted in what 
Heritage (1984, p. 81) calls ‘interactive breakdowns’, as the ‘perceived normality’ of the 
events was challenged.  
 
From observation of the contradictory feedback and the individual tutorials, it became 
clear that the accomplishments of success or failure were achieved within the setting of 
the brief and not subject to later re-evaluations. The experiment was constructed from 
rules based on unspoken consent or a set of normative constraints rather than fully 
explicated rules to be applied within the brief in order to reach a product solution. This 
relates to the ethnomethodological notion of reflexivity defined as the ‘consideration of 
the processes by which members of society organize and access the “rationality” of their 
own activities’ (Pollner, 1991, p. 371). In continuation Student M said: ‘I totally block off 
my mind when they criticise my ideas a few days before the final crit. In the end I decide not to care 
about it anymore and not to take myself too serious.’ This statement illustrates the way in which 
pain is constructed as a mean by which the students are ‘making sense’ of the event as a 
part of being inventive, that is the description of pain turns into a the performance of a 
particular experience. As such, the experience of the idea of ‘design for research’ 
contributes to the enactment of pain instead of providing a ‘regulating conduct’ 
imposed upon ‘pre-defined scenes of action’ (Heritage, 1984, p. 109). Instead the 
enactment of pain was ‘reflexively constitutive of the activities and unfolding 
circumstances to which they are applied’ (Heritage, 1984, p. 109). This points towards 
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the dual construction of this design approach as the students were subjected to the tools 
and methods they were also expected to apply. 
 
The notion of the ‘experiment’ relates to the organisation of this process and the 
fictional status of this practice, as nothing seems to allow for anyone to decide for 
certain whether the cause of the events was a real accident or a pretence – whether it 
was a deliberate deception executed by the tutors and designers involved in order to 
distort the students’ sense of reality. Student J said after the roundtable discussion: ‘…I 
am not sure if it was purposeful’. The inability to read the rules of the game resulted in such 
interactive breakdowns as were illustrated by the students’ account of the process, 
which, following the later argument, might in itself represent a performance. 
 
In this case, the students encountered a situation of action that shows the internalization 
of the enactment of pain. The students’ actions in this context are then caused or 
reflexively constituted by the rules-of-pain which they have previously acquired 
(Heritage 1984 p. 105). What we see in the breakdowns and the following descriptions 
of pain in the student interviews were also expressed by gestural signs. Student J said: 
 
[O] made me feel like I was stupid, it was a personal thing… a very subtle way of gesturing, 
like lifting his eye-brown, staring at the ceiling… it is the body language, saying like, ‘hmm’, 
‘yeah’, ‘I don’t know’ and then after a while he starts sketching what you need to do.  
 
The gaze, a bodily movement, the tears, the cry following the description of the break-
down signal a moment where the methods of design become a felt-experience of the 
body. Scarry argues that pain has no object and unlike any other state of consciousness 
has no referential content. That is, ‘it is not of or for anything. It is precisely because it 
takes no object that it, more than any other phenomenon, resists objectification in 
language’ (Scarry, 1985, p. 5). As such, physical pain seems to be translated into an 
affective design principle. 
 
Further to these findings was the observation that the students always deferred to the 
authority of the tutor. The students sat around the studio table with the tutors at the 
end. In turn the students presented their work to their peers. I noticed that even when 
the tutor wasn’t speaking, the students’ gaze would constantly return to the tutor to read 
any signs of approval or rejection. That is, the students produce the social experiment 
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by which they feel subjugated. It might not be the case that pain was directly imposed or 
constructed in order to make the students suffer in an artistic-aesthetic sense. However, 
the project was launched as if they intended to create the pain and inflicted the forces of 
experimentation as a drama. That is, a drama performed by the students, the tutors, the 
designers, the objects and the bodies involved, constituting the multiple layers of this 
assemblage entitled ‘Design Critique’. As such, the students’ experience of breakdown 
plays a crucial role as a performative construct making sense of the process as a design 
reality.  
 
A Design Territory 
To reach this conceptualization of design as enactment of pain I move from the 
students’ experiences of breakdown into the way in which the tutors accounted for 
these experiences. This was reflected in the way I was given access to the design brief. 
Throughout my fieldwork within this design practice the access to the studio, and 
therefore the interaction with the students, was limited and at times restricted to 
observations only. Professor A explained his concern not to make the students too 
conscious of the process they went through as he defined it as existential rather than 
analytical. Furthermore, he described how he wanted to keep some kind of ‘ignorance’, 
‘naivety’ or ‘innocence’ in the student. He said: ‘a bit of ignorance is good, especially in the 
beginning, to keep their minds open and inventive’. Therefore, he deliberately did not inform the 
students about future events within the design brief and did not want the student to 
reflect on the events before they happened.  
 
However, another reality revealed itself throughout the four weeks. The lack of 
information that I faced throughout the process and the restricted access to interviewing 
the students was not only caused by a concern for the intuitive and subjective character 
of the processes. The resistance was reinforced by the tutors’ own lack of information 
or internal planning of the events, which created a reluctance to answer my questions on 
future events. In this way, my presence came to test the tutors’ organisational abilities. 
My role then changed from being an ignorant observer, to being a mediator of 
information between the tutors and, at times, a spy revealing this lack of information 
given to the students. Thus, my role shifted between being an external informer, or 
outside observer, and an internal spy. In this way, the design process cannot exclusively 
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be accounted for as a process of subjugating the students, but rather as a process of 
mutual victimization. 
 
Taking this aspect of the process into account, the design process constituted an ever-
changing play where no role was scripted and maintained and yet they all functioned 
together, forming the constitution of this ‘design assemblage’. The indeterminacy of the 
roles played within the brief constituted an ever-changing game where the realms each 
actor was supposed to represent could not be clearly defined and where the relation 
between space, place and actor had been dismantled. It seemed as if no one was really 
accountable for what they said and that no single identity could be deployed to every 
participant or actor in the brief.  
 
At the final crit, the tutors also revealed that they did construct some kind of informal 
role-playing. Client R proclaimed in the final crit that Tutor M had asked him ‘to play 
the bad cop’. Professor A also explained in the follow-up interview that the confusion 
invoked was both ‘intentional’ and ‘exaggerated’, defined as ‘the feeling of thinking’. 
The important point here is that the pain described by the students was not only a sign 
of inchoate sensations and an un-making of everything stable, but constituted a 
structure with its own affective logic.  
 
The interactive game played out during the brief was set in motion by the tutors, 
designers and the client reproducing a specific way of being creative, which included the 
assumption of pain as a necessary consequence of innovation. Professor A said: ‘…I do 
think that learning new things is uncomfortable and painful. I think that actually being really original 
is quite painful too’. He further explained that he wanted the students to have ‘a strong 
point of view’ rather than ‘mass appeal’. In this respect Tutor O said: ‘…the emotions that 
go with this are just not pleasant, so the pain is confusion and conflict as doubts create emotions that are 
painful but really important experience…there is a healthy amount of confusion, but it can become 
frustration if there is too much confusion’.  
 
This recognition of pain makes it look like a strategy for innovation, where creation is 
built upon its inverse relation of un-making (Scarry, 1985), which Professor A describes 
as the ability to always ask ‘What if?’ or, in Deleuzian terms, to access the virtual defined 
by the capability to affect and in turn to be affected (Deleuze, 1986, p. 60). Not only is 
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the reality of norms and behaviour of everyday life in the streets of Berlin subverted as 
was the case in the Berlin Experiment, but also the reality of the students, the client and 
the tutors was, in one way or another, somehow intervened upon and reconstructed 
within the space of the design studio. Norms or rules are thus performative resources, 
which in this case pertain to the enactments of pain. 
 
The performative experiences that I have paid attention to in this chapter explicate the 
multiple layers enacted within this design brief as the students are taught to breach a 
fictional reality, in Garfinkel’s (2002) sense of the word. The design brief was organised 
around the concept of etiquette, which set the scene for the idea of the experiment that 
was conducted. In other words, the students were entangled in the production of a ‘lie’ 
that distorted their own sense of reality. At the final crit, Client R, who also acted as a 
tutor, announced that: ‘etiquette is a lie, we have a kind of behaviour and we have to stage an 
etiquette, so we tell a lie to create a new kind of behaviour… etiquette is all about how we cheat a 
system.’ The students moved from the illusion of producing a lie, that is, investigating 
etiquette as described in the experiment in Berlin, to one where they themselves became 
the subjects of that lie by producing and constituting the very lie they were meant to 
produce. 
 
The idea of cheating the system, that is producing a ‘lie’, is here used by the tutors as a 
way of accounting for the process of innovation. It shows the on-going tinkering and 
making up of contradictory criteria of evaluation as the process went along, and how the 
post hoc justification on the part of the tutors in itself constituted a reflection of 
relations of power. The client’s announcement of ‘playing-the-bad-cop’ at the final crit 
and the ‘production of a lie’ had the effect of pulling away the curtains in a theatre to 
reveal the scene upon which the brief had been staged as an interactive game. However, 
this act counts as a performance in itself, that is, a performative act that plays a part in 
the game constituting the assemblage of Design Critique. In this way the 
experimentation was set up in a process that not only converted the students’ sense of 
reality but also in a performative way announced the conversion of every conceivable 
aspect of the events within the brief. This means that any happening or accidental event 
might get included as a part of the ‘unfolding’ strategy of this design approach.  
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To sum up, the students’ knowledge or descriptions of their experiences of Design 
Critique turn back into the setting of this practice as a constitutive facet of its 
organisation. The reality of the design practice is constituted by the students’ reflection 
on themselves and subsequent enactment of pain accompanied by the tutors’ 
professionalization, which reinforces the co-constitution of the norms and rules by 
which the students’ engagement is guided as they are directed towards a critical 
orientation against the corporate world. Furthermore, the reflexive enactment of pain 
constructs the endogenous constitution of the accountable settings of this design 
practice. As such, the enactment of pain becomes a norm that is thus ‘doubly 
constitutive of the circumstances it organizes’ (Heritage, 1984, p. 107-108). In the 
following section I explain this point in further detail by referring to my last encounter 
with this design practice. 
 
The Inside-Out of the Assemblage 
It was in the last interview after the final crit that I faced Professor A again, who had 
given me the booklet previously. I asked about the Professor’s view on the projects 
invented and the process that the students went through. He said: ‘I should ask you … you 
know more about the students than I do!’ As the interview finished and I switched off the 
recorder, packed my bag and turned toward the door, Professor A stopped me and said: 
‘actually… you know… this process was not really [Design Critique]’. I asked him in response: 
‘What was it then?’ He said ‘I don’t know’ and kept the silence between us for a while, 
before he said: ‘…some kind of experimental design process trying out a new domain of design, … 
that is what we do, … which cannot be reduced to a single concept of design.’ I looked confused at 
him. ‘Well’, he said, ‘good luck with your writing’. I suddenly felt like I was staring into the 
green screen again, without any defined space to focus on as the letters were missing. I 
realized that I was in the middle of this fiction myself. My encounter with the practice 
of Design Critique was a process by which it was again reproduced and enacted in a 
specific way.  
 
Not only were the students deemed to be involved in the endogenous constitution of 
the accountable settings but so was I, as the analyst. The statement: ‘you know more about 
the students than I do!’ and then at the same time being treated as a student participating in 
the course, plus the limited access to the studio and individual interaction between the 
tutors and the students, had placed me both inside and outside the practice that I 
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studied (cf. Riles, 2001, p. 19). This means that the analyst was included in the scope of 
reflexivity – as when Professor A considered the formulation of reflexivity saying ‘...this 
process was not really [Design Critique]’; I was to be considered an actor, an achievement 
internal to the constitution of the practice of Design Critique (cf. Pollner, 1991, p. 372). 
 
The explicit rejection of Design Critique as a model applied to the brief implies that 
these kinds of reflexive design methods do not explicitly articulate criteria, concepts or 
methods to be applied as a model for innovation. However, the reflexivity of accounts 
contributes to the making of Design Critique as a principle of innovation even as a 
critical distance or rejection of their own status as a design practice might be achieved 
(Riles, 2001, p. 19). That is, reality is affectively enacted by the performance of pain, 
which makes this design practice ‘accountably constituted’ as innovative (cf. Garfinkel, 
1967, p. 15). Following Riles’ (2001) terminology I might say it turns its own reality 
‘inside-out’. The effort seems to be to recreate aesthetically the practice of innovation 
after post-structuralist critiques. The subversive structure of this design practice, in the 
course of events – the deadlines, the style and character of the feedback constructing 
the tools and methods used to disorient the students’ sense of reality – enacts a criticism 
that turn the students against the corporate world. This criticism constructs a specific 
‘design reality’, that is, a social order that operates according to an affective logic that 
territorializes or infolds its outside to become ‘internal to the construction of its own 
reality’ (Riles, 2001, p. 3).  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analyzed the process of innovation by focusing on provocation as 
a design method for research by means of breaching a fictional reality rather than 
producing ethnographic representations of the user or producing for a pre-existing 
market. In this case, the method is deployed by producing a specific kind of critical 
engagement turned against the corporate world in order to produce ‘Design Critique 
projects’ or, more specifically, to produce ‘poetic objects’ raising awareness about future 
digital manners. Criticism is also utilised as a teaching method in the design studio. I 
have presented the utilization of Design Critique as a method of innovation. In this 
setting the mobilization of pain came to be performed as a creative resource structured 
by artistic tools, such as ‘crits’, tutorials and artistic interventions.  
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From my observations of, and interaction with, the students I found that the ‘crits’ and 
tutorials functioned as destabilizing events distorting the students’ sense of reality. 
However, these experiences were not only based on the interruption of everyday life, 
such as the way in which the students carried out the Berlin Street experiment 
disrupting everyday life in the streets of Berlin, or the way in which the students 
explained the feedback and ‘crits’ as absurd. These events also contributed to the 
construction of a sense that reality becomes unsettled – close to fiction or a 
performative game, which is re-stabilized into an affective logic.  
 
By dividing the chapter into two separate texts, I have also provided an understanding 
of the underlying vision of this design practice. In doing so, I have explicated the way in 
which this design brief might be understood as ‘design for research’. The experimental 
methods, the booklet, and the idea of poetic objects show the way in which the 
principles of Design Critique function by means of disarticulation. The tutors and 
organisers aimed to ensure the failure of the traditional design principles associated with 
commercial design. The main text provided a description of the empirical events within 
a design brief based on the brief ‘Future Digital Manners’. I have investigated how the 
practice of Design Critique internally generates its own reality by following the 
inventions of three poetic objects. In doing so, I have described how this idea of design 
entails a critique towards the corporate world. The vision of the future evoked by this 
critical perspective also enacted within the brief of ‘Future Digital Manners’ produced 
the performative experiences as accounted for by the students. In analysing these 
performative experiences, the criticality presented in the subtext was repositioned –  
from being an anti-capitalistic orientation towards the corporate world to becoming an 
internally constitutive aspect of the practice of Design Critique.  
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7. Kafka: Individuation, Technologies and the Self 
 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 4, I explained the way in which the process of innovation is considered a 
form of ‘extreme collaboration’ when interpreted in relation to different artistic visions. 
Furthermore, I described the devices, tools and methods used in order to instantiate an 
artistic or anti-capitalistic critique, creating territorializing zones, in the form of camps, 
labs and studio-workshops, testing the limits of inclusions/exclusions, inside/outside, 
and exemption/self-exemption. More specifically, I have described the tools and devices 
by which these practices distort the students’ sense of reality in order to destroy the 
‘taken for granted’ (cf. Garfinkel, 1967). Student V explained in a later interview 
evaluating the design brief that: ‘…this course messes you up with all the things you knew before. 
Not everything is clear. You learn that all you have learned may not be true’.  
 
This statement brings to light the practice of thinking differently, ‘to modify oneself 
through the movements of thought’ (Davidson, 2001, p. xviii; cf. Foucault, 2001, p. 15). 
Student V shows how she was prepared to lose her way, that is, to detach herself from 
already given systems, orders, doctrines and codes in which she believed. This is an 
instance of how Student V engaged in a self-reflexive practice making sense of the 
critique given at the design ‘crits’. As such, the ‘crits’, tutorials and artistic interventions 
are devices that enact an affective technology by which she is able to install a new and 
strange relation to herself.  
 
Central to this analysis stands the concept of individuation, in particular, as it has been 
conceptualised by the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon (1992). Instead of 
assuming a pre-established divide between the individual and their environment, the 
principles of individuation grasp the dynamics of this establishment. More classical 
sociological studies have also proposed that individualities and the modern self are 
‘produced’ within specific sets of practices (cf. Giddens, 1991; Elias, 1939; Weber, 
1958). Other studies have highlighted the importance of technological materialities 
regarding subjectivation (Rose, 1999; Barry, Osborne and Rose, 1996). According to 
Simondon, those devices, which at once bring the individual into being and determine 
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the characteristics of its development, organisation and modalities – also bring the 
environment to light. Following this argument, I mean to conceive of the individual’s 
practical relation to their environment as a dynamic system of local, interdependent, 
self-organising movements, perceptions and affects that are both resources for and 
techniques of innovation. In doing so, this chapter asks: how do artistic devices, tools 
and technologies mediate or pre-figure the individuality of the subjects involved? 
 
To recall Chapter 4, Professor A said that ‘The students will not find any right answers, but 
have to look into themselves and take responsibility for their own ideas … The idea is to challenge the 
assumptions of your own work, to be critical of critical design’. He emphasised this in terms of 
techniques to make the students question ‘who am I’ and ‘why am I doing it’ as part of 
the facilitation of some kind of ‘extreme collaboration’. This strategy is created within a 
carefully structured frame (a staged environment), which was in itself reflected upon by 
the students as a constraint and, as a consequence, acted in response to that. This setting 
will be investigated as the capture of, and adaptation to, specific evaluation criteria and 
their effects. In doing so, I bring together the analysis from the work-camp and design 
brief by exploring and questioning the linkages between innovation, technologies and 
the self.  
 
More specifically, I demonstrate the way in which rules are reflected upon as a kind of 
technique, practice, exercise, attitude and event – which one might understand as a test 
of oneself. The artistic devices in question are considered as ‘the specifically modern 
techniques of bureaucratic organization’ (Kwinter, 2001, p. 105) where the performative 
criteria by which one is judged are never revealed. This theme is explicitly analysed in 
Kafka’s writings. I draw a parallel to his work with special focus on the stories, Before the 
Law (1916), In the Penal Colony (1919) and The Trial (1925). These stories are concerned 
with the relations of social organisation presented in a novelistic universe whose objects, 
spaces and relations are apprehended and manipulated ostensibly in the same distorting 
way as in the organisation of innovation. Such a comparison highlights the structuring 
role of bureaucratic organisation and suggests that the enactment of rules and norms are 
associated with governance at a distance (cf. Kwinter, 2001, p. 104).  
 
The second aspect of this is how the relation between the individual and its 
environment feeds into processes of valuation. A performative order is installed in a 
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two-fold way. Firstly, I analyse the way in which the students re-instate normality and 
make sense of the experiences enacted within the camp and the design brief, such as 
break-downs, crisis and frustrations, imposing a meaning upon the seemingly 
purposeless critique and contradictory feedback given in the crits, tutorials and events. 
In turn, the performance of pain, stress and anxiety acted out in the crits, tutorials and 
events provide evidence of the capacities considered necessary to be original and 
inventive. In this way, the devices themselves act as a public demonstration, test, or 
proof (Muniesa and Callon, 2007, p. 169), that exhibit the necessary work of ourselves on 
ourselves (cf. Foucault, 2001, p. 47), in order to be creative. That is, a performance gives 
validity to the processes carrying certain ‘aesthetic values’, which make anxiety, pain and 
suffering a criterion of success. I investigate the way in which these practices construct a 
mode of production where normality reinstitutes itself by means of such affective-
performative devices and how such devices led the participants to recognise themselves 
as subjects of artistic creation.   
 
As explained in Chapter 1 Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) propose that, such tendencies 
are an expression of the economization of artistic practice based upon non-instrumental 
or anti-capitalist critique to be absorbed into, and used to generate, economic value. 
Constituting a space that allows for a certain kind of self-exemption differentiated from 
the business world is what makes these processes distinctive and commercially valuable. 
That is not to conclude that these practices fail to produce the creative economy they 
attempt to endorse. On the contrary, these devices are powerful tools that work 
according to a logic of differentiation where the evaluation of value becomes a part of 
the performative capacity of innovation. In this way, the artistic critique and its 
entanglement in the innovation industry transform the relation between individuation 
and the production of value.  
 
Narratives and Personal Testimonies 
Kafka has in the sociological literature been widely recognised as a writer of 
displacement (Goffman, 1959; Sennett, 1980; Giddens, 1991). Instead of projecting 
futures from current scenarios, in Kafka novelty is produced in and through a narrative 
set-up that tests reality, such as the law, bureaucracy and the rules of administration. For 
instance, in the parable Before the Law a man is waiting outside an open door all his life to 
get access to the law. At the end, when he is almost dying, the doorkeeper closes it with 
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the words: ‘No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for 
you. I am now going to shut it.’ (Kafka, 1916, p. 4). According to Derrida (1992), the 
story exemplifies a narrative not of progression but of endless entanglement. The open 
door marks a limit ‘without itself posing an obstacle or barrier. It is a mark, but it is 
nothing firm, opaque, or uncrossable’ (Derrida, p. 203). In The Trial, this phenomenon 
plays out in K’s search for the law, which is always to be found somewhere else, always 
displaced. The offices and chambers of the court are always displaced to the office next 
door, in attics, basements, a closet, a cathedral pulpit, a painter’s studio etc. (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1975, p. 51; cf. Attridge 1992). It is in this way that Kafka has been said to 
displace the familiar frames of reference, while stimulating engagement. His writings 
have been said to deconstruct the divide between the perception of oneself and the 
outer world as the law allows K. to perform himself by making himself a stranger. This 
interpretation touches upon the alienating forces in Kafka’s writings, or what Kwinter 
(2001, p. 104) defines as its ‘distance-effect’. Surprisingly, it seems that it is here that we 
are to find the link to the study of innovation.  
 
In the practice of the studio-workshop, the notion of Design Critique emerged as a 
rather slippery, or at least complex, artistic concept. The partners always negated any 
predefined or analytical category from which to make sense of the artistic vision. 
Through my participation in the innovation processes themselves, I found those 
concepts to slip away from any determination, any objective description. They escaped 
categorisation of any kind, always pointing towards what they were not. This 
observation was supported by the fact that everything defining this space was always 
displaced. We might recall Client R’s last comment at the final crit: ‘etiquette is a lie, we 
have behaviour and we have to stage an etiquette, so we tell a lie to create a new behaviour. Etiquette is 
all about how we cheat a system’. Also, the artefacts invented were said to employ a 
‘hypothetical critique’; the design process is characterised as ‘speculative’; the projects 
are called ‘placebo’ and any functions are claimed to be ‘fictional’. The mode of 
operation for those practices seemed to be the subversion of their own categorisation, 
which was justified as ‘critical engagement’.  
 
This reminds me of Deleuze and Guattari’s opening when writing on Kafka’s 
description of his world as a universe where everything seems false: ‘According to a first 
view, everything is false in The Trial: even the law, in contrast to Kantian law, erects the 
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lie into a universal rule. The lawyers are false lawyers, the judges are false judges’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1975, p. 49). The exact same phrase could have been used to 
open the analysis of this case. On this view, everything seems to be fictional – we only 
need recall my last interaction with Professor A, where he rejects the design process as 
being about design critique – again trying to challenge my implicit assumptions about 
the concept of design, as well as my position as a researcher. Paradoxically, such 
contradictions, discrepancies, bifurcations and differences all contribute to a mode of 
dis-articulation, which simultaneously stage an explicit strategy of innovation, that is, an 
attempt ‘to challenge assumptions’ as Professor A framed it in a later interview. 
According to Kwinter (2001, p. 181) such statements are to be considered as a form of 
‘artificial closure’ designed for narrative experiments.  
 
The organisation of the design process and the fictional status of this practice was 
reinforced given that nothing allowed the students to know whether the coincidental 
state of the events was a real accident or a pretence: ‘We did not know anything before the 
launch and then we were told that there would be a second launch in Berlin, so we were not sure what 
new information we would get…There was an atmosphere of – not anxiety, but hesitancy like being in 
a hidden space – we were off, on hold… In Berlin we were all looking for additional constraints, but we 
did not get that, so they also left it quite open for us’. However, the processes are not completely 
without any direction or goals to be achieved, they are just seemingly distant and 
unspoken. The client added: It is not that the process is completely free and you can do what you 
want, there is a certain context, you will be lead to a certain path but in a very unpredictable way. It is 
not saying yes or no.’ It might even be argued that the crits, tutorials and workshops served 
as practical devices to turn a rather abstract artistic vision into a set of rules and 
behaviours. Client R explained those as ‘an approach you have to learn’. He said:  
 
If you go to modern Masters courses the rules for passing the exams are very clear and everyone 
knows them: You have to go to the classes. Then some people have more ability to understand 
the rules and therefore they pass. Here….you don’t have to pass exams, you don’t get a specific 
grade. But if you want to go through this process you have to discover the unspoken rules. This 
is a process that takes time and a lot of socialising. 
 
 
In the cases I followed, no matter whether rules were imposed from the outside or 
internally generated from the experimental setting itself, the criteria by which the 
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students were judged at the crits, tutorials and shows were never made explicit. The 
same client later said:  
 
There is no point in having marks or exams as everyone know that there is a goal to achieve. 
There are these unspoken rules that everybody knows, but no one is going to make explicit. 
This makes people very stressed to push themselves to be really original, creative, innovative, 
and to find new ways of understanding reality and things like that…. In this process you 
know nothing else than yourself and your ideas to pass the program.  
 
In addition, Professor A added to the conversation that ‘the students have to qualify their own 
work, however created in a very rigid structure’. He further emphasised that this existential 
process always relates to the students’ work, which is to create a space from where to 
question reality. Therefore, they were not given any external criteria by which to 
evaluate what needed to be tested. Professor A described this as a play with assumptions 
and expectations in order to install a kind of reflexivity:  
 
The students will not find any right answers, but have to look into themselves and take 
responsibility for their own ideas … we focus the students to ask: who am I? What am I 
doing? Why am I doing it? What is the purpose of my design and why do I think it is good? 
The idea is to challenge the assumptions of your own work.  
 
Echoing the latter, Partner W said: ‘In the final exam we are listening to them telling us why their 
work makes sense. They have developed the criteria to evaluate their own work’. Phil Race defines 
self-assessment as ‘when students [are] making judgments about their own work’ (Race, 
2001). In this way the crits might be understood as events where the students were 
guided to focus their attention on themselves (Foucault, 1984, p. 5). We end up here 
with a specific artistic vision assuming that creativity cannot be imposed from the 
outside, but has to be enacted in and through the students’ relation to themselves. What 
is at stake is not only defining reality anew, but also implying a narrative experiment that 
reinforces strangeness and causes the trauma of losing oneself. Kafka (1939, p. 437) 
writes that: ‘…it is an extremely painful thing to be ruled by laws that one does not 
know’. Stark explains, from an organisational context, that situations where one is 
accountable in many crosscutting and conflicting registers create a kind of ‘performance 
anxiety’, because with no external reference or instance to justify one’s actions. One is 
then ultimately accountable to oneself (cf. Stark, 2009, p. 113). Student J confirmed this 
point by saying: ‘…with an open process like this you are on your own’. Professor A said: ‘It is 
lonely to be inventive, as no one else is doing it, which adds another emotional layer. They have to go 
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their own way.’ This emphasises an experimental attitude based on ‘the testing of oneself’, 
which plays a crucial role in Foucault’s later lectures at the Collège de France, published 
in The Hermeneutics of the Subject (2001) and Rose (1999, p. 144) refers to such devices as 
technologies that ‘intervene’ upon oneself. In order to demonstrate this point in more 
detail, let me report another incident, again from the design brief.  
 
On the first day of the brief, a trip to the Whitechapel Gallery in London was planned 
as a part of the project launch. Once I had arrived together with the students it turned 
out that the gallery was closed. It was another half an hour until the tutors showed up. 
In the meantime, the students wondered whether they were part of a reality TV show 
programme. Student M looked around and laughed: ‘… now I want to know where they have 
placed the cameras?’ Similar to my experience in Rumspringa during the camp, a conspiracy 
was formulated – promoting a rather paranoid space. Student J later described the 
incident: ‘You always try to make sense of the process and sometimes overanalyse every step, like the 
way the gallery was closed one day and we all constructed a conspiracy of how this was a test for us. You 
become paranoid about what kind of pedagogical experiment you are supposed to be taking part in.’ In 
this case, self-assessment effects an exposure to the nightmare presented in Kafka’s 
writings. The students confront rules that do not simply command or prohibit, but as 
Derrida (1992, p. 203) says, ‘operate at the limit, not to prohibit directly, but to interrupt 
and defer the passage, to withhold the pass’. 
 
The Trial presents a universe where the eternal postponement of the verdict conceals the 
expectations applied to the accused. According to Derrida (1992), ‘being before the law 
is being in fiction’ as the criteria by which you are being judged are never revealed; as 
such, a revelation would impose a function, meaning and rationality to the activities. 
Instead, disruption, crisis and frustration effected a rather neurotic space where the 
creative goal seemed to have no external instance with which to justify itself. However, I 
not only look at how this amounts to Kafkaesque absurdity, existential meaninglessness 
or infinite goallessness represented by the individuals struggling against the bureaucratic 
machine. Rather, I also look at how a narrative is constructed around the experience of 
breakdown, which acts to validate the process as inventive.   
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Performative Techniques and Devices of the Self  
 
The problem with these people is that they take themselves too seriously and therefore feel free to 
criticise people and let them down in a way. What happened yesterday was definitely a personal 
problem with the tutor. And every one of the students feels like this after yesterday. I overheard 
that they told one of the other students just to give up his project, as the idea was too bad. I 
mean you don’t do that just a few days before the final crit… we only have two days left now.  
 
(Student V during the design brief) 
 
In Chapter 6, we saw how the students reported that they sometimes found the 
conflicting advice and feedback they received from tutors, partners and clients in the 
crits and tutorials confusing, and that they found the process to be a test of their 
personal or psychological strength rather than their design skills. The crit, initially 
defined as a peer feedback process in which the students mutually evaluate each other’s 
work, turned into an occasion for public humiliation. Race explains the crit as a 
performance, whose primary function lies not ‘in the opportunity for students to demonstrate 
their learning, or debate with their peers and their staff, but rather to witness the virtuoso performance of 
their tutors’ (2001, p. 5).  
 
The crits enabled a narrative structure which the students were forced to navigate. 
Student J explained that the crits were not especially useful in helping to develop the 
project further. He said:  
 
At the roundtable, I had the idea worked out and I was holding back what I had, as I knew 
there would be more presentations – we did not know what was expected at the interim crit at 
that point, so I knew I had to go through some kind of progression, so I just showed some 
initial sketches and prototypes…. I am glad I did not present them before, as I like my idea, 
and I would still have two more weeks where they could turn it around… I would say that the 
deadline is almost false… to really use the crits to develop the ideas is sometimes tricky. 
 
In this way, the narrative structure set out in the scripts (see in Chapter 5 and 6) are not 
to be interpreted in terms of a linear progression of time, where the progression 
happens in one stage following the other. The crits were not considered deadlines 
designed to focus the work, but were in themselves re-narrated as creative constraints. 
The temporality that lies beneath the event of Rumspringa is not one of progression, 
but rather a passage to the outside, a means by which to transgress oneself. The 
narrative effect from these devices is symptomatic of the structure of the camp, which is 
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explained by Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 95), with reference to Bauman as 
‘installations are conceived and planned as a hole in time as much as in space, a 
temporary suspension of territorial ascription and the time sequence’.  
 
At the follow-up interview several weeks after the final crit, Student V explained the 
confusion she went through as a natural part of creating new knowledge: ‘To be placed in 
a structure would be too uniform for creating something new. You need to be lost and find your own way 
to deal with a situation without a structure’. She explained further that structure is an easy 
solution for people who are not able to deal with new and changing situations. 
 
Student V: I am still very sceptical of the whole process we went through. The whole process 
was very painful for me and I am not sure we got anything out of it in the end.  
 
Researcher M: Yes, I know that you struggled a lot with the whole set-up of the process, 
especially before the final crit and all the criticism you had to go through.  
 
Student V: Yes, but that kind of pain was necessary I think. It is a kind of thing you need 
to go through to be creative and original. A little bit of suffering is good I think – you need 
that. We have to be original and think for ourselves and that is what they try to make us do, 
so I know that it is… well, I can understand why they do that. But the tutors just did not get 
my idea. They didn’t understand anything of what it was about. 
 
Artistic devices such as crits, Rumspringa and the tutorials created a process of 
differentiation by which the students came to perceive themselves as creative. That is, 
through this process, they come to see themselves as different from how they were 
before. The students gain an awareness of developing their own design approach and 
not of ‘serving others’, that is, producing design not ‘to solve problems’. Client R 
defined the purpose of the devices as: ‘about creating a reality that doesn’t exist and not lecture 
about it, rather you have to engage people in a new reality through the objects and working with the 
material.’ This is further implied by the notion of ‘facilitation’, used to describe methods 
of innovation which are not reduced to a specific program or strategic method, but as 
governing the students in the name of their own transformation.   
 
The students seemed to appreciate the confusion after recognising the pain enacted in 
the crits as necessary in order to become ‘real’ creatives. Student V further stated that: 
‘They don’t want you to be a school child, but to start a process in you that will never change back, it is 
not about a mark, a goal or a paper … You need to have a special mind-set to deal with this 
environment as it is not about finishing something… it is about self-confidence in what you do’. 
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Another student commented on inventiveness and the creative process thus: ‘It is hard 
work and it is painful to be creative, it just can’t be fun’. The self-declared purpose gives an 
interesting clue about one thing these experiments do: they implement artistic theories 
by way of transforming them into operational tools enacted by the participants 
themselves. Foucault defines such ‘techniques of the self’, or ‘arts of existence’, as:  
 
…those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves 
rules of conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in 
their singular being, and to make of their life into an oeuvre that carries certain 
aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria. (Foucault, 1984, p. 10-11) 
 
 
In evaluating the project, Student M said that: ‘You will get very harsh critiques from all the 
tutors, which can be very hard to take, but then you calm down and often realise that they are right and 
there is a point to what they are saying and that moves you forward’. The way in which students 
re-narrate the experience as ‘necessary to creativity’, akin to a personal sacrifice in the 
name of art, demonstrates a tacit acceptance of those events as devices of creativity. 
This acceptance has to do with the affective side of such tools. Scarry (1985) writes that 
the felt-experience of pain, in relation to its gestural physical presence, makes such 
processes, or power relations, seem ‘incontestably real’. Confirming this point, Student 
M described the pain she went through: ‘I feel like a shop and that I sell pieces of my body – you 
need time to let it grow back – it is really physical sometimes.’ She described the process as 
painful but explained that what she has done in this program of design was also 
‘personal’ and ‘weird’. The ‘crits’, tutorials and shows initiate a documentary effect, that 
is, an exposure to unscripted behaviour (Biressi and Nunn, 2005, p. 2). The crits served 
as an act in which the authentic enactment (see Chapter 4) of ‘real’ creativity was staged 
by critique and exposure. In both the camp and the brief, the exposure of uncontrolled 
feelings, such as the eruption of anger or a breakdown in tears, was a stressful moment 
of self-revelation. The ‘crits’ are spectacles in which the participants carry out necessary 
transformation on themselves, strategic modifications, ascetic exercises and 
renunciations in order to access aesthetic-creative forces. An affective response to the 
critique given in the crits was displayed through the students’ performances of pain and, 
in this way, affectedness is performed as the criterion of success which represents 
certain aesthetic values.  
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Terms used by a lot of the students to describe the process and the pain were ‘honest’ 
and ‘true’. This was framed as a positioning against the current debate on innovation in 
the creative industries, which the students considered to be superficial marketing 
promotion and thereby not ‘real’, in the sense of not-affecting. Student M explained:  
 
When you are working on this program you become idealistic. I am afraid of this process, 
because I know that I will not be the same. I am not sure if I will work for a company as you 
need to adjust your personality and ideas to a bigger thing – that is how big companies 
work…. I think I am too edgy for that.  
 
The affect and bodily gestures of persons get connected with artistic or aesthetic ways 
of legitimizing innovation and assign value to the process. In retrospect some students 
considered the experiment as a way of challenging themselves and a way of performing 
their own project in a public space: ‘it is a way to bring your project to life and test the effects of 
it’. Another student described the purpose of the experiment in relation to critical design 
as ‘to encourage, not to do the obvious’, creating a self-perception amongst the students of 
being ‘on the edge’. This is what Scarry explains as a reality-conferring function, which 
in this case depends on the attributes of artistic creation, such as pain and suffering.  
 
By exploring the empirical evidence and personal testimonies that serve to document 
such affectedness, in what follows I consider the way in which the clients and funders 
account for the practice of innovation in and through the techniques produced in the 
camps, labs and studios. The evidence of affect, or its empirical instantiation, is not just 
provided through psychological consequences such as stress, neurosis and anxiety; the 
way in which such performances are in themselves acted upon, performed and 
transformed becomes something integral to modern innovation practices. What I 
attempt to capture here is the way in which the participants involved are able to account 
for the new; that is, how the traumatized experience gets repaired and normality is 
reinstituted through personal narratives of acting, coping, frustration, disappointment 
and appraisal. The central question that is asked here is: what is the relation between the 
emotional acts in the crits and the project brief on behalf of which these acts are 
performed? This is a question about the relation between the interior content of 
innovation and what stands outside of it. In order to answer this question, I go back to 
some of the statements which evaluate the design brief.   
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The Fiction of Power  
The attempt to destroy any conceivable aspect of the process in order to distort the 
students’ sense of reality might be expressed as ‘referential instability’ (Scarry, 1985, p. 
121). The sense of reality that is destroyed through unspoken rules is rescued or re-
established by appending a direction in the statement ‘for the sake of creativity’. Such a 
statement credits the tutors and the partners, providing them with a justification and the 
opportunity to rather cruelly humiliate, which serves a kind of function.  
 
The students perform Professor A as a creative guarantor legitimizing the course of the 
brief, just as Lars von Trier legitimised the course of the camp (se Chapter 4). 
Evaluating her experience of the brief, Student J said about working with Professor A:  
 
He talked about two genres of projects that had been done the last years in the telecom space. 
That was helpful to push the ideas…. He is one of the most thoughtful and impressive minds I 
have worked with. He talks through the ideas and helps you to explore the actual idea. He is 
not judgemental, and there is no right or wrong.  
 
Student V also mentioned the Professor as her creative mentor despite the horror 
scenario she went through during the brief itself. She explained the experience of pain 
as a ‘seed’ that they plant and that you become part of a ‘life-project’. The basis of this 
power is to make the participants feel that they belong to something greater and more 
powerful than themselves. Professor A explains that what keeps the students in the 
studio is some kind of a shared ‘ethos’. So far the point is that these practices are 
organised around this belief created within the experimental setting through the 
enactment of charismatic individuals. These are individuals who, in Arvidsson’s (2009, 
p. 8) words, ‘accumulate affective status’, which might be why the students volunteer to 
contribute with free labour as ‘they believe in, feel for, or belong to a community 
around the charismatic person’. The appraisal on the part of the students indicates not 
only the adaptation to a specific creative environment, but also confirms what Scarry 
defines as the fiction of power. She writes that the element of ‘as if’ in the performance 
of pain ‘lead[s] out into the array of counterfactual revisions entailed in making’ (Scarry, 
1985, p. 22). This point picks up on the idea that pain seems ‘to confer its quality of 
“incontestable reality” on that power that has brought it into being’ (Scarry, 1985, p. 27). 
It is in this way that the crits, tutorials and artistic events are given some kind of 
legitimization which has to do with the affective relationship between the student, tutor 
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and client than the reception of a specific innovative outcome such as a consumer 
product or business strategy.   
 
The fiction of power is an aspect of what professor A explained as the ‘what if’ function 
of innovation, that is, the fiction-generating or reality-conferring function of the artistic 
devices. The students described the innovation processes as providing a ‘safe space’, an 
‘atmosphere’, or a ‘special climate’. Student J explained the studio as ‘a space to say silly 
things, which are not silly but just undone’. The ‘what if’ function is what certifies the reality of 
the not yet enacted disposition of the new, original or unexpected. The students further 
described themselves as being ‘sensitive people excluded from normality as crazy’. The 
students disappear into the ‘apparatus of capture’ or, perhaps more precisely, become 
ontological exiles (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 153), and this substantiates a feeling of 
being integrated by dis-integrating from the world ‘out-there’44. A sort of de-realization 
takes place. From the students’ enactment of the space it seemed as if the studio were 
more real and everything outside became a shallow replacement of the intensity of that 
reality. Student V explained the struggle to get an idea brought to life as a process ‘to 
fight normality’, so the studio-space represents a sphere that is meant to produce the 
students’ self-confidence and not ‘reproduce’ knowledge. Scarry (1985, p. 133) writes 
that ‘this framing unreality of the exterior’ is what constructs or appropriates the reality 
of the interior content, in this case the reality enacted within the walls of the studio-
space. This relation of inside to outside is a relation that directed the students’ 
orientation, enabling certain performative activities and indirectly prohibiting others.  
 
The fiction of power turned the emotions generated from pain, crisis and anxiety into a 
promise of innovation. It is in this way that the exposure of pain becomes a legitimate 
criterion in a collective spirit of making; for example, ‘I scream and cry’ was a repeated 
expression when I later talked to the students about the experience of the design 
process. That is to say, they reify, isolate and demote creativity to the beyond, regardless 
of whether this is understood as an inside to which the participants painstakingly seek 
admittance (working on the self), or an outside (guru) that serves as a divine guarantor 
of originality and ultimate creativity. Such a beyond is enacted by the fiction of power, 
which in Kafka’s novel is presented by access to the law (Kwinter, 2001, p. 112).  
 
                                                
44 The various partners explained this aspect from different innovation practices as ‘a safe space’ (see 
Chapter 4).  
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In what follows I elaborate this point by claiming that it is in the very search for its 
meaning and legitimization that the students impute a value to the one in power (the 
tutors and partners). This point indicates that valuation ‘stems not from some concealed 
essence but from its very accessibility’ (Derrida, 1992, p. 182). It is in the shadow of 
such fictional reality that this peculiar valuation takes place in such innovation 
processes. The inside/outside divide in what is considered creative is what is at stake in 
the relationship between the use of artistic devices and changes in what we tend to 
consider as economic value; as Muniesa (2011, p. 32) remarks: ‘Valuation is about 
considering a reality while provoking it’.  
 
Let me unravel this rather complex dynamic in further detail below. I trace the 
performances that define what count as inside and outside the economic world in 
relation to the notion of artistic pain or suffering performed by the client representing 
the telecommunication company. The interview below took place just after the final crit 
and was conducted outside of the studio space, but was still inside the academic building 
where it had all taken place during the past four weeks. 
 
Valuation and Artistic Assessment 
Client J, who had worked with Professor A before and also graduated from the course 
in Design Critique a few years ago, explained her reason for collaborating with the 
design practice:  
 
…even me, working two years in the [lab] I realised that I kind of start to, not close, but in a 
way get this narrow way of thinking. You need on a regular basis to open up again to get 
lateral approaches to keep that brainstorming muscle working. Therefore it is important to 
engage with research on a regular basis, which is very important for us, to step out there and 
not just go out and do research where we look at user research but expand our minds and look 
at fresh minds, like the bunch of students here. 
 
An important point to state is that Client J not only acted as a tutor, but also represents 
a past student. Client J explained that she felt as if she was betraying her ‘creative mind’ 
by working in the telecommunications industry. She described the lab, which she 
represented, as an in-house agency having a ‘satellite’ status, not located in the same 
building as the head-office of the company. She explained her job as a mediator 
bridging those worlds, which is why she liked to stay connected to the design space run 
by Professor A. She further explained her role at the lab as ‘keeping the organisation’ 
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thinking as it otherwise might become closed around its own organisational self-image. 
She defined the brief as a way of maintaining open-mindedness from the design 
perspective and of ‘keep[ing] the brain thinking’. She explained the tools of art and 
design as a means of initiating a process of ideation and thereby fostering change in 
these large-corporation-environments. She said: ‘I like the extreme approach. The more 
extreme you are the better the signal comes across in the organisation. Sometimes you need to shout very 
loud in a company like this before anything moves…’. 
 
It is the ‘extremity’ and ‘endurance’ of the process that assigns economic value. That is, 
it is the vivid and experienceable alternation of reality enacted in the performance of 
self-transformation, crisis, frustration and stress among the students, that makes it look 
like innovation. The crits, tutorials and events are tools through which the client, 
facilitators and students  are able to give an account of this extremity and they are used 
to legitimize its value. The lab buys into that world in order ‘to shake things up a bit’. 
Client R, a freelance designer employed by the lab for the project on e-etiquette and 
who had also graduated from the course in design, added:  
 
It is a very rich space for working together and experimenting. The whole atmosphere is very 
unusual/rare and something you do not get in many places. When I was here, I learned from 
the students, the everyday discussion and the networks they draw on. You go through a process 
with ups and downs in activities with all the people here. This is something you take with you 
in your future career.... You build a platform here that influences you to think in a certain 
direction.   
 
In this sense, the justification for engaging with ‘critical design’ feeds back into a 
justification for the existence of the lab itself. The engagement with the design practice 
was, for her, a strategic relationship in order to actualise her self-perception as being 
creative. The crits, tutorials and staged performances serve as a testimony of that – 
almost like a demonstration or public proof of creativity, which was a matter of bearing 
witness to the pain suffered and participating in its display.  
 
In Chapter 6, we saw how the clients in the crits also acted as tutors criticising the 
students and giving instructions on how to progress with their projects. We might recall 
Client R, who revealed his role as playing ‘the bad cop’ in the final crit. In this way we 
are to understand the crits, tutorials and events as devices enabling the tutors, funders 
and clients to prove their own creative talent or inventive capability in guiding and 
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leading the process of invention. The implied consent from the tutors to ‘be creative’, 
meant that they performed a critique that would normally place them outside the moral 
limits of what is common practice in an educational setting. Client J said that ‘I know 
these methods from my degree in fine art. It is only in art and more experimental practices that you still 
find these horrible ways to educate the students’. In the crits, the clients were to suspend the 
most basic ethical rules of norms and behaviour. Although the client considered the 
methods as too strong, or not appropriate for an academic setting, they claimed it to be 
necessary in the case of creativity. In Client J’s case, she consented to ‘unmaking’ 
herself, deconstructing herself, emptying herself of any ethical responsibility for the sake 
of the experiment (cf. Stengers, 1997 on scientific justification of experiments). As the 
act of critique does not guarantee creativity (or more generally creation for that matter) 
as a causal effect – the fact that it is imposed on the students in order to produce the 
new then becomes the legitimization for the act of public humiliation, which was 
verbalised in the statement: ‘for the sake of creativity’.  
 
Client J exempted herself from certain codes of conduct and norms of behaviour. What 
is being displayed in and through the clients’ participation in the evaluation of the 
students is the capacity for self-exemption as the attribute required for artistic creation. 
Santner refers to this as what he calls ‘immanent traumatism, a point at which the very 
resources of legitimacy are linked to a power of suspension and disruption’ (Santner, 
2001, p. 41). The notion of ‘betrayal’ used by Client J to explain her activities with the 
telecommunications industry is itself an indication of a perceived difference in selfhood 
(Adkins, 2005). As Percy (2003, p. 145) notes, artistic devices such as crits, tutorials and 
events present ‘a spectacle of performance that conveys much authority and power’. 
However, the relation between the facilitators, partners, professors, students, clients and 
funders is not purely one of domination, but one of individuation, of ‘making up’ 
persons whose ‘relations to themselves are configured within a grid of norms and 
knowledges’ (Rose, 1999, p. 92).  
 
To succeed in this case does not entail following a set of rules, formulas or best 
practices, rather, it entails a display of ‘affectedness’ evident from the students’ 
testimonies. The interview with Client J also adds to these findings, claiming that 
‘staying real’ and ‘being real’ were significant criteria for assessing the value of creativity. 
What I see as the ‘I betrayed my creative self’ variant of enacting creativity is a means of 
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co-constructing business and art as distinctly different. This was evidenced by the claim 
that employment in the business world closes off the ability to think ‘the new’ and to 
insist that the exposure to pain, crisis and failure experienced together with the students 
is evidence of an artistic-creative environment. This points to the fact that the domain 
of examination, testing or the trial becomes an apparatus of self-actualization, which in 
this case can be reformulated as the capacity of the participants to turn an artistic vision 
into their own territorial self-definition. The use of artistic devices such as crits and 
tutorials influence the actions of the individuals showing that the subject cannot be 
separated from the relations and ensembles into which it enters. This approach to 
valuation offers ways in which to understand the process of creation as something 
different from self-realization widely acknowledged as a driver of social value in 
organisations (see for instance Arvidson, 2009).45  
 
The Kafka-Machine  
Instead of referring to an external instance justifying the process of innovation, I have 
demonstrated the way in which a narrative can be enacted, making the experience of 
innovation look like a Kafkaesque universe. Left with these traces of personal 
experiences and the enactment of the fiction of power – how are we then to understand 
innovation? So far the notion of innovation has been performed in and through a 
narrative representing an artistic vision related to the act of differentiation and self-
transformation. Comparing this to a Kafkaesque universe, we see that no cause is given, 
which creates ‘validity without meaning’ (Santner, 2001, p. 39, italics in original) or 
governance without the state (Rose, 1999). This is the theoretical argument behind the 
relation between individuation, technologies and the self. To demonstrate this relation I 
include one more of Kafka’s stories.  
 
In In the Penal Colony (Kafka, 1919) a kind of territorial legitimacy without reference to 
any external instance such as the state, is explored through a fictional representation of 
torture. The story is centred on a machine designed to inscribe the sentence of the 
crime onto the body of the condemned with a multitude of vibrating needles. Subjection 
to this machine is dependent upon the way in which one assigns value to its power, 
                                                
45 In the present case of innovation, the issue of self-actualization does not rely on the assumption of an 
autonomous individual striving for self-realization within an external environment. Rather it is the 
performance of autonomous selfhood that is acted upon in these processes elaborated by the affective, 
interpersonal techniques.  
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which is portrayed towards the end of the story when the officer controlling and 
executing the violence gives himself up to the machine. Let me set out the analogy to 
the case study already here. It becomes clear from the empirical material that it is not so 
much the attempt to access creative forces through critique and pain that creates the 
fear and horror of subjectivation. Rather, as in the functioning of this machine it is 
through the very search for its meaning and legitimization that the students impute a 
value to the one in power (the tutors and partners). Moreover, the desperate search for 
meaning and the attempts to impose a meaning on to the actions and critique enforces a 
struggle, which is retrospectively romanticised by the students themselves. An 
apparatus, or torture-machine is created, which provokes its own reality. Kwinter argues 
that the apparatus in Kafka’s story functions as a machine exactly via its separation from 
an external instance which justify its existence (the state apparatus). In this way, power is 
imposed by a legend, which is evident from an unreadable script, demanded by the 
officer to explain the working of the machine to the explorer and this is what 
constitutes its ‘divine program’ (Kwinter, 2001, p. 202).  
 
The machine has been allegorized as the law inscribing itself on the body, or the 
violence in the very act of writing (Schaffner, 2012). It is through a belief in creativity 
that the students restore a sense of self through a narrative performance by which the 
student can re-establish a sense of continuity and make sense of the events they have 
gone through (such as crits and tutorials and artistic interventions) and impose meaning 
on the actions of the tutors. They are performing an unreadable script, which assigns a 
double role to the participants as both storyteller and protagonist. Kwinter (2001) in 
relation to the writer ‘Franz Kafka’ and the protagonist K. in The Trial explains this role:  
 
The task of Kafka the writer was perhaps no different from that of “K.” the 
land-surveyor in The Castle or the accused in The Trial. It was, on the one hand, 
to chart the topography of this peculiar emergent world, to discover the laws of 
how things combine, and on the other, to trace by trial and error the mysterious 
principle of its functioning. But at the same time no sketch or figure is anywhere 
offered up, unless it be one of those deliberately scrambled and inscrutable 
images like the officer’s blueprints for the inscription apparatus in the Penal 
Colony’. For in Kafka, the task is no longer to trace the visible form of the world 
by recourse to an external schema or representational mode, but to somehow 
espouse its very substance, to become of the world by becoming one with it 
(Kwinter, 2001, p. 107). 
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The invention of the new is not born out of the type of transformation which occurs in 
a linear, progressive manner from one state to another when a challenge or obstacle is 
overcome. Rather, it is in and through the reproduction of that narrative that the 
innovation network is able to sustain itself. In this way, as Kwinter also suggests, a 
narrative is less a medium for the telling of events as it is performative, in the sense that 
it creates the procedure for developing the practical conditions for the enactment of 
innovation.  
 
The currency placed by the client and also the students on this unscripted emotion in 
design and artistic practice can be related to the trend towards the commercialisation of 
feeling (Hochschild, 1983). The study of the students’ reaction to those tools support 
this idea by suggesting that the main criterion of valuation lies in detecting the moments 
of ontological integrity when people are not acting according to explicit rules but are 
apparently ‘transforming themselves’. Not only is the affective status of innovation 
displayed in the crits, but also in the acts, which in the end, ‘authenticate’ the client’s 
actions (cf. Irwin and Michael, 2003, p. 126). 46  
 
The narrative constructed by the students refers not to any kind of ‘progression’, but 
rather, to the breakdown, the crisis and the conflict that carry the process forward. No 
final result was ever approved either by the client or the tutors, and neither was any kind 
of feeling of a successful break-through experienced. Student M reflected on this after 
the final crit: ‘I struggled with the idea until the very end. The night before the crit I just had to do 
something, so it was then the idea was brought to life. I made the presentation just the night before. It 
was all very stressful…’. There is no revelation in this world, no harmonious state where 
the self comes to terms with its environment. It is the documentation of crisis upon 
crisis that is produced as a result. In the penal colony, the condemned is always found 
guilty. The torture machine and the values that were initially associated with it amount 
to a mystical experience characteristic of its very functioning. Power relations are 
rendered unstable as the officer gives himself up to the machine and is transformed 
from omnipotent torturer to helpless victim. The condemned is the one who lets the 
                                                
46 Flexible processes of organisation and new management techniques have in recent critical management 
studies been translated into a Kafkaesque narrative of endless postponement, in relation to issues of self- 
management, evaluation schemes, performance measure etc. See for instance the work of Bernard Stiegler 
(2009), Stefano Harney (2008) and Christopher Grey (1994). In their view, Kafka is to be read as a 
critique of the individual fighting against the state or any larger machine determining its destiny, 
meanwhile forgetting the constitutive or performative aspect of the law or the apparatus making the 
bureaucracy work.  
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killing take place and the observer is guilty of preventing their escape (Schaffner, 2012 p. 
227). Commenting on the universe constructed in Kafka’s writings, Kwinter (2001, p. 
108) notes: ‘The subject – either as protagonist or narrator – is no longer continuous, 
stable, or identical with itself, but is caught in a perpetual, complex, and nearly 
imperceptible process of variation and transformation’. Again, this dimension of the self 
is by no means a pre-existing determination. It is a line of subjectivation as a process, a 
production of subjectivity enacted in and through the apparatus, just as Deleuze defines 
the principle of individuation: ‘… it has to be made, inasmuch as the apparatus allows it 
to come into being or makes it possible’ (Deleuze, 1992, p. 161).47 The artistic devices 
create a domain of power and authority enacted by cross-cutting vectors, which means 
that the client is also being tested in the crits, just as the status of the guru was 
performed by the students themselves.  
 
In this world, neither the students nor the client are to be considered as actors faced 
with an environment external to themselves. An exclusive space in which the 
participants came to exempt themselves (see Chapter 5) is perceived as ‘an “invented 
structure”’ (Scarry, 1985, p. 128) and not a pre-given world to which one can enter as if 
it were naturally given (1985, p. 128). In the interview with Client J, we saw how she 
performed the brief as an outsider in the business world yet she projects onto herself 
this outside in order to stay connected with her creative self. The artistic tools that, in the 
practice of innovation, rendered the process commercially valuable by providing a space 
for self-actualization also mean that the funders and clients themselves generate the 
proof that they need to justify their own participation. In this sense, the reality enacted 
is proven unstable and it seems as if it is the clients themselves who in the end produce 
the ‘creative’ environment in which they invest. This relation between world-making, 
self and creation is lost, or transcended, through the intensity of the process of 
innovation and, in return, does not entail a realization of that self in the creation of 
innovation. Rather, it is through the process of making sense or justifying innovation 
that value is assigned to such processes.  
 
The fact that Client J was a former student and that the students quoted in this thesis 
will be possible future clients indicates that the client cannot by considered an external 
agent to the practices in which they participate. It is by the folding-in of the outside that 
                                                
47 Foucault (1984) refers to the apparatus as made up of intrinsic aesthetic criteria where immanent 
evaluation schemes have replaced transcendental judgement and examination. 
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a field of innovation emerges – that is, how it moves and creates what Director S in 
Chapter 4 framed as ‘a bureaucracy of its own’. The doubleness of innovation, or the 
way in which it moves, is by this folding-in of the outside enacted by artistic critique 
which dismantles the stable constellation and structure of the institutions and 
organisations investing in it. Progress is ensured by the contradiction present in the arts, 
which requires opposition in order to challenge (Horton, 2007). The actualization of 
such an artistic vision, as we saw  in the practical application of Design Critique and the 
Dogma movement, relies on  differentiation, which is played out  as a kind of 
ceremonial event in crits, shows etc. In organising innovation in this way, a tactical 
space is constituted, which proceeds by local interventions (and not global oppositions) 
immanent to the institutional power it aims to subvert or intervene in. It is a mobile 
technology operating in and through the individuals and objects themselves, that is, a 
tool which operates ‘at intimate proximity from within’ (Kwinter, 2001, p. 123). The 
coherence of a world formed and totalised by an external agency is, in this case, replaced 
by a new, internal, and concrete multiplicity. An apparatus that in itself remains silent, is 
constituted in and though principles of individuation, regimes of tutoring, exposure, 
types of normativity and subjectivity – it works without making itself visible.  
 
In this case, the pressure to endlessly differentiate through the act of subversion 
becomes a structuring system in itself (machinic). Derrida (1992, p. 203) writes: ‘The 
present prohibition of the law is not a prohibition in the sense of an imperative 
constraint; it is a difference. When breaking the rules becomes the norm, then the 
machine does not limit itself to distinguishing what is inside from what is outside but 
instead produces a threshold between the two, which enters into the complex relations 
that make the validity of this ‘innovation’ order possible. What they differentiate 
themselves from is less important than the act of differentiation itself. As such, the 
problem of critique is no longer to critique given values – but to create them and Zepke 
(2005, p. 13) writes that ‘critique is the art of creating values’.   
 
Diken and Laustsen (2005, p. 167) write that ‘aesthetic critique seems to have liquefied 
into a post-fordist normative regime of justification, which promotes creativity, 
flexibility and difference’, referring to the principle of individuation whereby the 
undifferentiated tends to become individual or the process through which differentiated 
components become integrated. This coincides with Boltanski and Chiapello’s (1999) 
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theory that any capitalist order is constantly traversed by its own critique. By producing 
an alternative discourse to that of the creative industries, the practices investigated in 
this thesis contribute to the field that they negate. In the camp and the design brief, 
criticism preceded and did not follow justification (Diken and Laustsen, 2005, p. 168; 
Boltanski and Thévernot, 1991). This means that value is what emerges through the 
evaluation that creates it, which is what Zepke (2005, p. 13) refers to as the ‘re-valuation 
of value’. This makes the students’ interpretation an affirmation – evaluation is therefore 
pre-individual and expresses the ‘innovation regime’ in terms of appraisal. Put another 
way, resentment gives birth to values, which means that the machine incorporates its 
own negation into its very functionality. Said differently, what we have seen is a 
machinic assemblage that functions in and through the production and re-production of 
difference. Capitalism, or innovation orchestrated through its own critique, is a 
Kafkaesque irony, or as Deleuze and Guattari (1980) would have said – a schizophrenic 
logic.  
 
Conclusion 
Kafka’s writings, such as The Trial, Before the Law and The Penal Colony, present a 
capitalistic-bureaucratic machine that functions in and through the fiction of power. In 
the case of innovation, artistic tools such as crits, tutorials and events become ordering 
devices which evaluate the affective capacity of the tutors, clients and students. I have 
shown, via the notion of individuation, the way in which the tutors and client buy into 
this practice as an instance of self-actualization. This means that the client generates 
their own ‘results’ or proof of creativity, which justified their participation in the brief. It 
is in this way, I argue, that the market of innovation is not a collective that pre-exists the 
individual players acting within it.  
 
More generally, there is an issue that relates to the importance of individuation for the 
rise of capitalism. Giddens writes that in a capitalist order:  
 
[I]ndividualism becomes extended to the sphere of consumption, the 
designation of individual wants becoming basic to the continuity of the system. 
Market-governed freedom of individual choice becomes an enveloping 
framework of individual self-expression. (Giddens, 1991, p. 197)  
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However, Kwinter’s reading of Kafka has enabled me to take this point further, 
claiming that the process of innovation is a process in which the participants are being 
individuated in and through the environment, which they also constitute. I have 
demonstrated this by analysing the way in which the participants were led to assign 
meaning and value to their conduct, breakdowns, feelings and sensations. In short, it is a 
matter of seeing how the ‘experience’, or performance, of pain came to be constituted in 
and through the experiments in which they took part – a performance that caused the 
individuals to recognize themselves as subjects of ‘creativity’.  
 
What I have attempted to demonstrate in this chapter is that a particular narrative can 
figure, at one time, as the program of a specific artistic practice and, at another time, as a 
means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent. A particular 
narrative may also act to figure as a retrospective re-interpretation of these practices 
stimulating new forms of valuation that reconfigure the relations between art and 
business. This kind of ‘artistic management’ becomes a matter of the management of 
self – the students’ self-perception became an object to be managed. As Kafka (1919, p 
140) states in In the Penal Colony: “It’s a remarkable piece of apparatus”.  
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8. Conclusion: An Inclusive Logic of Differentiation 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Photographic Documentation from Occupy Wall Street, Oct 2011, New York 
 
 
I opened this thesis with a comparison between Price’s installation and the event of  
Occupy Wall Street as it started outside the New York stock exchange in the financial 
district of downtown Manhattan and its relation to Boltanski and Chiapello’s notion of 
artistic critique. What is at stake in these events is the mixing of the values and 
principles associated with the field of art and business – or how those divisions facilitate 
a differential reconfiguration of the economic world. Having investigated a variety of 
practices and techniques by which innovation is produced, I revisit these examples in 
order to make sense of the way in which the art-business relation was accounted for in 
the empirical cases. In doing so, I hope to show that, when analysed in innovation 
practice, the distinctions rely on a great deal on social reasoning in artistic practice, as 
well as in political and social theory.  
 
At the time of writing – a year later – the Occupy Wall Street Movement re-assembles 
outside the NY Stock Exchange. Many scholars now understand the protests as a 
symptom of a hybrid or diverse movement that never really took final shape and that 
appears without any clearly defined aim. Rather, a diverse range of goals have been 
posed producing multiple and contradictory demands (from war oppression to cuts in 
public funding) that do not work according to an overarching ideological standpoint. 
Instead, Occupy Wall Street has been framed as a kind of collective articulation which 
gives voice to a divergent series of protests. Grusin (2011) suggests that Occupy Wall 
Street is ‘a becoming movement, still in a stage of preacceleration or incipient 
movement’, or perhaps put differently, it is what one might call a performative occupation, 
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one that is said to remain in an ongoing process of inventing what a global social and 
political movement could be in the 21st century. Following Escobar and Osterweil 
(2010) it can be understood as a virtual politics, a politics of the ‘not-yet’, posing similar 
critiques against the capitalist domination of the world as the artistic avant-garde. This 
enactment of critique is said to be, by politicians and political commentators, what 
makes Occupy Wall Street a disruption, yet according to Grusin (2011), these 
commentators are ‘trapped within neoliberalism’s calculus “of the rational modern 
subject”’, a logic to which the Occupy movement is said not to compute.  
 
This interpretation of the event resonates with the theories presented in this thesis 
concerning the role of the market, the aestheticization of the economy, social critique 
and new forms of labour. The argument posed by Grusin (2011) is that Occupy Wall 
Street has become a symbol of modern social critique in a capitalist world. What I hope 
to show in this chapter is that a complex logic underwrites the diverse practices of 
boundary-making between the field of art and business. I follow here the links made 
visible by the research at hand in order to answer the overarching questions of the thesis 
presented at the outset: what does an innovation strategy between art and business look 
like? What is its mode of operation? Was there indeed something new and disorienting 
about the forms of knowledge that were practiced? How are capacities for creativity 
being legitimized, how are they being mobilized, and with what effects? Having 
presented the study of innovation from inside the camps, labs and studio-spaces, this 
thesis has yielded many diverse answers that add layers and folds to the study.  
 
Having mapped the territorial configuration of innovation throughout the chapters, it 
should be clear that the thesis, in the context of late capitalism, does not so much 
employ a single geographic perspective as such but, instead, gives an introduction to the 
ways in which critical thought is being applied to artistic techniques and ‘spaces of 
exception’ in their strategic use as devices of innovation. In respect to the sociological 
foundation of this study, I should mention that George Simmel in The Sociology of Conflict 
(1903) has already pointed out the paradox of conflict and friction as being the major, 
perhaps even the principal, mechanism of social inclusion. However, this term might 
indicate here something else than traditionally suggested within social science. The 
notion of integration is not taken as an overarching explanatory category; it is rather 
understood as an operational mechanism that contributes to the differential enactment 
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of this innovation assemblage that occurs on a variety of scales, from the trial of a new 
commercial product or business strategy to the design of an entire market system. The 
title of this thesis – ‘a differential strategy of innovation’ – refers to exactly this point. A 
consideration of this in relation to artistic critique serves to focus on collective 
performance with a self-organising or spatial dimension, which explicitly seeks to break 
away from the kind of rationality that has been proposed by neoclassical economic 
theory (see Chapter 2).  
 
In this concluding chapter, I draw out what the implications this poses for further 
sociological investigations within the field of innovation. I relate the findings from my 
ethnographic studies of the application of artistic techniques as tools of innovation to 
the theoretical debates with which this thesis has engaged. This chapter is in two parts. 
Firstly, I draw a few lines together from the cases to demonstrate the way in which I 
came to consider the artistic critique as both opposed and internal to contemporary 
capitalism, and as enacting a differential strategy of innovation. In so doing, I include 
some considerations on how ethics might also be thought of as an aspect of this 
economic integration. Secondly, I reflect on the way in which sociological research and 
assemblage theory contributes to a critique of creativity. 
 
Occupational Territories 
Throughout the preceding chapters I have demonstrated the assembled strategy of these 
practices posing differentiation as their main challenge. I have encountered a series of 
affective environments that enable specific performances. The landscape that I have 
portrayed in and through these practices does not offer a straightforward and coherent 
scene that can be processed according to spatial and representational conventions 
(within and outside the social sciences). From this it might be concluded that territorial 
relations undergo transformation, globalisation and flexibilization; it is clear in addition 
that they are non-representational or ‘performative’. However, an immediate result from 
the ethnographic studies presented in this thesis is the fact that the crisis of territories 
(cf. Chapter 2) does not coincide with their disappearance. Rather, I have shown their 
productive and social dimensions.   
 
One of the main concerns of this project has been the questioning of the effects and 
uses of the complex and hybrid boundary-making process between art and economic 
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life. In doing so, I have shown how a differential strategy was promoted by an 
orientation towards the affective relations afforded by a specific critical engagement 
(against the capitalist world). Both in the academic literature and in innovation practice 
the ‘art-inside-business’ was enacted as a crucial divide, which also made it a project of 
anti-capitalist engagement.48 I investigated the way in which these differential events 
constitute a self-producing system that performs the economy by giving it an internal 
difference that drives it forward and again feeds back into the capitalistic production of 
value.  
 
In Chapter 4 I described the way in which an artistic vocabulary was introduced into the 
field of business producing an expressive strategy of innovation by differentiating art 
from the industrial world. I introduced this as mapping a kind of grammar of business 
imperatives, an innovation assemblage, where a new territory is marked out or rather 
performed by the mechanisms of inclusion, exclusion, exemption and self-exemption 
which are intimately bound up with new sites of action (such as the formation of camps, 
labs and workshops). The studies of Dogma and Design Critique served as prime 
examples of what it means to look at innovation as process, especially as one that is 
constitutive of economic valuation. In the ethnographic studies, art emerged as a 
privileged site of corporeal experimentation, bodily sensation and affective performance, 
enabling the integration of an aesthetic dimension into business innovation.  
 
Having focused on the inside of such trials, I established some similarities between the 
enactment of various roles that would otherwise be considered to be at the opposite 
ends of the innovation process. Firstly, the issue of funding was considered not only as 
an external requirement outside of the practice itself, but also providing the themes and 
issues to be tested within the labs. Secondly, the art-business distinction is twisted and 
reapplied as the client who represented the business world came to act as an artistic 
tutor imposing constraints upon the students. Chapter 5 also illustrated how rules were 
transformed and used as shifting devices but not absolute imperatives that configured 
and re-configured the relation between the self and the other in terms of friend and 
enemy – which meant that the actors’ position in the game was constantly twisted and 
                                                
48 In Chapter 5, I described the way in which the work-camp applied the artistic tools and devices inspired 
by the Dogma, which have roots back in the French New Wave films that emphasised a critique against 
Hollywood filmmaking. In Chapter 6 I showed that the case of the design brief was inspired by what was 
called Radical Italian Design or Anti-Design.  
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bent. Even the dedicated artistic space was recalibrated – using this same distinction – 
by momentary gestures or utterances, voicings that made the students rethink their own 
relation to those distinctions which create less institutionalised and more spontaneous 
spatial divisions during interaction. As we saw in the final closure of the work-camp 
presented in Chapter 5, the film instructor announced Dogma to be a consequence of 
economic constraints. Again, the economic world was externalised, but at the same time 
this act of externalization also informed the artistic practice of experimental filmmaking. 
In this way, the outside is folded into the setting – recalibrated – and becomes a 
constitutive element. This practice of the folding-in of the outside has informed many 
of the chapters in this thesis and raises a new set of ethical concerns that I have, so far, 
left undeveloped. 
 
In Chapter 5 I showed how the camp’s physical confinement, the rigidly structured 
tasks and the dramaturgical events were organised in order to facilitate a mode of 
embodied activity. The spatial-temporal constitution of these spaces was designed in 
order to enable a transgression of dominant social norms and orders. The key focus was 
an investigation of how such relational structures were variously staged, materially and 
semiotically, including the collective emotional investment inscribed upon bodies (via 
rituals, scripted actions and conflicts) and the performances that served to generate 
accounts about such events. As Irwin and Michael (2003, p. 119) note, in relation to the 
public understanding of science, aspects of this connect the assemblage with 
sociological traditions including ethnomethodology. In Chapter 5, I explored this in 
relation to the notion of reflexivity defined as the ‘consideration of the processes by 
which the participants organize and access the ‘rationality’ of their own activities’ 
(Pollner, 1991, p. 371).  
 
Identifying these links between assemblage theory and ethnomethodology opened up 
new ways of questioning how particular events and their effects are performed and 
made manifest through artistic tools or devices and their impact on the shaping of such 
accounts. Moreover, this view rendered the transformative capacity of such spaces 
visible, or rather showed how emotional intensification and creative interaction happen 
through the focus on personal traumas, crisis and beliefs (cf. Chapter 6). An affective 
environment was created in which the tutors came to be subjects of the experiment as 
well.  I was denied access and, at the same time, included as a participant within the 5-
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week design process, as well as being considered an internal spy by the tutors, which in 
turn produced the enactment of a kind of mutual victimization (cf. Chapter 6). Chapter 
4 and 7 of this thesis brought together the discussion on the ’trial’ as an experimental 
tool that tested the limits of de-subjectivation and thus demonstrates the 
deterritorializing forces of innovation. This was also seen in the design brief with the 
promotion of reality-destroying techniques, which enacted moments of unmaking. To 
recall Chapter 2, Parr (2005, p. 67) defines the process of deterritorialization as the 
‘transformative vector of a territory’, that is, a process of ‘coming undone’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1972, p. 322). Thus, spaces that are associated with the business world can be 
turned into artistic ones by folding gestures (i.e. the cry, the scream and the critique), 
which re-territorializes in turn divides as those gestures were retrospectively re-narrated 
as creative. These are the processes of stabilization and destabilization that define the 
connectivity of this as an innovation assemblage, which again gives rise to new ways of 
folding art into business. The conceptualisations of crisis and conflict as tools of 
innovation, in turn, share the same topological property where internally constructed 
divisions or boundary-making practices are what holds the experimental field together, 
that is, a form for connectivity promoting economic integration.49  
 
It was the enactment of critique within the crits, tutorials and interventions that 
differentially produced the links that tied the participants to the practice. This seems 
particularly true when looking in detail at the utilization of artistic devices and the way in 
which affect seems to act as a resource of innovation. The emotional performances, 
crisis and breakdown were played out at the scene as part of the creative evaluation of 
the process of innovation. The integration of the technicity or machinic functioning of such 
devices into a study of innovation rendered another fold: one’s relation to oneself, or 
the affect of self on the self (Deleuze, 1986, p. 101). It is such differential relations that I 
paid attention to as they were actualized in and through artistic techniques as tools of 
innovation. In this way, an inside is hollowed out and constitutes its own industrial 
territory that not only enables, but also depends on a highly self-reflexive exercise 
including the basic human capacities, such as the ability to be affected, thought, 
expression and relationality.  
                                                
49 The innovation produced in the camps, labs and studio workshops did not consist of producing new 
products to create economic value when realised in a  ‘pre-existing’ market. It was not the poetic objects 
invented in the design brief or the business strategy for Evoke invented in the work-camp that led to the 
creation of value for the client. 
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What makes those spaces disturbingly violent is this subtle interplay between the power 
of fiction and its reality conferring aspect, which acts to unleash and actualise the 
potentially valuable activities of the participants. It is in this way that these spaces might 
be considered as topological in nature. They engage the participants, students, clients, 
organisers and funders in processes of mutual affection in which the artistic idea, social 
relationships and the environment itself are brought into being. A new kind of work 
ethic – a kind of neo-management – is proposed that embraces what Thrift (2005) has 
claimed as an ‘exploratory mode of capitalism’, one in which differentiations give rise to 
new oppositions and, in turn, transform the ethics of ethical values.50   
 
In all this the sense of self – embodied, social and political – undergoes some interesting 
shifts while forming an integral part of economic change. This is not to be understood 
as the ‘entrepreneurial self’, which Rose (1989; 1996) writes about and in a Foucauldian 
sense takes as the figure of neoliberalism – a figure through which the human is turned 
into capital. This account of the self relies on autonomous subjectivity where one is self-
motivated, self-reflexive and consciously organising a life-project which, according to 
Heelas and Morris (1992), are the characteristics that define the individual’s choice, 
accountability and responsibility and are at the core of an ‘entrepreneurial culture’. 
Instead, the folded self, as defined in this thesis, is not ‘controlled by’ economic 
development or embedded within specific performative regimes. It is a self that is 
generated and is generative of the environment in and through which it was also 
produced.51 More generally, Kwinter (2001, p. 171) emphasises this logic as a process 
‘twice cleaved: first as a subject distinct from a world become an instrumental, exterior 
object; and then, once this exterior has been introduced into our world, we are able to – 
                                                
50 This is closer to Isabelle Stengers (1997) critique of scientific experiments than Arvidsson’s claim about 
an ethical economy. The repurposing of art when utilized as a tool of innovation is a production of value 
or ethics. According to Arvidsson, Bauwens and Peitersen (2008), in the realms of late capitalism and 
post-Fordist production, ethical values are beyond the moral codes of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in order to define 
what he calls an ‘ethical economy’. He grounds this argument on the democratization of value, which he 
claims has happened due to diversification of various orders of worth and immaterial production. Rather, 
the divide between good and bad is what has been twisted, and re-enacted in practice. Stengers writes that 
such experiments created torturers in the name of science – meaning that the ethical values have been 
twisted, bent and stretched in the course of innovation. Thus, the aim has been to investigate how the 
divide between what was encountered as good and bad, art and business was utilized as a powerful tool in 
generating economic profit. This was investigated as the ‘revaluation of value’ in Chapter 7.  
51 The experimental trial produces an act of folding different from sociological accounts of the 
entrepreneurial self which rely on more individualistic accounts of the self, such as self-control or self-
relation as in ‘self-made’. What I aim to show is that the folded self is always constructed in affective 
relations that are generated and generative of its environment.   
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and do – see ourselves from the outside as also distinct, that is, as an Other’. A folded 
self is enacted in and through differential relations externalising the business world and 
again re-enacting a new set of binary oppositions associated with the world of art and 
business.  
 
These accounts (or folds) demonstrate a shift where self-performance comes to be a 
source of legitimization and the site of the creation of value rather than the self being 
authorised by external institutions, such as the company or the market. As I suggested 
in Chapter 7, this is a kind of government without the state – producing an ethics which 
is at the heart of late capitalism: it is the source of value production, of legitimization, of 
culture itself. Furthermore, the theorisation of conflict as a means of ideation and the 
declaration of innovation as a viral or anti-capitalistic movement makes it look as if a 
topology structure is produced (Marres 2012; Allen, 2011).  
 
Behind this spatial politics is an appraisal of mystification and strangeness where art is 
taken as a tool to access affective and potentially creative forces. I refer here to 
sociological critiques of capitalism as outlined in Chapter 2, which tend to favour  
conflict and crisis as a kind of aesthetic violence that gives access to hidden and virtually 
valuable creative forces. However, to include folds, the self and subjectivity in the study 
of innovation is not to conclude that art is able to transport the participants to an 
elsewhere; instead, it is to look at the utilisation of artistic methods and techniques in 
producing multiple ways of folding the world into the self, which meshes with what 
Clough (2007, p. 25) has called an ‘affect economy’. As such, capital produces its own 
outside from inside what Clough (2007, p. 25) calls ‘the viscera of life’, accumulating at 
the level of pre-individual bodily capacities and putting those capacities to work. On the 
one hand, artistic innovation seeks to make possible and profitable the utilization of the 
affects performed in and through the crits, tutorials and interventions. On the other 
hand, the processes of production, aestheticization and capitalization are changed as 
they become directly engaged in modulating affectivity – and a creative apparatus 
emerges as economic potentia, a sensed production of the world that reconstitutes the 
conditions of innovation.  
 
In the established categories which define art from business (outlined in Chapter 2), art 
is seen as either being instrumentalized by business or posing a critique against the 
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business world. As emphasised in Chapter 1, others have contrasted, denied and 
opposed such a divide, emphasizing a hybridization of the art-business relation. 
However, to account for the art-business relation in terms of unstable boundaries tends 
to subordinate such divisions to a single dichotomy. Such an ultimatum seems to miss 
the more intimate or local orderings – folds and differentiations – that are 
indistinguishable from the outside but by which they are produced. That is to say, the 
art-business relation is not to be derived from overarching political strategies or 
macroeconomic models but something that is being worked out from ‘those ‘micro’ 
experiences and experience-laden values’ which serve to perform relatively radical forms 
of change (Heelas, 2008, p. 208). 
 
In this regard, the notion of assemblage suggests that we must be wary of 
oversimplifications when analysing the organisation of innovation practice. To think in 
terms of assemblages is to be sensitive to the way in which fictions, promises, visions 
and rituals themselves play a crucial role in contrasting, opposing and denying specific 
(economic) realities. Furthermore, the critique given in crits, tutorials and interventions 
in one context seemed to appear as unethical violation of the students and the tutors 
perception of reality resulting in a huge amount of stress, anxiety and confusion. In 
other events it was justified as part of artistic creation. I include this aspect to note that 
the folded self is part of an embodied practice where unethical actions are justified in 
the name of innovation and artistic creativity, which give rise to a specific ontology of 
innovation – a kind of ethics of the unethical. At the same time the unification of the 
dichotomies between art and business also harbour an indifference to the act of critique 
as it is enacted, performed and provoked in practice. This aspect of innovation and its 
potential for critique in relation to the process of capitalization leads me to the second 
part of this chapter. 
 
Critique and its Folds 
An important aspect of the present version of critique concerns its entanglement in 
practice. To lay the groundwork for the chapters on the cases themselves, I heuristically 
divided the text into two parallel narratives. I did so in order to account for the 
criticality invoked by a specific use of artistic practice, that is, one that stems from some 
of the more radical avant-garde groups of the twentieth century, such as Oulipo and the 
Situationists. I divided the text in order to keep this heritage in sight while untangling 
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the ethnographic accounts of its application in practice. This process of doubling is one 
that informs the analysis of the consequences of artistic critique when applied to 
business and challenges the relation between representation and data in social science. 
The artistic ideas explained in the subtext, and their enactment in practice explained in 
the main text, point to innovation as a transformational practice continuously re-defining 
the dominant values and techniques within the study of innovation. I conclude that this 
is an ever-changing logic of innovation re-forming what creativity may look like, as well 
as dictating what a sociological study can illuminate with its ethnographic techniques. 
Firstly I explain this point with reference to its sociological entanglement and I then 
return to the duality of the design of this study.  
 
My participation in and observation of this practice in itself afforded yet another layer of 
the act of folding. This was most evident in my meeting with practitioner N, who 
changed the interview setting to a testing site, informing his practice of innovation and 
turning me into his informant. In this way, I have shown that even to enter or leave the 
assemblage, to be in it or to distance myself from it, were all components of its 
construction. The feeling it involved to contact, to reject, to ask for permission, to gain 
access and again to be restricted from participation is all part of the assemblage, 
changing the orderings and dis-orderings of its stability. Methods, in this case are as 
much about acting on the boundary as it is about describing it.   
 
More specifically, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, innovation is a relational construction 
where the outside of one practice might comprise the inside of another. In my meeting 
with Director S, I was suddenly included in this innovation assemblage, which mediated the 
connections and collaboration between various practices. However, at a later point in 
time she considered me as a spy sent from the other innovation practice. Relations were 
performed and did not stay the same. I was put under observation and enacted as a 
subject of innovation. However, it is important to note that I was included even in my 
capacity as an outsider. In this world, there was no stable model or point of reference 
that would make those relations interchangeable and unite them in a division assignable 
to an outside observer. The way in which I was considered to be an internal spy by 
some of the tutors during the design brief (see Chapter 6) is a case in point. One does 
not see the object (and its relations) from a distance in a performative space like this. 
There was no transparent view from where to observe the practices I studied, rather a 
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sociological study of innovation became a matter of working on the border challenging 
the relation between the inside and outside, exclusion and inclusion. I was never outside 
any more than I was within. Those considerations gave rise to some of the 
methodological questions that I have dealt with throughout this thesis: what can an 
ethnography of innovation tell us about artistic critique and what can it teach us about 
its constitutive practices and theoretical principles?  
 
Before directly answering this question, I stay with the notion of assemblage for a little 
longer. The kind of assemblages that I have investigated in this thesis do not refer to a 
reality outside of themselves, but have acted upon oppositional or antagonized 
structures – they were, so to speak, constructed by differentiation or the act of the 
folding in of an outside produced in and through its own performative practice. The 
fold is a technology produced by the utilisation of artistic devices in the production of 
the new. Incorporating non-humans into innovation studies shows the materiality 
behind the myths, rituals and stories, which are utilized as resources of innovation. This 
is one way of doing empirical philosophy (cf. Adkins and Lury, 2009) informed by the 
new anthropological approaches and their practices found in STS or what Clough (2009, 
p. 47) has named an ‘expanded empiricism’.52  
 
Such a study cuts across and blurs conventional sociological registers and poses a 
critique of typical accounts of subjectivity that presume a simple divide between the 
interior and the exterior.53 This study shows that the enactment of innovation entails a 
process of territorialization, characterized as the fixation or stabilization of relations that 
generate particular differentiations where the inside is nothing more than a fold of the 
outside (Deleuze, 1986). This is not a spatial construction where the one field (either art 
or business) could be understood as context and thus as an explanatory device for the 
                                                
52 In order to respond with an adequate method to this idea of an ‘expanded empiricism’, Clough (2009, 
p. 47) calls for the use of performative methods. Throughout the empirical chapters I have aimed to show 
how the use of traditional ethnographic methods, such as interviews and participant observation, enable a 
kind of intervention which is central to the modulation of affect. At the same time I have considered the 
performative aspect of such methods as they have been entangled with the self-organizing capacity central 
to the logic of innovation, subjectivity and contemporary modes of governance.  
53 This means a kind of subjectivity that does not rely on a subject that stands in relation to an object, as a 
phenomenological approach would suggest. The point that follows from Chapter 3 on the 
methodological implications of the study of affect, is that the fold is not to be understood as the 
phenomenological doubleness of a body that stands in oppositional relation to things and a perceiver of these 
things. Equally, things are not reduced to our perception of them (cf. Harman, 2009, p. 104-105). Rather, 
the fold is to be understood as a relational concept that includes the relation to oneself (which are both 
constitutive of and mediated by objects or things).  
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other (cf. Riles, 2001, p. 69) – there exists no clear category of creativity and capitalism 
that conform to the current criticism of either new forms of capitalism or to the 
instrumentalism of art, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Neither does there exist first a field 
of capital from which creativity is then produced. Instead, I have looked at the way in 
which this folding or doubling of spatial relations composes in itself a field or industry 
of innovation. I take this point further to conclude that the process of innovation itself 
is a kind of fold – the folding in of what is also negated. That is to say, the practice of 
innovation as it happened in Dogma and Design Critique differentiates itself from other 
forms of innovation by the use of a specific artistic logic (explained in the subtext in 
each chapter). In this way, the field site came to be indistinguishable from the objects 
that it contained, the relations through which they circulated and the market in which 
they might have been embedded.54 Such relations have been covered by the notion of 
‘machinic assemblage’, which according to Clough (2007, p. 12) ‘connects and 
convolutes the disparate in terms of potential fields (crossing the usual thresholds 
between scales)’. Put differently, such a field was characterised by a differential topology 
– the kind of geometry that is not embedded within, but enacts an occupational territory 
produced in and through a range of divisions that tend to repeat themselves across 
scales (from the self to the construction of an entire market system).  
 
The utilization of art or the process of aestheticization (Lazzarato, 2008) has 
transformed the logic of innovation into a form of sociality characteristic of 
contemporary economic life and practice. The camp performed a space in which the 
exemption would only be a temporary break in an unforgiving motion towards the next 
demanding phase, staging yet another conflict. The result of this study is not to propose 
a response to a new stage in a progressive development, where the conflict is seen as a 
externality, anomalous to social life or economic development. This is perhaps even 
more explicitly expressed by Diken and Laustsen (2005), who, with reference to Simmel, 
point to the spatial formation of innovation as a form of sociality including antagonistic 
values, friction and conflict as internal to its constitution. The task has, therefore, not 
been to trace a visible (or representational) form of innovation and its industry with 
reference to an external schema or representational mode, but somehow to expose its 
operation; that is, to propose a territorial construction of innovation not defined by a 
                                                
54 For the sake of clarification, Durie (2006, p 179) explains the concept of topology thus: ‘Like 
Riemannian geometry, topology deals with surfaces of figures as spaces in themselves, rather than from 
the perspective of the space within which they might be embedded.’  
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network of relations between stable entities that are to be mapped out as they cut across 
pre-given boundaries between art and business. The spaces are not held together in a 
formal network identified by the territorial occupation of land but by their performative 
capacities, by the activities and investments they at once promote and enable.55 
 
In summary, the form of innovation that I have described involves a folding or 
doubling of the object of study and its analysis. The further this study has enquired into 
the reasons ‘behind’ the enactment of innovation, the techniques applied, the responses 
which they have produced and the reasoning by which the participants made sense of 
the events, the more difficult it became to reach a definitive answer as to how to 
measure the effect of introducing art into business or capitalization of the artistic world.  
 
Like Occupy Wall Street, it is not just a single distinction that is imposed. Therefore, it is 
not possible to understand artistic critique as a single opposition or outside to current 
innovation studies. At the same time this study cannot be reduced to a single dichotomy 
such as the ‘creative industries’ or the ‘cultural economy’ that assumes the inclusion of a 
field ‘creativity’ or ‘culture’ into the economic world. In the ethnographic studies I have 
demonstrated how the distinction between art and business was reproduced repeatedly 
by projecting it onto smaller scales (de-selving) and broader ones (the industry). In the 
case on Design Critique, the students’ knowledge or descriptions of their experiences of 
the innovation process turn back into the setting of this practice as a constitutive facet 
of its organisation. The reality of the design practice is constituted by the students’ 
reflection on themselves and subsequent enactment of pain accompanied by the tutors’ 
professionalization, which reinforces the co-constitution of the norms and rules by 
which the students’ engagement is guided as they are directed towards a critical 
orientation against the corporate world. Through recursivity each of these parts can 
then be re-categorized again, so that an initial division between art and business gives 
rise to subsequent splits within the field of the ethnographic material that a sociological 
                                                
55 By territorial occupation of land I refer to the way in which an industry is often defined by external 
measures of scale, (or stable relations between fixed entities). In Chapter 4, I explained that the territory 
of innovation is constructed in and through a funding context, which acts as a configuration against 
which these practices define the notion of innovation and at the same time justify their value. It is in this 
way that the use of assemblage theory offers a different interpretation than the one proposed by studies 
of actor-network theory. Harman (2009, p. 30) argues that actor-networks are made of ‘individual actors, 
events fully deployed at each instant, free of potency or other hidden dimensions lying outside their sum 
of alliances in any given moment’. According to these characteristics, actor-network theory tells nothing 
about the process of actualization (cf. Chapter 7) as in actor network theory everything is always 
empirically present.   
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study itself has brought to life.56 In this way, critical ethnography contributes to the 
boundary-making practice which constitutes new sets of divisions. It is not the same art-
business in each subdivision, as even though the same co-constituting contrast of art 
and business is retained, a partial transformation takes place on each folding.  
 
As I have also shown, by reflecting on the dual structure of the empirical chapters, 
sociological writing itself enacts yet another set of oppositions (between data and its 
representation in the written text), which tend to repeat themselves across scales. Firstly, 
the artistic ideas of Dogma and Design Critique differentiate themselves from other 
artistic fields. Secondly, those ideas are then translated into business by producing 
differential oppositions – excluding the realities that were also experimentally tested. 
This differentiation is exactly what attracts business clients and funders to the practice, 
which produces yet another set of differences. It was in order to keep this continuous 
double in sight, that I divided the two ethnographic chapters into two parallel narratives. 
The text was in itself folded between an ethnographic account and a representation of 
the critique this account was said to emerge out of.  
 
This thesis has presented the logic of innovation as an inclusive differentiation, that is, 
as a logic where undifferentiated space progressively differentiates, eventually giving rise 
to actualised structures or machines as I explored in Chapter 7. I have emphasised the 
way in which this enactment of space acts as a progressive strategy for innovation, 
informing the current debate around innovation. Taking into account the spatio-
temporal dynamics of innovation illuminated a topological logic, that is, a spatial 
construction in which art cannot be distinguished from capitalistic production but rather 
entails a mutual reconfiguration of space (or boundary-making). This logic has been 
mapped out as a movement between de- and re-territorialization in this thesis. The 
argument is that innovation is an effect of that pattern and not a condition outside of 
the practice observed. It is therefore difficult to distinguish an outside from where to 
conduct sociological analysis. One could say that reality is an effect of the specific 
assemblage and not external to it (Riles, 2001, p. 22). This study is in itself performative 
in the sense that it feeds into a logic by which the practice of innovation keeps 
                                                
56 I have divided the text into two narratives in order to reflect upon the impossibility of taking sides and 
the endless boundary-making practice in ethnographic writing. In the design of this study, I have 
attempted to acknowledge the folding of the relation between social data and its discursive or textual 
representation.   
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reinventing itself. Or perhaps to put it differently, it is a movement, one that is said to 
remain in an ongoing process of inventing what innovation can be on the horizon of so-
called ‘late capitalism’, which defines economic relations in the 21st century.  
 
A Little More on Those Folds 
To sum up, this thesis has used a relational account to link theory to real-world events 
and has developed a praxis for future research based on a sociology of critique rather 
than binary oppositions – whether denied, upheld or provoked – which have dominated 
many of the debates concerning the creation of value and innovation. I have looked into 
processes of innovation in order to untangle the art-business relation and have posed a 
critique of the simplification of what was, in practice, complexly recursive. Informed by 
tendencies within economic sociology, combined with aspects of STS, I hope at least to 
have highlighted some of my concerns in attempting to provide a critical account of 
innovation beyond post-structuralist critiques. Throughout the last chapters, I have 
attempted to provide detailed information regarding artistic devices and techniques and 
how they operate. However, I have only looked at some particular practices, and some 
of these have been the most contentious or radical practices within this field of 
innovation. Other artistic encounters could have been investigated and further empirical 
data could have brought about a different result studying the entanglement between art 
and the field of innovation. I could have chosen less extreme or more conventional 
cases to broaden the study in order to see if one might find similar kinds of orderings 
and to what effect. There are many avenues of research and empirical fields which have 
not been taken.  
 
As I have argued earlier on, my primary aim has not been to produce a commentary on 
the contemporary debates about the evaluation of the effects of innovation – to judge in 
a binary fashion if something is innovative or not but to understand the ethics that it 
produces. Neither have I tried to develop a normative frame or description of how to 
innovate, or to reveal the truth or hidden insights from inside innovation practice. 
Instead, the aim has been to question how innovation, when considered a performative 
practice, could be articulated with ethnographic techniques. This research has been 
guided by a more open-ended question on the prevailing social form and production of 
the new and a desire to empirically follow how ideas are translated into practical action. 
Due to the scope of this study, my primary aim has been to provide detailed 
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information about particular artistic techniques and devices as they were utilised as 
sources of innovation. The focus of this thesis has been on the particular encounters 
between anti-capitalistic critique, artistic practice and innovation and its consequences 
for the way in which we tend to understand the creation of economic value.  
 
The connectivity between the practices I have encountered was not one to be 
choreographed according to regimen or calculated rules (as in neoclassical economic 
models) but enacted in the making or differentiation of an outside. I have mapped the 
contours of an emerging industry characterised by the act of folding. The notion of the 
assemblage offers a possibility to grasp such a politics of the not-yet or, in Deleuzian 
terms, the becoming movement of specific innovation practices, which cannot be 
subsumed under the neoclassical model of the market. The notion of topology offers a 
way in which to consider the complex operation of innovation defined by the acts of 
folding as a new kind of metric. Furthermore, this strikes me as an important topic to be 
developed in future research subsequent to this thesis. Every threshold, between inside 
and outside, old and new, fiction and reality contributes to the boundary-making of a 
domain legitimised by the perspective of its performative capacity.   
 
In the cases presented, the potential for differentiation or the act of folding was 
embodied in a diversity of techniques, such as critique, public humiliation, physical 
locations and time restraints, which produced altogether certain types of visibility, 
exposure and display. Furthermore, regimes of supervision and tutorials enabling 
personal interaction were assembled and infused with the aim of governing capacities 
and actions. Such interventionist assemblages are far more complex than explained by 
the nature of domination, which is so brilliantly portrayed in Kafka’s universe. For 
instance, in The Trial (Kafka, 1925) the character K. is not the symbol of the re-
integration back into society of an exempted or asocial individual, but an effect of their 
entanglement in an individual’s own processual or generative self-creation. It is from 
here that I have developed a critical contribution to the study of innovation as an 
intermingling between creativity and capitalism. This thesis has pointed toward 
innovation as a temporary construction of freely navigable and mobile spaces that in 
themselves create a form of social subjection that establishes new scales of thresholds 
and effects. Indeed, contemporary innovation might be understood as precisely a 
topology of such folds.  
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